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THREE ESSAYS ON SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
Georgios Katsenos, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
This dissertation examines the reasons for which a seller may decide to conduct a multi-
unit auction sequentially rather than simultaneously. It analyzes the manner in which the
information generated during a sequential auction can affect bidding to the seller’s benefit
and demonstrates the requirement of intertemporal commitment to the auction rules.
When the seller cannot commit not to alter the reserve price over time, the bidders
are reluctant to reveal their valuations. Therefore, with single-unit demands, a symmetric
monotone equilibrium exists only in a sequential Dutch auction. In the earlier rounds of
this auction, because of the anticipation of lower reserve prices in the future, some buyers
prefer not to submit a bid, although their valuations exceed the requested reserve price.
Furthermore, any buyer submitting a bid shades it sharply. Consequently, under imper-
fect commitment, the optimal sequential auction results in lower expected revenue than its
simultaneous counterpart.
In the presence of allocative and informational externalities, in particular, in a sale of two
oligopoly licenses, a sequential auction succeeds in eliminating some of the payoff uncertainty
by allocating the licenses in an ordered manner, according to the bidders’ strength. There-
fore, the weaker oligopolist can acquire his license at a lower price than the one he would pay
in a simultaneous auction. In addition, he can avoid overpaying. Conversely, the stronger
oligopolist pays a higher price, so that, when the bidders’ production costs are independent,
the two auction schemes generate the same expected revenue. Therefore, without affecting
the seller’s revenue or efficiency objectives, the sequential auction results in a more equal
distribution of the wealth generated by the oligopoly.
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Finally, when the preparation or submission of bids is costly, so that a buyer will not
enter the auction unless he expects a substantial gain from it, low prices in the earlier rounds
of a sequential sale trigger stronger participation, and, consequently, higher prices in the
later rounds. A sequential auction, therefore, may result in higher expected revenue than a
simultaneous sale, especially when the number of potential bidders is large, the participation
cost small, or the distribution of valuations convex.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2.0 OPTIMAL RESERVE PRICES IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
WITH IMPERFECT COMMITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 General Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Optimal Sequential Auctions under Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Sequential Dutch Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Sequential Sealed-Bid and English Auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Imperfect Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.0 SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
OF OLIGOPOLY LICENSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 General Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Market Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3.1 Cournot Oligopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.3.2 Bertrand Oligopoly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.3 General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 No Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4.1 Simultaneous Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.2 Sequential Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
v
3.4.3 Comparison of Auction Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5 Positive Signaling: Cournot Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5.1 Simultaneous Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.5.2 Sequential Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.5.3 Comparison of Auction Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Negative Signaling: Bertrand Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6.1 Simultaneous Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6.2 Sequential Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.0 SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS WITH PARTICIPATION COSTS . . . . . 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Simultaneous Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.4 Sequential Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5 Revenue Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.0 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
APPENDIX. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A Proofs for Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
B Proofs for Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
C Proofs for Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
vi
LIST OF FIGURES
4.1 Participation Thresholds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2 Expected Seller’s Revenue for N = 10. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Difference in the Expected Seller’s Revenue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4 Revenue Effects of Convexity for N = 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
vii
PREFACE
I wish to express my deepest feelings of gratitude to my supervisor, professor Andreas Blume.
Throughout the course of my doctorate study, he offered me his advice in the most generous
manner; and at the same time, he granted me plenty of freedom, so as to learn to work,
especially to develop my ideas, in an independent manner. He is a role model for me, an
example to follow in the future. Indeed, I consider myself most fortunate to be his student.
In addition, I would like to thank the members of my PhD committee, professors Oliver
Board, Esther Gal-Or, Paul J. Healy and Jack Ochs. They patiently read my papers and
listened to my presentations; and their insightful comments, in particular, their challenges
of my assumptions and their inquiries upon the validity of my insights, forced me to sharpen
my earlier arguments as well as to investigate new directions. Much of their advice has been
incorporated to this dissertation. The rest of it will be the subject of future research.
Some of the material on my dissertation has received the benefit of being discussed
in various conferences and university seminars. Chapter 2 was presented in the Fall 2005
Midwest Economic Theory Conference, at the University of Kansas. Chapter 3 was presented
at the universities of Bielefeld, Hannover and St Andrews. I wish to thank the audiences of
my presentations and the people who invited me.
Financial support from the Department of Economics and the School of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Pittsburgh is gratefully acknowledged.
Finally, now that my formal education is about to be concluded, I cannot escape lapsing
momentarily into nostalgia, remembering my earliest years at school and the people who
either supported or simply accompanied me in my first efforts to learn. During these years,
I have had the good fortune to be in an environment that encouraged idealism. No doubt,
its influence has been a long lasting one.
viii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Several multi-unit sales are typically conducted by means of sequential auctions, carried out
either in rapid succession or over long periods of time. For example, wine, art, condominium
units, used cars, agricultural products and fish are often auctioned sequentially. On internet
auction sites, sellers often auction in a sequence many units of the same consumer product.
Furthermore, procurement contracts are also auctioned sequentially, as the need for each
project arises. Finally, the recent radio spectrum auction in the United States, as well as
similar spectrum auctions in numerous other countries, was conducted by means of a dynamic
procedure.1
The present dissertation examines the reasons for which a seller may decide to organize
a sequential rather than a simultaneous auction, or vice versa. In particular, it compares
the performance of these two auction formats in three different environments:
a. When the seller cannot commit not to alter the auction rules over time.
b. In the presence of allocative and informational externalities.
c. When the bidders face costs of preparing or submitting their bids.
In each case, a symmetric monotone equilibrium for the sequential auction is constructed,
its properties are analyzed and its outcome is compared to that of a similar equilibrium for
the simultaneous auction.
1The examples mentioned here have been documented by numerous empirical studies. Sequential auctions
of wine have been studied by Ashenfelter [2] and Ginsburgh [36]; art, by Pesando [83], Beggs and Graddy
[8] and Ashenfelter and Graddy [4, 5, 6]; real estate, by Ashenfelter and Genesove [3]; cars, by Genesove [34]
and Raviv [85]; Dutch roses, by van den Berg et al. [9]; dairy cattle, by Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [25];
and fish, by Pezanis-Christou [84]. Sequential auctions on the internet have been studied, among others, by
Zeithammer [97]. The procurement of highway paving contracts in California has been analyzed by Jofre-
Bonet and Pesendorfer [54]. Finally, the radio spectrum auctions in the United States have been surveyed
by Cramton [18, 19]; for similar auctions in Europe, see Jehiel and Moldovanu [47] and Klemperer [61].
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In all of the above settings, we assume that there is a fixed number of identical objects
being put for sale as well as a fixed number of potential buyers. Each buyer has single-unit
demand and no time preference over the sequence of auctions. Finally, the buyers’ private
information is distributed identically, in a statistically independent manner. These general
assumptions, which are typical of much of the literature on sequential auctions, describe
realistically some of the real-world problems that we wish to analyze. In other problems,
they can be accepted only as a compromise between realism and tractability. When such a
compromise is not necessary, relaxing these assumptions can be the subject of future research.
In the case of imperfect intertemporal commitment, studied in chapter 2, the buyers
are concerned about the consequences of revealing, by means of their bids, information
to the seller. Therefore, a symmetric monotone equilibrium can be constructed only in a
sequential Dutch auction. In this equilibrium, the seller lowers the second-period reserve
price, according to the outcome of the first auction. Anticipating the seller’s second-round
behavior, several buyers prefer not to bid for the first object, even though their valuation
exceeds the requested reserve price. Because of this reduction in competition, any buyer
willing to submit a first-period bid shades it sharply. Consequently, the optimal sequential
auction results in lower expected seller revenue than its simultaneous counterpart (or the
sequential auction with commitment to the optimal reserve-price schedule). In addition to
justifying the use of a simultaneous sale, this conclusion may also explain the adoption by
the seller of costly commitment measures, such as the signing of a formal contract or the
employment of a neutral auctioneer.
Chapter 3 compares a sequential and a simultaneous auction of two oligopoly licenses.
Since the value of each license depends on the identity of both winners as well as on the
information revealed by the wining bids, these are auctions with allocative and informational
externalities. The sequential procedure creates two informational effects, both of which are
absent from the simultaneous sale. First, the revelation of the first-round winning bid allows
the remaining firms to form better estimates of their valuations. Thus, the possibility of
overpayment by the winner, that is, of acquiring a license at a price that exceeds its revealed
value, is eliminated. Second, by allocating the licenses in an ordered manner, according
to the winners’ strength, the sequential auction appends the first license with the promise
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of a stronger market presence, a promise that is realized on the equilibrium path; and it
sells the second license along with the knowledge of weaker market presence. As a result,
relative to the simultaneous auction, the bidders compete more aggressively for the first
license; and less aggressively for the second one. Therefore, in the sequential auction, the
stronger of the two oligopolists acquires his license at a higher price than the one he would
pay in the simultaneous auction; while the weaker oligopolist pays a lower price. Eventually,
the two auctions result in the same expected seller revenue and market outcome. Hence,
without affecting the sellers’ revenue or efficiency objectives, the sequential auction succeeds
in distributing more equally the wealth created by the oligopoly.
The information revealed by the first-round bids turns out to affect the seller’s revenue
when the bidders face costs of preparing or submitting their bids, the problem studied in
chapter 4. In this environment, a buyer will not participate in the auction, unless he expects
a substantial gain from it. In equilibrium, therefore, each buyer adopts a cut-off strategy,
according to which he enters the auction if and only if his valuation for the object exceeds
a certain threshold. In a sequential auction, low prices in the earlier rounds can result in
stronger participation and, consequently, higher prices in the later rounds. On the other
hand, because of the opportunity of delaying one’s entry, the first-round participation rate is
lower than that of a simultaneous auction. The first effect turns out to be more important,
so that the sequential auction can generate a higher expected revenue for the seller, in many
cases, especially when the number of potential bidders is large, the participation cost small
or the distribution of the buyers’ valuations convex.
Primarily, this dissertation shows how the information present in a sequential (but not
in a simultaneous) auction can affect bidding to the seller’s benefit. In particular, two
informational effects are identified, a direct one, originating from the information revealed by
the buyers’ actions during the earlier rounds of the auction, and an indirect one, originating
from the type of equilibrium describing the buyers’ behavior in the entire auction. This
information can affect the distribution of the prices that the winners of the auction pay
as well as the seller’s overall expected revenue. Finally, this dissertation also shows that
the profitable use of a sequential auction requires from the seller the ability to commit
intertemporally to the auction rules.
3
It should be mentioned that the three main chapters of this dissertation have been
organized independently of one another. In particular, the study of each chapter does not
require any knowledge of the material discussed in the remaining parts of the dissertation.
Although this may occasionally create some duplication, especially in the references to the
literature, at the end, the advantage of referring directly to each of the problems appears to
be of greater importance.
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2.0 OPTIMAL RESERVE PRICES IN SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
WITH IMPERFECT COMMITMENT
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the study of sequential auctions, a usual assumption is that of intertemporal commit-
ment. In particular, the seller is able to commit in a fully credible manner to a specific
auction mechanism, or to a sequence of auction mechanisms, through which all sales will be
made. The bidders can therefore reveal, in the earlier rounds of the auction process, private
information about their valuations, without fearing that the seller will change the rules, for
example, alter the reserve price, at their expense.
In reality, however, perfect intertemporal commitment is often infeasible. In many cases,
the seller lacks the credibility that this assumption requires. In addition, even when he
commits to a certain selling scheme by means of a contract, he may still decide to redesign
the auction at a cost, if it becomes profitable for him to do so. Finally, in several cases in
which the seller announces the auction of only a single item, the bidders may try to conceal
some of their private information, in anticipation of similar sales in the future.
In this chapter, we study the effects of imperfect commitment. In particular, we examine
the sequential auction of two identical goods by a seller who can change the reserve price for
the second object after observing the outcome of the first sale. The same group of potential
buyers is assumed to be present in both auctions; and each buyer has single-unit demand and
a valuation that is persistent over time. The seller is therefore able to take full advantage of
any information that the buyers may reveal in the first auction.
The problem we have described typically occurs in sequential procurement. In this
setting, a number of contracts for similar projects, for example, for highway paving, is
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procured sequentially. Capacity constraints force the competing firms to limit the supply of
their services.1 If the buyer’s commitment not to alter the rules pertaining the future auctions
cannot be fully credible, then the issues involved in the design of the optimal procurement
process will be identical to the ones we study.
The seller is restricted to using standard single-unit auctions, with the actual auction
format fixed exogenously. In particular, we will consider the cases of English, Dutch, and
sealed-bid, first- or second-price auctions. For a specific auction format, the seller can choose
reserve prices r1 and r2 so as to enhance his expected payoff.
We introduce imperfect commitment by restricting the manner in which the seller can
set the second-period reserve price r2. More specifically, the seller cannot credibly commit
at the beginning of the game to any reserve price, or rule for determining the reserve price,
for the second auction. Rather, he must choose the reserve price r2 at the beginning of the
second period, after the end of the first auction.2
The impossibility of intertemporal commitment has important consequences for the bid-
ders’ behavior in the first round of the auction. Since the auctioneer cannot restrict the
manner in which he will use in the second round the information revealed in the first round,
the bidders have strong incentives not to reveal their valuations. In particular, the non-
winning bidders are best-off not submitting any bid.
This incentive to conceal one’s private information turns out to be extremely strong.
For several auction formats, in particular, for the sealed-bid and the English auctions that we
consider, there is no symmetric equilibrium in monotone bidding strategies. The auctioneer’s
unrestricted use of the revealed information forces any bidders who might wish to participate
in the first round not to shade their bids (beyond the degree characterizing the equilibrium
of the corresponding single-unit auction). As a result, a deviation to non-participation (or
to minimal bidding) during that round becomes strictly profitable.3
1The relevance of such constraints has been documented by Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [54], in their
study of highway paving contracts in California.
2In this setting, therefore, imperfect commitment assumes an extreme form, namely, that of non-
commitment. In section 2.6, we show that all intermediate situations, in which the seller is allowed to
change the reserve price with some positive probability, are qualitatively identical to non-commitment.
3 The cause of this non-existence result can be thought off as a variation of the “ratchet effect” from the
literature of dynamic contracting. The agents are reluctant to reveal any information that the principal can
use at their expense in the future. For further details, see Freixas et al. [28] and Laffont and Tirole [63, 64].
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For a symmetric monotone equilibrium, one shall consider an auction format that allows
the non-winning bidders to avoid revealing information. Such a format is that of the Dutch
auction. In this auction, there is only one bid, that of the winner. The remaining bidders
do not take any action in the first period, other than that of their refusal to bid above the
winner’s price. Therefore, their private information remains protected, thus enabling the
construction of an equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the auctioneer always sets a first-period reserve price that allows the
sale of the first object, if a bidder with a sufficiently high valuation exists. Subsequently,
given the outcome of the first auction, he updates his beliefs (in particular, he obtains a
sharper upper bound for the remaining bidders’ valuations) and, accordingly, he lowers the
reserve price for the second object. Because of the anticipation of a lower future reserve price,
several bidder types do not submit a bid in the first auction, even though their valuations
exceed the first-period reserve price.4 Consequently, those bidders who participate in the
first round shade their bids sharply, knowing that they face limited competition. Both the
strategic non-participation and the excessive shading of the submitted bids would be absent,
if the auctioneer could commit not to change, in particular, not to lower, the reserve price
over time.
Overall, the seller suffers a revenue loss. Although he is able to design the second auction
in a better informed manner and, therefore, to derive a higher revenue from the sale of the
second object than in the case of commitment, he cannot prevent severe losses in the first
auction. Thus, we reaffirm the intuition favoring commitment5, in the setting of sequential
auctions. In particular, the seller would be willing to adopt costly measures to enhance his
credibility, for example, he would be willing to pay for the services of a trusted intermediary,
like a well-established auction house.
The literature on sequential auctions has paid relatively little attention to the possibility
of a strategic auctioneer. Some of this literature has tried to explain the declining-price
4 This strategic non-participation decision first appeared in the literature of dynamic bargaining; for
example, see Hart and Tirole [39]. For examples of its occurrence in sequential auctions, see McAfee and
Vincent [75] and Caillaud and Mezzetti [14]. In our case, we shall remark that it differs from the ratchet
effect, despite its resemblance to it. A buyer decides not to participate in the first auction even though the
seller cannot use against him, in the future, the information revealed by his bid.
5This result was formally established by Stokey [91] and Bulow [11].
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anomaly6, a problem in which the auctioneer plays no strategic role. Learning in sequential
auctions has been studied by Ortega Reichert [82] and Jeitschko [52]. They concentrate,
however, on the manner in which the bidders, rather than the auctioneer, can use the infor-
mation revealed during a sequential auction. A strategically active auctioneer is present in
McAfee and Vincent [74], who study the optimal reserve-price path in a sequence of first- and
second-price auctions.7 In particular, the auctioneer puts the same object for sale repeat-
edly, until it is sold. At each round he chooses a reserve price according to his (increasingly
pessimistic) beliefs about the buyers’ valuations. Since the game ends as soon as the object
is sold, that is, as soon as a bid is submitted, the buyers do not face the problem of hiding
their valuations. Prior to the end of the game, information can be revealed only in a passive
manner, by the buyers’ refusal to bid for the object at a given reserve price.
The issue of concealing, during the auction, information from the auctioneer has appeared
in Caillaud and Mezzetti [14]. In a sequence of two auctions in which the buyers have multi-
unit demands and persistent valuations, the bidders face a problem similar to the one in
our setting. However, because of the multi-unit demands, the need to conceal information
eventually concerns only the bidder with the highest valuation, all other bidders realizing that
they cannot win either of the two auctions.8 Therefore, it is the format of the English auction
that is employed in this setting, as it allows the winning bidder not to reveal his valuation.
Our work complements that of Caillaud and Mezzetti [14] by looking at an environment in
which the problem of concealing information is faced by the non-winning bidders.
In both settings, it turns out that relevant information can be revealed only indirectly,
through the actions of the bidders that have no further interest in the game. In addition,
in both cases, imperfect commitment is costly for the seller. In our setting, however, the
seller’s loss is enhanced by the bid shading that occurs in the first auction.9
6Although intertemporal non-arbitrage requires that the expected prices remain constant over time, in
practice it has been observed that earlier sales tend to be concluded at higher prices than later ones. For
details, see Ashenfelter [2], Jeitschko [53], MacAfee and Vincent [74] and Milgrom and Weber [79].
7Sobel and Takahashi [89] have studied a similar problem in the context of dynamic bargaining. Skreta
[88] has generalized this problem, with respect to the mechanisms that the seller can use in every period.
8 In fact, on the equilibrium path, if there is a winning bidder in the first auction, then the second auction
becomes a bargaining problem between the seller and that bidder.
9In Caillaud and Mezzetti [14], the participating bidders are always willing to bid up to their valuation,
so as to overbid their competitors. Therefore, any revenue loss for the seller comes directly from the decrease
in participation.
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Finally, a different type of strategically minded auctioneer appears in Thomas [94] and Tu
[95]. This auctioneer tries to maximize his expected revenue by controlling the information
that is made available to the bidders at the end of the first auction. He does not set any
reserve prices nor make any decisions during the game. Therefore, the issues involved in his
interaction with the bidders differ from the ones in our setting.
In the sections 2.2 and 2.3, we present the model describing our problem and we sum-
marize the results regarding optimal reserve prices under commitment of the auctioneer. In
section 2.4, we examine the sequential Dutch auction and we derive a symmetric sequential
equilibrium in weakly increasing first-period strategies. In section 2.5, we show that such an
equilibrium does not exist in sequential English or sealed bid first- and second-price auctions.
In section 2.6, we extend this non-existence result to the case of imperfect commitment, that
is, to a setting in which the auctioneer can change the second-period reserve price with a
small probability only, which reflects his lack of credibility. We conclude in section 2.7.
Lengthy proofs have been placed in section A of the appendix.
2.2 GENERAL MODEL
There is one auctioneer with 2 identical objects for sale. The auctioneer’s valuation for the
objects is normalized to zero, so that he can derive no benefit from any object that may
remain unsold.
The auctioneer faces N > 2 bidders, indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . Each bidder has single-unit
demand and private valuation vi  [v, v¯], for 0 ≤ v < v¯, which remains constant throughout
the game. The valuations are independently drawn, according to a common distribution
function F : [v, v¯]→ [0, 1]. We assume that the distribution function F is differentiable and
that its derivative, f : [v, v¯]→ R+, has full support. The payoff of bidder i, in case he wins
one unit, equals his valuation vi minus the price that he pays for it; otherwise, if he does not
win any unit, it equals to zero.
The two objects are allocated to the bidders by means of a sequence of two standard
auctions, conducted in periods (or rounds) t = 1, 2. For simplicity, we assume that the two
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auctions are of the same format.10 In particular, we will consider the cases of sequential
Dutch auctions, English auctions, and sealed-bid first- and second-price auctions.11
Given a certain auction format, the auctioneer can select reserve prices r1 and r2 so as to
maximize his expected revenue. We assume that the auctioneer cannot restrict at the begin-
ning of the game the manner in which the reserve price r2 will be determined (impossibility
of intertemporal commitment). Instead, he must choose r2 at the beginning of the second
period, according to the information revealed by the bids submitted in the first auction. His
strategy, therefore, consists of a reserve price for the first auction and a reserve price rule for
the second auction:12
r1  R+;
r2 : ( b
1
1, . . . , b
1
N , r1 ) 7−→ r2  R+.
In each period, every bidder either submits a bid or abstains from the auction. His
first-period bid depends on his valuation and the reserve price. His second-period bid, if
he does not win the first auction, depends on his valuation, the new reserve price, and the
information that has been revealed in the first auction. In the sealed-bid auctions, we assume
that the auctioneer reveals directly13 only the winning bid. On the other hand, in the open-
bid auctions, the auctioneer does not have anything to reveal, since the bidders can observe
all first-period behavior.
Given an information revelation scheme h(b1), for first-period bids b1 = (b11, . . . , b
1
N),
determined by either the auction format or the auctioneer’s information revelation policy,
the strategy of each bidder i consists of the bidding rules
10Since the outcome of the entire auction will depend only on the auction format used in the first period
(in particular, on the type of information that the first-period auction reveals), our results easily extend to
the case of different auction formats in the two periods.
11In the sequential Dutch auction, the auction clock is set high, above v¯, at the beginning of each round.
The second item can therefore be sold at a higher price than the first one. In the same manner, in the
sequential English auction, the auction clock is set low, at the seller’s reserve price, in each round.
12To simplify the notation, we have allowed b1i to take the value of “no-bid” or “abstain”.
13Indirectly, through his choice of the reserve price r2, the auctioneer may reveal additional information.
In our analysis, however, this issue will be of trivial importance. Our negative results regarding sequential
sealed-bid auctions will remain valid independently of the auctioneer’s information revelation policy.
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β1i : ( vi | r1 ) 7−→ {a} ∪ [r1,∞);
β2i : ( vi | b1i , h(b1), r1, r2 ) 7−→ {a} ∪ [ r2,∞),
where a denotes the action of abstaining from an auction.
The solution concept will be that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. At each decision node,
each player must behave optimally, given the other players’ strategies and his beliefs. On
the equilibrium path, these beliefs are determined by Bayes’ rule. Off the equilibrium path,
we strengthen the equilibrium concept by requiring that the players cannot infer from an
observed action information that the acting player does not have.14 For example, an off-
equilibrium reserve price r1 cannot alter the bidders’ beliefs about their opponents’ valu-
ations. Finally, we restrict attention to symmetric15, pure-strategy equilibria, in weakly
increasing bidding strategies.
2.3 OPTIMAL SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS UNDER COMMITMENT
If there is only one unit for sale, then, according to Myerson [81], the auctioneer will choose
the optimal reserve price by considering the bidders’ virtual valuation function
ψ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
.
We make the standard regularity assumption that the function ψ(v) is increasing. For this
assumption to hold, it is sufficient that the hazard rate f(v)
1−F (v) is increasing.
Given the regularity assumption, the auctioneer can maximize his expected revenue by
allocating the object by means of any standard auction with reserve price
14For a formal definition, consult Fudenberg and Tirole [30], definition 8.2.
15In fact, wherever it is applicable, we impose a stronger symmetry requirement, one that rules out
the possibility of using the first-period bids as a labeling device. For example, we will not allow symmetric
strategies that prescribe different second-period bidding behavior to the second and the third highest bidders
of the first auction.
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r0 =

ψ−1(0), if ψ(v) < 0;
v, otherwise.
(2.1)
That is, the auctioneer must exclude all bidders with valuations below ψ−1(0).
If the players receive prior information that the upper bound of the valuations is vˆ, then
they update their beliefs, so that they consider the bidders’ valuations as i.i.d., according
to the distribution function F (·)/F (vˆ) on [v, vˆ]. In this case, the bidders’ virtual valuations
will be given by the function
ψ(v|vˆ) = v − F (vˆ)− F (v)
f(v)
.
It is easy to check that the function ψ(v|vˆ) also satisfies the regularity assumption.
Therefore, given such prior information, the auctioneer maximizes his expected revenue by
setting a reserve price:
r0(vˆ) =

ψ(· | vˆ)−1(0), if ψ(v|vˆ) < 0;
v, otherwise.
(2.2)
Notice that the reserve price r0(vˆ) is increasing in vˆ. Finally, for any optimal reserve price
r0(vˆ) > v, the condition ψ(r0(vˆ)|vˆ) = 0 implies
F (vˆ)− F [r0(vˆ)] = f [r0(vˆ)] r0(vˆ). (2.3)
The optimal reserve price r0(vˆ) equals to the inverse hazard rate at r0(vˆ).
If there are two units for sale, then, because of the single-unit demand and the regularity
assumption, the solution to the auctioneer’s revenue optimization problem is similar to that
of the single-unit case. By Maskin and Riley [70], the optimal selling mechanism takes the
form of any standard multi-unit auction with reserve price r0 ∈ [v, v¯], defined as in the case
of a single-unit auction.
Under full commitment, the restriction to sequential allocation plays no role, since the
assumptions of risk neutrality and i.i.d. private valuations imply that all allocation equivalent
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equilibria of the sequential and the single-round auctions are revenue equivalent. Hence, any
sequential auction that allocates the two units to the bidders with the two highest valuations,
as long as these valuations exceed the reserve price r0, is optimal for the auctioneer.
16 In
particular, the auctioneer can maximize his expected revenue by conducting a sequential
Dutch auction with the same reserve price r1 = r2 = r0 in both rounds.
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2.4 SEQUENTIAL DUTCH AUCTIONS
In the sequential Dutch auction, there can be at most one bid in each period, that of the
winner. Therefore, when the buyers follow monotone strategies, the information revealed
by the first period outcome will take the form of an upper bound for the valuations of the
remaining bidders.18
We show that the following strategies can be part of an equilibrium:
a. Given a first-period reserve price r1 < r¯1, for a certain threshold r¯1, each bidder i follows
a bidding strategy β1(· | r1), such that he participates in the auction only if his valuation
is vi ∈ [v(r1), v¯], for some value v(r1) > r1. In addition, in the region of participation,
[v(r1), v¯], the strategy β
1(· | r1) is strictly increasing. Thus, the winning bidder fully
reveals his valuation. If r1 ≥ r¯1, then, in equilibrium, no bidder participates in the first-
period auction.
b. If the first-period object is sold at a price bˆ1 = β1(vˆ | r1), corresponding to a winning
valuation vˆ  [v(r1), v¯], then the auctioneer and the bidders update their beliefs, so that
the remaining bidders’ valuations vi are i.i.d., according to the distribution F (·)/F (vˆ).
16 Notice, in particular, that the optimality extends over sequential auctions in which the second-period
reserve price is determined endogenously by the first-period bids, according to a reserve price schedule
r2 = r2(b11, ..., b
1
N , r1).
17A sequential English auction or a sequential first-price or second-price auction, with reserve prices
r1 = r2 = r0, is also optimal for the auctioneer. Any of the sequential auctions that we consider would also
be optimal, if the auctioneer revealed all the bids submitted in the first round.
18We shall notice that there is a possibility of more than one bids in a Dutch auction, in case of a tie
between two or more bidders. In this case, the valuation of some of the non-winning bidders will be fully
revealed. Given our assumptions regarding F (·), this event has zero measure and can be ignored.
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The auctioneer sets a new reserve price r2, according to the updated virtual valua-
tion function, and the bidders bid according to the standard first-price auction bidding
strategies. Unless r1 ≤ v, the new reserve price, r2, is strictly lower than the first-period
reserve price r1. If the first-period object remains unsold at the reserve price r1, then the
same argument applies, with vˆ = v(r1) being the revealed upper bound for the bidders’
valuations.
For these strategies to support an equilibrium, a bidder with valuation v(r1) must be
indifferent between winning the first-period object at the minimal price β1(v(r1) | r1) = r1
and waiting for the second auction, in which the reserve price will be lower. This requires
that the bidders shade their second-period bids less than in the first period, so as a bidder
with valuation v(r1) will still bid r1.
Notice that any bidder with valuation vi ∈ (r1, v(r1)), for a given reserve price r1, does
not participate in the first auction. He prefers to wait for the second auction, even if he
can buy the first-period object at price r1. This strategic non-participation decision, which
also appears in McAfee and Vincent [75] and in Caillaud and Mezzetti [14], is entirely the
consequence of the auctioneer’s inability to commit not to lower the reserve price. It would
not occur, if the auctioneer could commit to a second-period reserve price r2 ≥ r1. In
particular, it does not occur in the subgame following a first-period reserve price r1 = 0.
Therefore, it does not depend on the bidders’ expectation of a smaller number of competing
bidders in the future.19
We start our formal analysis by investigating the second-period auction. Since we are
considering monotone first-period bidding strategies, we can abbreviate the notation for the
second-period bidding strategy to β2,M(vi | vˆ, r2), where M = N − 1 or N is the number of
participating bidders and vˆ ∈ [v, v¯] is the upper bound for the participating bidders’ valua-
tions revealed in the first auction.20
19This expectation affects only how sharply the bidders shade their bids, not their decision to wait.
20Restricting attention to the game described in Lemma 2.1, notice that the possibility of vi > vˆ does not
contradict the bidders’ assumed beliefs and, therefore, does not violate the consistency requirement in the
definition of equilibrium. We can simply assume that prior to the draw of the privately known valuation vi,
each bidder attaches zero probability to the event vi > vˆ, for all i.
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Lemma 2.1.
Consider a single Dutch auction with M bidders, whose valuations are i.i.d. according to the
distribution function F (·) on [v, v¯]. Suppose that the auctioneer and the bidders believe that
the unknown valuations are bounded above by the value vˆ ∈ [v, v¯]. Then, given a reserve
price r2, the following strategy constitutes a symmetric equilibrium:
β2,M(vi | vˆ, r2) =

E[ max{v(M−1)1 , r2} | v(M−1)1 < vi ], if r2 ≤ vi ≤ vˆ;
E[ max{v(M−1)1 , r2} | v(M−1)1 < vˆ ], if vi > vˆ;
a, if vi < r2.
In this auction, it is optimal for the auctioneer to set a reserve price:
r2(vˆ) =

ψ(· |vˆ)−1(0), if ψ(v | vˆ) < 0;
v, otherwise.
Proof:
The result follows directly from standard arguments regarding symmetric equilibria and
optimal reserve prices in first-price auctions. In particular, for r2 ≤ vi ≤ vˆ, we derive the
equilibrium bidding function
β2,M(vi | vˆ, r2) = 1
F (vi)M−1
[∫ vi
r2
v (M − 1)F (v)M−2f(v) dv + F (r2)M−1 r2
]
, (2.4)
which corresponds to the upper branch of the first expression in the lemma.
Therefore, if the first-period auction reveals an upper bound vˆ for the bidders’ valuations,
then, in the second period, the auctioneer’s optimal reserve price and the bidders’ strategies
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are described by Lemma 2.1. The possibility of a valuation vi > vˆ corresponds to an off-
equilibrium path event, namely, to the case in which bidder i should have won the first-period
unit but did not bid according to the prescribed strategy.
Moving backwards, suppose that the auctioneer has set a first-period reserve price r1
and consider a bidder with valuation vi ≥ v(r1), for some value v(r1) > r1 that will be
determined later. Suppose that all other bidders follow the strategies (β1, β2), where β2 is
as in Lemma 2.1. Furthermore, suppose that the auctioneer follows the strategy r2, again
described by Lemma 2.1.
Then by mimicking a type v˜i > vi, bidder i has an expected payoff
Π[v˜i; vi] = F (v˜i)
N−1 [ vi − β1( v˜i | r1 ) ]
+ (N − 1) [1− F (v˜i)] F (vi)N−2
[
vi −
∫ 1
v˜i
β2,N−1(vi | vˆ, r2(vˆ) ) f(vˆ)
1− F (v˜i) dvˆ
]
.
Similarly, by mimicking a type v˜i ∈ [v(r1), vi), bidder i has an expected payoff
Π[v˜i; vi] = F (v˜i)
N−1 [ vi − β1( v˜i | r1 ) ]
+ (N − 1) [1− F (vi)] F (vi)N−2
[
vi −
∫ 1
vi
β2,N−1(vi | vˆ, r2(vˆ) ) f(vˆ)
1− F (vi) dvˆ
]
+ [F (vi)
N−1 − F (v˜i)N−1]
[
vi −
∫ vi
v˜i
β2,N−1(vˆ | vˆ, r2(vˆ) ) (N − 1)F (vˆ)
N−2f(vˆ)
F (vi)N−1 − F (v˜i)N−1 dvˆ
]
.
The third term corresponds to the possibility in which the first-period object is sold at
a price bˆ1 ∈ (β1(v˜i|r1), β1(vi|r1)). In this case, the winning bidder reveals the valuation
vˆ = β1( · | r1)−1(bˆ1) ∈ (v˜i, vi). Therefore, in the second auction, with reserve price r2(vˆ),
bidder i bids β2[vˆ | vˆ, r2(vˆ)].
In either case, by solving the differential equation that results from the necessary first-
order condition at the endpoint v˜i = vi along with the boundary condition β
1(v(r1) | r1) = r1,
we get the bidding function
β1(vi | r1) = 1
G(vi)
[ ∫ vi
v(r1)
β2,N−1[v | v, r2(v)] g(v) dv + G[v(r1)] r1
]
, (2.5)
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where G(v) and g(v) denote respectively the distribution and the density of the highest of
the competing N − 1 bidders’ valuations.
To determine the function v(r1), consider a bidder with valuation vi = v(r1). Such
a bidder shall be indifferent between winning the first-period object, at the minimal price
β1(v(r1) | r1) = r1, and abstaining from the first period so as to win the second-period object.
This implies that the bidder shall pay the same price in either of the two auctions:
r1 = β
2,N [ v(r1) | v(r1) , r2(v(r1)) ]. (2.6)
Since the function r1(v) = β
2,N [ v | v, r2(v) ] is increasing21 in the valuation v, it follows that
the threshold value function v(·) : r1 7→ v(r1) is increasing in the reserve price r1. Let r¯1 be
the minimal reserve price for which no bidder will participate in the first auction, that is,
r¯1 = min{r1 : v(r1) = v¯}. Then
r¯1 = β
2,N(v¯ | v¯, r2(v¯)). (2.7)
Therefore, for all reserve prices r1 < r¯1, we have v(r1) ∈ [r1, v¯); and, for all r1 ≥ r¯1, we have
v(r1) = v¯. Finally, notice that for all reserve prices r1 > v, we have v(r1) < r1, implying
non-participation for bidders with valuations vi ∈ [r1, v(r1)).
The above arguments lead to the following result, regarding the bidders’ behavior in the
game following a first-period reserve price r1:
Proposition 2.2.
Consider a sequence of two Dutch auctions and suppose that the auctioneer has set a first-
period reserve price r1 ∈ [v, v¯]. Then there is an equilibrium for the continuation game, in
which the strategies r2, β
2,N and β2,N−1 are given by Lemma 2.1 and the strategy β1 depends
on the value of r1:
- If r1 < r¯1, for the threshold value r¯1 = β
2,N(v¯ | v¯, r2(v¯)), the strategy β1 is given by
21For a function Φ(x) = F [f1(x), f2(x)], we have Φ
′
= F1 f
′
1 + F2 f
′
2. Hence, if the derivatives F1, f
′
1, F2
and f
′
2 are all positive, then the function Φ(x) is increasing.
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β1(vi | r1) = 1
G(vi)
[
∫ vi
v(r1)
β2,N−1[v | v, r2(v)] g(v) dv + G[v(r1)] r1 ],
for all valuations vi ∈ [v(r1), v¯], where v(r1) ∈ (r1, v¯) is given by the equation
r1 = β
2,N [ v(r1) | v(r1), r2(v(r1)) ].
Otherwise, for vi ∈ [v, v(r1)), bidder i abstains from the first-period auction.
- If r1 ≥ r¯1, then all bidders abstain from the first-period auction.
Having described the bidders’ behavior, we can now consider the auctioneer’s problem
of determining the optimal first-period reserve price r∗1. Since there is a bijective relation
between a reserve price r1 ∈ [v, r¯1] and the participation threshold v(r1) ∈ [v, v¯], namely,
r1(v) = β
2,N [v | v, r2(v)],
we can think of the auctioneer’s problem as one of determining the revenue maximizing
first-period participation threshold v∗ = v(r∗1).
Proposition 2.3.
The optimal first-period participation threshold v∗ in a sequence of two Dutch auctions solves
the equation
1− F (v)
f(v)
G[r2(v)]
dr2
dv
(v) =
∫ v
r2(v)
ψ(u) g(u) du. (2.8)
The auctioneer always induces participation by a positive measure of bidders’ types, that is,
v∗ < v¯. In addition, for distributions F (·) such that r0 > v, we have r1(v∗) < r0 < v∗.
Finally, if r0 = v, then r1(v
∗) = r0 = v∗ = v.
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It is interesting to notice that the auctioneer’s choice of second-period reserve price
r2 = r2(b
1, r1) is better informed under non-commitment. Therefore, he expects a greater
revenue in the second auction than in the case of commitment to a reserve price r1 = r2 = r0.
This gain, however, is dominated by the auctioneer’s loss in the first period, so that, overall,
it is more profitable for him to commit to r0. The two revenues are equal only when r0 = v,
which occurs when ψ(v) ≥ 0.
There are two reasons for the first-period loss. First, unless r0 = v, there is a smaller
measure of bidder types participating in the auction. In addition, the participating types bid
less aggressively than in the case of commitment. In this respect, our auctioneer’s decision
has a stronger effect on the bidders’ behavior than that of the auctioneer in Caillaud and
Mezzetti [14]. In their setting, because of the use of English auctions and the bidders’
multi-unit demands and persistent valuations, each participating bidder always bids up to
his valuation.
We underline the need of the auctioneer to commit to a reserve price schedule, if this
can be possible, in the following result:
Corollary 2.4.
Suppose that the bidders’ lowest virtual valuation is ψ(v) < 0. Then, in a sequence of two
Dutch auctions, the auctioneer’s revenue is strictly greater under commitment to reserve
prices r1 = r2 = ψ
−1(0) than in any reserve-price scheme under non-commitment.
Proof:
The result follows directly from the characterization of the optimal selling mechanism under
commitment, from Maskin and Riley [70], the revenue equivalence of sequential auctions and
appropriately defined single-round, multi-unit auctions and Proposition 2.3.
We conclude by applying the above results to the case of uniformly distributed valuations.
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Example:
Suppose that the bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed in [0,1]. In the second round,
if the reserve price is r2, the revealed upper bound for the bidders’ valuations is vˆ and there
are M competing bidders, each bidder acts according to the bidding strategy described by
Lemma 2.1:
β2,M(vi | vˆ, r2) =

1
M vM−1i
[rM2 + (M − 1)vMi ], if r2 ≤ vi ≤ vˆ;
1
M vˆM−1 [r
M
2 + (M − 1)vˆM ], if vi > vˆ;
a, if vi < r2.
In this auction, it is optimal for the auctioneer to set a reserve price
r2(vˆ) =
1
2
vˆ.
In the first auction, there will be a positive measure of participating bidder types, if and
only if the reserve price is r1 < r¯1, where r¯1 ∈ [0, 1] is given by the equation (2.7):
r¯1 = β
2,N(1 | 1, r2(1)) =⇒ r¯1 = N − 1 + (1/2)
N
N
.
Otherwise, all bidders will wait for the second period.
When r1 < r¯1, bidders with valuations vi ≥ v(r1) bid according to the strategy
β1(vi | r1) = 1
vN−1i
∫ vi
v(r1)
r2(v)
N−1 + (N − 2)vN−1 dv + v(r1)
N−1
vN−1i
r1,
given by the equation (2.5), while bidders with valuations vi < v(r1) abstain from the auction.
By imposing the indifference condition (2.8) defining the type vi = v(r1), we get
r¯1 = β
2,N(v¯ | v¯, r2(v¯)) =⇒ v(r1) = N
N − 1 + (1/2)N r1 =
r1
r¯1
.
Clearly v(r1) > r1, because of the bidders’ anticipation of a lower second-round reserve price.
In addition, v(r¯1) = 1, according to the definitions (2.6) and (2.7) of v(r1) and r¯1.
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By using the expressions for r2(v¯) and v(r1) that we derived above, we can simplify the
function describing the first-period strategy of a bidder with valuation vi ≥ v(r1):
β1(vi | r1) =
(
r¯1 − 1
N
)
vi +
1
N
(
r1
r¯1
)N
1
vN−1i
.
Finally, suppose that the auctioneer chooses a reserve price r1 ≤ r¯1 corresponding to a
participation threshold v = v(r1) = r1/r¯1. Then his expected payoff will be
R(v) =
∫ v¯
v
(
r¯1 − 1
N
)
vN1 +
1
N
(
r1
r¯1
)N
dv1
+
∫ v
v/2
( v
2
)N
+ (N − 1) vN1 dv1
+
∫ v
v/2
∫ v1
v1/2
N
[( v1
2
)N−1
+ (N − 2) vN−12
]
dv2 dv1.
The necessary condition (2.8) from Proposition 2.3 yields:
(1− v) vN−1 = 2N
∫ v
v/2
(2u− 1) (N − 1)uN−2 du.
Therefore, the auctioneer maximizes his expected revenue by inducing a first-period partic-
ipation threshold or, equivalently, by setting a first-period reserve price
v∗ =
N (2N − 1)
2 (N − 1) (2N − 1) +N ⇐⇒ r
∗
1 =
N (2N − 1)
2 (N − 1) (2N − 1) +N r¯1.
Since v∗ < 1, the auctioneer is always willing to sell the first-period object. In fact, the first-
period reserve price will be r∗1 <
1
2
, the optimal reserve price under commitment. However,
since v∗ > 1
2
, there are strictly fewer bidder types participating in the first auction than in
the optimal sequential auction under commitment.
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2.5 SEQUENTIAL SEALED-BID AND ENGLISH AUCTIONS
Under non-commitment, the auctioneer is able to make full use, in the second auction, of any
information about the bidders’ valuations that the first auction may reveal. For example, if
a non-winning bidder in the first auction is revealed to have a valuation vi ≥ vL, then the
auctioneer will set a reserve price r2 ≥ vL. The bidders, therefore, have a strong incentive
to conceal, in the first auction, their valuations from the auctioneer. Non-surprisingly, this
incentive leads to strong negative results.
Proposition 2.5.
In a sequential English or sealed-bid first- or second-price auction, there does not exist any
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly increasing first-period bidding strategies.
The non-existence of a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium22 in weakly increasing
first-period strategies originates from the asymmetric effects of the deviations to β1(vˆi), for
vˆi > vi, and to β
1(vˇi), for vˇi < vi. In particular, a deviation to mimicking a type vˆi > vi does
not decrease the expected second-period surplus of the bidder; this will still be zero. On
the other hand, a deviation to mimicking a type vˇi < vi does increase the expected second-
period surplus of the bidder, as it leads to a lower second-period reserve price. Hence, to
avoid deviations to vˇi < vi, the bidders shall shade their first-period bids so much so that
the deviation to vˆi > vi becomes strictly profitable.
22Notice that if we adopted a weaker notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, one that would not impose
any restriction on the players beliefs off the equilibrium path, then an equilibrium would exist in a rather
generic manner. In particular, in the equilibrium path, the auctioneer would set r1 = v¯, so that effectively
only the second-period auction, with r2 = r0 = ψ−1(0), would take place. Off the equilibrium path, for
r1 < v¯, we could allow each bidder to believe, in an inconsistent manner, that he does not have the highest
valuation; thus, all bidders would abstain from the first auction. Therefore, the auctioneer could not benefit
from lowering the reserve price.
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2.6 IMPERFECT COMMITMENT
We consider a variation of the sequential auctions that we analyzed in the previous two
sections, one in which the auctioneer is able to commit in a non-fully credible manner not
to change the second-period reserve price. In particular, at the beginning of the game, the
auctioneer announces a reserve price r1 ∈ [v, v¯]. After the end of the first auction, with a
small probability ρ > 0, which reflects the auctioneer’s lack of credibility (so, it is commonly
known), the auctioneer can set a new reserve price r2 = r2(b
1, r1) for the second auction;
otherwise, with probability 1−ρ, we have r2 = r1, that is, the reserve price does not change.23
One would hope that for ρ ≈ 0 there can exist an equilibrium with participation in the first
round. As the following result shows, this turns out not to be possible.
Proposition 2.6.
In a sequential English or sealed-bid first- or second-price auction under imperfect commit-
ment, there does not exist any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in weakly increasing
first-period bidding strategies.
On the other hand, in the case of sequential Dutch auctions, it is easy to show that
there exists a sequential equilibrium demonstrating similar characteristics to the ones of the
equilibrium described in the case of non-commitment. Therefore, the two cases, of imperfect
commitment and of non-commitment, are qualitatively identical.
In conclusion, however small the auctioneer’s lack of credibility may be, the bidders will
be concerned about not revealing their valuations in the first round. Because of this concern
a symmetric, monotone, pure-strategy equilibrium exists only in the case of sequential Dutch
auctions. In the absence of sufficiently strict legal assurances or other means of establishing
credibility24, the use of this auction format, or of a single-round, multi-unit auction, is the
only manner in which the auctioneer can induce a positive outcome.
23We assume that the auctioneer learns his type, whether he can change the reserve price or not, only
after the end of the first auction. Hence, his choice of r1 does not signal any information to the bidders.
24For example, the seller might try to trade though a well-established auction house. One can assume that
reputation concerns may be more important for such an institution than for a single individual.
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS
In a sequential auction in which the buyers have single-unit demands and the seller is unable
to commit perfectly to the auction rules, we have shown that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in symmetric monotone strategies exists only in the case of Dutch auctions. It is precisely
this auction format that allows the non-winning bidders to hide their valuations. Our result
complements Caillaud and Mezzetti [14], where the multi-unit demands, along with the
persistent valuations, placed the problem of concealing one’s valuation upon the winning
bidder and, therefore, forced the use of the English auction. In both settings, information
is revealed only indirectly, through the action of the bidders that do not have any further
interest in the game.
It would be interesting to consider an environment in which all bidders try to hide
their valuations, independently of whether they win the first object or not. This could be
a sequential auction with multi-unit demands and non-persistent valuations or decreasing
marginal returns. Alternatively, one could try to derive an equilibrium for the case of sealed-
bid auctions. In all these cases, in equilibrium, the bidders may need to mix their strategies.
Finally, one could consider the sequential allocation problem in its full generality, by
allowing the auctioneer to use a sequence of any single-object selling mechanisms he wishes.
In this case, it would be interesting to learn whether the seller can profit from using a
first-period mechanism that extracts information from the non-winning bidders.
24
3.0 SIMULTANEOUS AND SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS
OF OLIGOPOLY LICENSES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Many important auctions aim at creating new markets or at expanding markets that already
exist. For example, the radio spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications
Commission in the United States (and by similar government agencies elsewhere in the world)
have allowed the wireless communication companies to expand their services. In the same
manner, the auction of other state-owned resources, such as oil fields or timber tracts, have
enabled the related companies to expand their operations. In addition, in several regulated
markets, companies need to compete periodically for the acquisition or renewal of the license
to supply their product. Finally, the development of new technologies often forces those
companies that can benefit from their adoption to compete for the acquisition of the right
to use them.1
Such auctions are typically characterized by the presence of allocative and informational
externalities. In particular, the value of the resources or of the licenses that are sold, that
is, the market profit that these assets may generate, depends on the entire outcome of the
auction. First, it depends on the characteristics of the bidders against which a firm will
compete in the market. In addition, it may depend on the identities of the winning and
the losing bidders. Finally, when the bidders’ characteristics are privately known, their bids
1For a survey of the FCC auctions, see Cramton [18, 19]; for a survey of similar auctions in Europe, see
Jehiel and Moldovanu [47] and Klemperer [61]. For information regarding the auctions of oil sources or of
timber tracts, see, respectively, Cramton [20] and Hendricks and Porter [40] as well as the references therein.
For the relation between an auction and the market created by it, see Dana and Spier [22]. Regarding patent
licensing schemes, see Kamien [55], Kamien et al. [56] and Kamien and Tauman [57]. Finally, for a general
survey of auctions of public assets and the issues that typically arise in them, see Janssen [43].
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convey information about them, in a manner that allows for the possibility of signaling. For
example, an oligopoly license is more valuable for its recipient when the firms that gain the
other licenses are weaker. Similarly, an oligopolist’s overall benefit from acquiring the rights
to use a new technology increases when his market competitors, which are prevented from
accessing this technology, can derive a greater benefit from it. Finally, in both examples,
a firm can profit from exaggerating or from understating its private information during the
auction. Hence, because of these externalities, the value of the assets sold is determined
endogenously, by the types of the bidders, the final allocation and the information that the
auction reveals.2
In this chapter, we study a particular environment in which such externalities are present:
an auction of two licenses to supply in a Cournot oligopoly or in a Bertrand oligopoly for
differentiated products.3 For each of the competing firms, the value of the auctioned licenses
depends, primarily, on its own production costs. In addition, it depends on the production
costs of the winner of the other license, that is, of the firm against which it will compete in
the market. Finally, when the firms’ production costs cannot be revealed otherwise, there is
the possibility of signaling through bidding. In a Cournot oligopoly, a firm can increase its
market profit by signaling, during the auction, a stronger type, so as to beguile its opponent
into supplying a smaller quantity. Similarly, in a Bertrand oligopoly, a firm can increase its
profit by signaling a weaker type, so as to lure its opponent into setting a higher price.
We compare two procedures for allocating the oligopoly licenses, a simultaneous “pay-
your-bid” auction4 and a sequential first-price auction. We assume that in each auction
scheme, the seller reveals the same information, namely, the two winning bids. The two
schemes differ, however, in the timing of revelation of that information. In the simultaneous
format, all information is revealed at the end of the entire procedure, prior only to market
2This environment differs from that of an auction with symmetric interdependent valuations, such as the
one studied in Milgrom and Weber [78]. There, the value of the assets sold depends on the bidders’ private
information only. It is independent of the outcome of the auction; in particular, it does not depend on who
wins the auction or on the information that the auction may reveal.
3For simplicity, we have assumed that the sale of the licenses results in the creation of a new market.
Our results, however, easily extend to an auction of two licenses to enter an already existing oligopoly or
monopoly. In such an auction, the structure of the firms’ payoffs and incentives is identical to that in our
model. Similarly, one can modify our model so as to describe the auction of two licenses to use a process
innovation. Again, the structure of the firms’ incentives will not change.
4In Krishna [62] and elsewhere, this auction is referred to as a “discriminatory” auction.
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competition. On the other hand, in the sequential format, some information, the bid that won
the first license, is revealed during the bidding process, in between the two auction rounds.
As a result, in the sequential auction, the firms can bid in a better-informed manner, as
some of the payoff uncertainty present in this environment is eliminated.
When the winners’ production costs are truthfully revealed after the auction5, so that
the information conveyed by their bids does not affect the ensuing market competition, then
for each auction scheme there exists a symmetric equilibrium in strictly monotone bidding
strategies. The two licenses are therefore allocated to the two strongest firms. The difference
in the information structure, however, affects the degree by which the firms shade their bids
and, therefore, the prices that they eventually pay.
In the first round of the sequential auction, the firms know that they will win the license
only if they have the strongest type. Therefore, since they do not take into account the
possibility of having to compete against a stronger market opponent, they shade their bids
less than they would do in the simultaneous auction. Consequently, the stronger of the two
market competitors, as revealed by the outcome of the auction, pays a higher price in the
sequential auction than in the simultaneous one. Similarly, the firms participating in the
second round know that, by winning the second license, they will necessarily have to face a
stronger market competitor. Therefore, on average, they shade their bids more than they
would do in the simultaneous auction. As a result, the weaker of the two market competitors
pays a higher price in the simultaneous auction.6
Despite the differences in the bidders’ behavior, the two auction schemes turn out to be
revenue equivalent.7 The excess of aggression that the bidders show in the first round of the
5The revelation of the two oligopolists’ production costs can be the consequence of the actions that they
need to take in the time period between the end of the auction and the beginning of the market. Truthful
revelation can also be assumed when the effects of false signaling are negligible, for example, when the
oligopolists can quickly adjust their market strategies. This assumption is present in much of the literature
on auctions with externalities, for example, in Jehiel and Moldovanu [45].
6In addition, in the simultaneous auction, the weaker of the two oligopolists may gain his license at a price
that exceeds its revealed value, thus, regretting his participation to the market. Such a negative outcome,
however, cannot occur in the sequential auction.
7Since we assume that the firms’ production costs are independent, the intuition of the Linkage Principle
for auctions with interdependent valuations (cf. Milgrom and Weber [78]) does not apply to our setting.
For this principle to impose a revenue ranking in favor of the auction scheme that reveals more information
during the bidding procedure, in this case, in favor of the sequential auction, the firms’ production costs
must be affiliated.
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sequential auction, which stems from the good news that a victory in this round will convey,
is balanced, on average, by the excess of restraint that the bidders show in the second round,
in reaction to the bad news they have received. Therefore, without incurring any cost to the
seller, the sequential auction results in a more even distribution of the wealth generated by
the introduction of the new market.8
When the oligopolists’ production costs are not automatically revealed after the auction,
but have to be inferred from their bids, the possibility of signaling is introduced. In this
case, the firms adjust their valuations by incorporating the informational rents that they can
extract. In each auction scheme, there are two incentive trade-offs, the signaling and the
non-signaling one. Since the firms’ market profit functions are separable in their real and
signalled production costs, the two trade-offs can be separated and treated independently.
Therefore, the firms’ non-signaling incentives can always be balanced, as in the case in
which their costs are truthfully revealed. On the other hand, the possibility of balancing the
signaling incentives depends on the auction scheme as well as on the type of the market.
In the simultaneous auction, the firms can adjust their strategies so that any gains from
false signaling can be offset by an increase in the expected payment, in the case of the
Cournot market, or by a decrease in the probability of winning a license, in the case of
the Bertrand market. In the sequential auction, a similar trade-off is possible only in the
Cournot oligopoly. In the Bertrand oligopoly, a firm can always profit from mimicking a
weaker type in the first round, as this would increase its expected market profit and decrease
its expected payment, without changing its overall probability of winning one of the two
licenses. Therefore, in this case, no symmetric monotone equilibrium exists.
Hence, in the Cournot oligopoly, the non-signaling results remain valid under signaling.
The two auction schemes are revenue equivalent, even though the sequential auction favors
the weaker (ex-post) of the two oligopolists. On the other hand, in the Bertrand oligopoly, a
comparison between the two auction schemes is not possible, since a separating equilibrium
exists only in the simultaneous auction.9
8The seller’s concern for a more even distribution of the oligopolists’ overall profit may stem from a desire
to maintain balance, over time, among the competing firms. In this case, therefore, the choice of a sequential
auction can be thought off as an indirect subsidy to the weaker market participant. For a discussion of this
issue, see Maasland et al. [69].
9In light of the results regarding information sharing in oligopoly (cf. Gal-Or [32, 33]), our signaling
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Overall, our results regarding the comparison of the two auction schemes are based on
the ability of the sequential auction to generate implicitly, by the characterization of the
equilibrium that describes the firms’ bidding behavior, information about the two winners’
relative strengths. Because of this information, the firms modify their interim valuations
for each of the auctioned licenses. The first license becomes more valuable, relative to a
license won in a simultaneous auction, since its acquisition promises a stronger presence in
the market. On the other hand, the second license becomes less valuable, since its recipient
knows that he will have a weaker market presence. As a result, the two licenses (as well as
the information that accompanies their acquisition) are sold at prices that differ from the
ones in the simultaneous auction.
The early study of auctions with externalities10 assumed that the externalities depend
only on the number of allocated objects (and not on the bidders’ types and identities).
In their study of the persistence of a monopoly, Gilbert and Newbery [35] show that a
monopolist who faces a potential entrant may bid for a technological innovation for which
he has no use, in a preemptive manner. Within the context of patent licensing and vertical
contracting, Katz and Shapiro [59], Kamien and Tauman [57] and Kamien et al. [56] compare
some typical licensing mechanisms, such as auctions, fixed fees and royalties, and show the
superiority of auctions.
Optimal selling mechanisms in the presence of type-dependent externalities were first
studied by Jehiel et al. [50, 51]. If the agents’ private information is multi-dimensional,
then it is optimal for the seller to employ identity-dependent “threats”, which can exploit
the negative allocative externalities in order to extract payments from bidders that do not
acquire the license. For very strong negative externalities, the bidders may even pay the
seller not to allocate the license at all. Clearly, this mechanism is not efficient. In fact,
Jehiel and Moldovanu [46, 48] show that, with multi-dimensional signals, efficiency cannot
be implemented. If the agents’ private information is single-dimensional, however, efficiency
is feasible. Figueroa and Skreta [27] show that sometimes the optimal mechanism is efficient;
at other times, though, it allocates the auctioned objects in a random manner.
results are hardly surprising. In particular, when signaling is possible, a separating equilibrium exists only
in the oligopoly in which the firms are willing to share information about their production costs.
10For an extensive survey of the literature on this subject, see Jehiel and Moldovanu [49].
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Since the application of the optimal mechanism, in particular, the differential treatment
of the bidders, may not be possible, Jehiel and Moldovanu [44, 45] examine relatively simpler
selling schemes, such as auctions with fixed reserve prices or entry fees. They find that some
bidders may prefer to abstain from the auction, if their participation can have an adverse
effect on the other bidders’ behavior and, eventually, on the winner’s identity. Conversely,
to encourage participation, the seller may set a reserve price below his own reservation
value. In a multi-unit setting, in particular, in the sale of the rights to use a cost-reducing
innovation in an oligopoly, Schmitz [87] and Bagchi [7] examine simultaneous auctions of
a predetermined number of licenses. As the bidders’ information is single-dimensional, the
licenses are allocated efficiently. In addition, the seller can be better off auctioning multiple
licenses rather than the exclusive rights to use the technology. Finally, in an auction of
multiple licenses to enter an already existing oligopoly, Hoppe et al. [41] show that the
resulting market can be less competitive if more licenses are made available.
Signaling in auctions with externalities was introduced in Goeree [37], who examined
the auction of a single license to compete against a monopolist with known marginal cost.
Das Varma [23], in a problem of bidding for the acquisition of a cost-reducing patent, iden-
tified conditions for the existence of equilibrium in the presence of negative informational
externalities. Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf [60] extended the study of signaling to more
general schemes of information revelation, showing the revenue equivalence of the auction
schemes that result to the same allocation and reveal the same information. Finally, Molna´r
and Vira´g [80] determine the revenue maximizing allocation and information mechanism in
environments with post-auction interaction.
The present work contributes to the existing literature on auctions with externalities
by extending the analysis of the multi-unit case to sequential auctions. When there is
no signaling, we show that both the simultaneous and the sequential scheme lead to an
efficient allocation of the licenses11 while they raise the same revenue for the seller. In
addition, we demonstrate the effects of the better-informed bidding that is allowed by the
sequential format, showing that it favors the weaker, ex-post, of the two oligopolists. Hence,
11Since the bidders’ private information is single-dimensional, the efficiency result in our setting does not
contradict Jehiel and Moldovanu [46, 48].
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in the absence of informational externalities, we conclude that the sequential auction can be
recommended as a policy device to an auctioneer who prefers a more even distribution of
the wealth generated by the creation of the oligopoly. Finally, we explore the implications
of signaling, showing that the incentive to understate one’s strength, which is present in the
case of the Bertrand oligopoly, eliminates the possibility of efficient allocation.
In sections 3.2 and 3.3, we present the model describing our problem and we analyze
the firms’ behavior in the oligopoly created by the auction of the two licenses. In section
3.4, we examine the two auction procedures when there is no signaling, deriving symmetric
equilibria in strictly monotone bidding strategies and comparing them. In section 3.5, we
analyze the case of positive signaling, which is present in the Cournot oligopoly, showing
that the non-signaling results fully extend. In section 3.6, we study the case of negative
signaling, present in the Bertrand oligopoly, showing that a symmetric equilibrium in strictly
monotone strategies exists only for the simultaneous auction. We conclude in section 3.7.
Lengthy proofs have been placed in section B of the appendix.
3.2 GENERAL MODEL
We study the auction of 2 licenses for participating in a newly formed oligopoly, which
will take the form of either Cournot competition or Bertrand competition for differentiated
products. The market profits of the two oligopolists depend, respectively, on the quantities
they supply to the market or on the prices they set for their product. These decisions depend,
in turn, on the oligopolists’ production costs.
There are N > 2 firms competing for the acquisition of the oligopoly licenses. The
firms have linear production technologies without fixed costs. Therefore, for each firm i,
its technology is characterized by the privately known marginal cost ci, which is drawn
independently, at the beginning of the game, from a distribution F : [c, c¯] → [0, 1], where
0 < c < c¯ < 1+c
2
.12 We assume that F is twice differentiable, with a density function
f : [c, c¯] → R+ that has full support. Finally, we assume that the inverse hazard rate
12In particular, this last assumption implies that c¯ < 1.
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[1− F (c)]/f(c) is decreasing.13
For any firm i, we denote by c1−i and c
2
−i the random variables describing respectively
the lowest and the second-lowest marginal costs of firm i’s competitors (and by c1 and c2 the
values these random variables take). In addition, we denote by G(c1) = 1− [1− F (c1)]N−1
the cumulative distribution function of c1−i and by
g(c1) = (N − 1) [1− F (c1)]N−2 f(c1)
the corresponding density function. Finally, we denote by G(c1, c2), for c1 ≤ c2, the joint
cumulative distribution function of c1−i and c
2
−i and by
g(c1, c2) = (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c2)]N−3 f(c2) f(c1),
for c1 ≤ c2, the joint density function.
We consider two auction formats:
a. A simultaneous pay-your-bid auction, with the two winning bids announced at the end
of the auction.
b. A sequence of two first-price auctions, with the winning bid announced at the end of
each auction.
In both formats, the winners’ bids are publicly known by the end of the auction process,
so that the information they reveal affects the ensuing market competition. Furthermore,
in the sequential auction, the winning bid in the first round becomes known prior to the
beginning of the second round, so that the information it conveys also affects the bidding for
the second license. Since there are no reserve prices in any of the auctions, we can assume
that the two licenses are always sold, even at a zero price.
13This assumption is satisfied by many well-known distributions, such as the uniform, exponential, normal,
power (for α ≥ 1), Weibull (for α ≥ 1) and gamma (for α ≥ 1) distributions. It is consistent with the
assumption of logconcave distribution of the firms’ strength, made elsewhere in the literature, in particular,
in Das Varma [23] and Goeree [37]. If the firms’ strength θ ∈ [c, c¯], defined by θ(c) = (c+ c¯)−c, is distributed
according to a logconcave density f˜ , then the rate F˜ (θ)/f˜(θ) must be increasing. This, in turn, implies that
the hazard rate [1−F (c)]/f(c) must be decreasing. For the definition and properties of logconcave probability
density functions, consult An [1] and Caplin and Nalebuff [15]; for more on the assumption of increasing
inverse hazard rate, consult Hoppe et al. [42].
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We will restrict attention to equilibria in symmetric strategies, strictly monotone in the
firm’s own marginal cost. Therefore, in the simultaneous auction, each firm i bids bi = β(ci),
according to its marginal cost ci and the strategy
β : [c, c¯] −→ R+.
Similarly, in the sequential auction, each firm i bids b1i = β
1(ci) in the first round, according
to its marginal cost ci and the strategy
β1 : [c, c¯] −→ R+.
If it fails to win the first round, then firm i bids b2i = β
2(ci | b1i , b1) in the second round,
according to its marginal cost ci, the first-round history
h1i = (b
1
i , b
1) ∈ H1sqc = R+ × R+,
consisting of the privately known bid b1i and the publicly known price b
1, and the strategy
β2 : [c, c¯]×H1sqc −→ R+.
Following the completion of the auction, each of the winning firms enters the oligopoly.
The information that firm i has at the end of the simultaneous auction,
hi = (bi, b
1, b2) ∈ Hsim = R+ × R+ × R+,
consists of its privately known bid bi and the publicly known prices b
1, b2.14 Similarly, the
information that firm i has at the end of the sequential auction is
h2i = (b
1
i , b
2
i , b
1, b2) ∈ H2sqc = R+ ×
(
R+ ∪ {∅})× R+ × R+,
allowing for the absence of a second-round bid, in the case of a first-round win.
14Without loss of generality, the two prices are in descending order.
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Given this information and its marginal cost ci, firm i will supply qi = q(ci | bi, b1, b2) or
qi = q(ci | b1i , b2i , b1, b2) in the Cournot oligopoly, according to the strategy
q : [c, c¯]×H −→ R+,
for H ∈ {Hsim, H2sqc}, following respectively a simultaneous or a sequential auction.
Similarly, in the Bertrand oligopoly, firm i will set a price pi = p(ci | bi, b1, b2) or
pi = p(ci | b1i , b2i , b1, b2), according to the strategy
p : [c, c¯]×H −→ R+,
for H ∈ {Hsim, H2sqc}, following respectively a simultaneous or a sequential auction.
Overall, we will impose a stronger symmetry requirement, one that rules out the pos-
sibility of using past histories as a labeling device for asymmetric continuation strategies.
This assumption will rule out, in particular, asymmetric supply or price-setting strategies
for the two oligopolists.15
In the sequel, we will use the strict monotonicity of the bidding strategies, with respect
to the firm’s own marginal cost, to simplify the notation in the following manner:
Notation:
In the sequential auction, we will denote16 firm i’s second-period bid b2i , following a first-
period bid b1i and a price b
1 = β1(c1), by
β2(ci | b1i , β1(c1)) ≡ β2(ci | c1).
In the Cournot oligopoly, following either a simultaneous or a sequential auction, we will
denote firm i’s supplied quantity, qi = q(ci | bi, b1, b2) or qi = q(ci | b1i , b2i , b1, b2), by
qi ≡ q(ci | c˜i, c˜j),
15For example, in the sequential setting, this assumption does not allow the possibility of prescribing
different oligopoly strategies to the winners of the first and the second sequential auctions.
16This simplification is customary in sequential auctions; for example, see Krishna [62], chapter 15. It is
based on the strict monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy β1 as well as on the independence of
the equilibrium bidding strategy β2 of the first-round bid b1i .
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where c˜i and c˜j are the marginal costs corresponding to the bids, under the equilibrium bidding
strategies, with which firms i and j won their oligopoly licenses.
Similarly, in the Bertrand oligopoly, following either of the two auction formats, we will
denote firm i’s requested price, pi = p(ci | bi, b1, b2) or pi = p(ci | b1i , b2i , b1, b2), by
pi ≡ p(ci | c˜i, c˜j).
The notational simplification of the oligopoly supply or price setting strategies is also based
on the independence of these strategies of the firm’s privately known bids. Indeed, as it will
turn out, each oligopolist’s behavior depends only on its own marginal cost, ci, its opponent’s
inferred marginal cost, c˜j, and its own marginal cost as perceived by its opponent, c˜i. Since
the costs c˜i and c˜j are inferred by the publicly known prices, the privately known bids provide
no information.
The game payoff of firm i, in case it wins a license, equals its profit from the oligopoly
minus the price that it paid for the license. Otherwise, if it does not win any license, it
equals zero.
The solution concept is that of perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The players must therefore
behave optimally at each decision point, given their knowledge of the other players’ strategies
and their beliefs. On the equilibrium path, these beliefs are formed by applying Bayes’ rule
while, off the equilibrium path, they are arbitrary.
3.3 MARKET COMPETITION
When the two winners’ marginal costs, ci and cj, are truthfully revealed at the end of the
auction, the firms cannot use their bids to manipulate their market opportunities, that is, no
signaling is possible. In this case, each oligopolist supplies a quantity qi = q
NS(ci, cj) or sets
a price pi = p
NS(ci, cj), which is independent of the bids submitted to or the prices reported
in the auction.
When the oligopolists must infer their opponent’s marginal cost by the reported prices,
the opportunity of signaling arises. In this case, the two winning bids bti and b
t′
j perfectly
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reveal, through the inversion of the corresponding strategies βt(.) and βt
′
(.), the marginal
costs c˜i and c˜j that the winners mimicked in the auction.
17 Therefore, each firm supplies
qi = q(ci | c˜i, c˜j) or sets a price pi = p(ci | c˜i, c˜j). Since we consider only unilateral deviations,
in examining the incentives of player i we will assume that c˜j = cj, so that qi = q(ci | c˜i, cj)
and pi = p(ci | c˜i, cj).
Clearly, in the equilibrium path, the two firms reveal their marginal costs truthfully. As
a result, for all ci, cj ∈ [c, c¯], we have q(ci | ci, cj) = qNS(ci, cj) and p(ci | ci, cj) = pNS(ci, cj).
In analyzing the firms’ market behavior, therefore, we will consider only the case of signaling,
treating the absence of signaling as one of its particular outcomes.
3.3.1 Cournot Oligopoly
We consider a Cournot oligopoly, in which the inverse demand function is given by p = 1−q,
where p is the market price and q = qi + qj is the aggregate supply of oligopolists i and j.
If firm i reveals its marginal cost ci truthfully, then, by supplying qi ∈ [0, 1 − qj] in
response to qj ∈ [0, 1], it will make a market profit
pi(qi, qj) = qi (1− qi − qj − ci).
Therefore, in equilibrium, firm i will supply18
q(ci | ci, cj) = 13 (1 + cj − 2ci),
for a profit of
pi(ci | ci, cj) = (13)2 (1 + cj − 2ci)2.
17In the sequential auction, it is possible for a bidder to deviate into mimicking two different types, if he
does not win in the first round. In this case, however, only the type mimicked in the second auction will be
revealed and, therefore, be relevant in the analysis of the post-auction competition.
18The assumption of c¯ < 1+c2 ensures that the market does not become a monopoly. In equilibrium, it is
optimal for a firm to supply a positive quantity to the market, regardless of its own marginal cost and its
beliefs about the marginal cost of the other firm.
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Off the equilibrium path, if firm i mimics a type c˜i 6= ci in the auction that it wins, firm
j will supply q(cj | cj, c˜i) = 13 (1 + c˜i − 2cj). Therefore, firm i will maximize its profit by
supplying
q(ci | c˜i, cj) = 13
(
1 + cj − 32ci − 12 c˜i
)
.
In this case, its market profit will be
pi(ci | c˜i, cj) =
(
1
3
)2 (
1 + cj − 32ci − 12 c˜i
)2
.
Clearly, we have
pi2 =
∂pi
∂c˜i
< 0,
so, prior to market competition, during the auction process, each firm has an incentive to
overstate its power by mimicking a lower marginal cost.
3.3.2 Bertrand Oligopoly
We consider a Bertrand oligopoly, in which each firm i faces a linear demand function
qi = 1 − pi + γ pj, where pi and pj are the prices set respectively by firm i and its rival,
firm j, while γ ∈ [0, 1) is a parameter reflecting the degree of product differentiation.19 Since
γ < 1, the demand faced by each firm is more responsive to changes in the price charged by
this firm than to changes in the price charged by its rival.
If firm i reveals its marginal cost ci truthfully, then, by setting a price pi ∈ [0, 1 + γ pj]
in response to a price pj ∈ [0, 1], it will make a market profit
pi(pi, pj) = (1− pi + γ pj) (pi − ci).
19Our results will not change, if we consider a more general linear demand function qi = α − β qi + γ pj ,
for β ≥ γ, as the induced equilibrium market profit function will demonstrate the same properties.
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Therefore, in equilibrium, firm i will set a price
p(ci | ci, cj) = 2 + γ + γ cj + 2ci
4− γ2 ,
for a profit of
pi(ci | ci, cj) = [2 + γ + γ cj − (2− γ
2) ci]
2
(4− γ2)2 .
Off equilibrium, if firm i mimics a type c˜i 6= ci, firm j will set a price pj = p(cj | cj, c˜i).
Therefore, firm i will be best-off by setting a price
p(ci | c˜i, cj) = 2(2 + γ) + 2γ cj + (4− γ
2) ci + γ
2 c˜i
2(4− γ2) ,
for a market profit of
pi(c˜i | ci, cj) = [ 2(2 + γ) + 2γ cj − (4− γ
2) ci + γ
2 c˜i ]
2
4 (4− γ2)2 .
In this market, we have
pi2 =
∂pi
∂c˜i
> 0,
so, during the auction process, each firm has an incentive to understate its power by mim-
icking a higher marginal cost.
3.3.3 General Remarks
For both oligopolies, the market profit function of each firm i is decreasing in its own marginal
cost ci and increasing in its rival’s marginal cost cj. That is,
pi1 =
∂pi
∂ci
< 0
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and
pi3 =
∂pi
∂cj
> 0.
Furthermore, for all c ∈ [c, c¯], we have
d
dc
[pi(c | c, c)] = pi1(c | c, c) + pi2(c | c, c) + pi3(c | c, c) < 0,
so that, with truthful revelation of the firms’ marginal costs, a firm’s market profit will be
affected more by a change in its own marginal cost than by the same change in its rival’s
marginal cost.
The two oligopolies differ in the sign of the derivative
pi2 =
∂pi
∂c˜i
,
that is, in the signaling incentives of the firms. In the Cournot oligopoly, there is positive
signaling, that is, each firm has an incentive to overstate its power. On the other hand, in the
Bertrand oligopoly, there is negative signaling, that is, each firm is better off understating
its power. Other than that, in particular, when there is no signaling, the profit functions in
the two oligopolies induce the same, qualitatively, incentives.20
3.4 NO SIGNALING
When signaling is not possible, the value of each oligopoly license,
piNS(ci, cj) = pi(ci|ci, cj),
20The opposite signaling incentives correspond to the distinction between strategic substitutes and strategic
complements, introduced by Bulow et al. [12]. In particular, in the Cournot oligopoly that we have described,
quantities are strategic substitutes, since an increase in qi causes a decrease in the qj (as well as a decrease
in the profit of firm j). On the other hand, in the Bertrand oligopoly, prices are strategic complements, since
an increase in pi causes an increase in pj (and in the profit of firm j).
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is fully determined by the actual marginal costs of the two firms that compete in the market.
Mimicking a different type during the auction process cannot affect a firm’s potential market
profits. It only affects the firm’s probability of winning the auction and its expected payment
in it.
3.4.1 Simultaneous Auction
Suppose that all firms follow a strictly decreasing bidding strategy b = β(c) and consider
firm i with marginal cost ci. Then, by mimicking a type c˜i ∈ [c, c¯] during the auction, firm
i will win a license if and only if c˜i ≤ c2−i. In this case, the actual value of this license will
be equal to firm i’s market profit, piNS(ci, c
1
−i), which depends on the marginal cost c
1
−i of
the winner of the other license. Therefore, for a bid b˜i = β(c˜i), the expected payoff of firm i is
Π(c˜i | ci) = P[c2−i ≥ c˜i] × [Ec1−i [piNS(ci, c1−i) | c2−i ≥ c˜i ] − β(c˜i) ]
or, by expanding the term for the firm’s expected market profit,
Π(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c˜i
c
piNS(ci, c
1) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
c˜i
piNS(ci, c
1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
− P[c2−i ≥ c˜i] β(c˜i).
The first-order condition with respect to c˜i results in the equation
d
dc˜i
{P[c2−i ≥ ci] β(ci)} = −
∫ ci
c
piNS(ci, c
1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (ci)]N−3 f(ci)f(c1) dc1,
which requires, in a manner that is standard for “pay-your-bid” auction schemes, that any
increase in the firm’s expected market profit from a deviation to c˜i 6= ci must be offset by
an increase in the firm’s expected payment in the auction.
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The differential equation derived from the first-order condition, along with the boundary
condition expressing the equilibrium behavior of the weakest type ci = c¯,
β(c¯) =
∫ c¯
c
piNS(c¯, c) f(c) dc,
which guarantees the uniqueness of the solution to that differential equation, provides the
equilibrium bidding strategy for this setting.
Proposition 3.1.
In the simultaneous pay-your-bid auction of two oligopoly licenses, in which the winners’
marginal costs are revealed truthfully after the auction, the following strategy constitutes a
symmetric separating equilibrium:
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
piNS(c2, c1)
(N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c2)]N−3 f(c2)f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2 (3.1)
The strategy β(ci) can also be expressed as
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
vNS(c2)
(N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c2)]N−3 F (c2)f(c2)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc2,
where
vNS(c) =
∫ c
c
piNS(c, c1)
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1,
for c ∈ [c, c¯], is the expected market profit of a firm with marginal cost c, assuming that its
market opponent is stronger. Therefore, in equilibrium, each firm submits a bid equal to the
expected market profit of the strongest non-winning firm.
The value of the licences that the two winners of the auction gain is determined en-
dogenously, as a function of the marginal costs of the winning bids. Since these costs are
unknown prior to the end of the auction process, it is possible for a firm, when its market
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opponent turns out to be stronger than expected, to acquire a licence at a price above its
ex-post value.21
Corollary 3.2.
In the simultaneous auction, the firm with the lowest marginal cost gains a license at a price
below its ex-post value. The firm with the second-lowest marginal cost, however, may gain a
license at a price above its ex-post value.
Hence, in equilibrium, the stronger of the two oligopolists will always make a positive
profit. On the other hand, the weaker oligopolist may regret his participation to the market,
because of the price of the license.
3.4.2 Sequential Auction
When the two licenses are allocated by means of a sequence of first-price auctions, then,
assuming that the firms follow strictly monotone bidding strategies, the winning bid in the
first auction reveals the marginal cost c1 of the strongest oligopolist. This information affects
the bidding for the second license in two distinct manners. First, it allows the remaining
firms to learn, prior to the second auction, the actual value of the license for which they
compete. In addition, the revealed marginal cost c1 forms a lower bound for the marginal
costs of the remaining firms. Therefore, after the end of the first auction, the firms update
their beliefs, so that, for c ∈ [c1, c¯],
ci ∼ F˜ (c) = F (c)− F (c
1)
1− F (c1) .
21We emphasize the difference between this phenomenon and the winner’s curse for an auction with
interdependent valuations (as well as for our environment). The winner’s curse refers to the bad news that
a victory in such an auction conveys, namely, that the winner’s estimate of the value of the auctioned object
has been the most optimistic one. In the equilibrium path, the winner’s curse is eliminated by means of an
adjustment of the bidders’ estimates. Still, it is possible that the losing bidders’ private information will be
very negative, so as to defy the winner’s reasonable expectation and to result in a value that is below the
price the winner must pay. It is this phenomenon to which we refer as the winner’s regret.
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Since the privately known first-period bids do not affect the firms’ behavior in the second
period, the second auction takes the form of a standard first-price auction with independent
private values.
Lemma 3.3.
Suppose that N − 1 firms, whose marginal costs are i.i.d. according to the distribution
function F (·) on [c, c¯], compete in a first-price auction for a license to participate in an
oligopoly against a firm with known marginal cost c1 ∈ [c, c¯]. In addition, suppose that the
firms believe that the unknown marginal costs are bounded below by the value c1. Then,
assuming that the winner’s marginal cost is revealed truthfully at the end of the auction, the
following strategy constitutes a symmetric equilibrium:
For a marginal cost ci ≥ c1, firm i bids
β2(ci |c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
piNS(c, c1)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc,
while for a marginal cost ci < c
1, firm i bids b2 = β2(c1 |c1).
A marginal cost ci < c
1 corresponds to an event off the equilibrium path, namely, to
the case in which firm i should have won the first license but did not bid according to the
strategy β1 that was prescribed in the first auction.22 Such a firm enters the second auction
knowing that it has the highest valuation and that it will be best-off bidding as if it has
marginal cost c1.
For the analysis of the firms’ behavior in the first auction, we will need the strategy
β2(ci|ci) to be decreasing with respect to the marginal cost ci. Without this condition,
the strategy β1(ci) that we derive may fail to be strictly decreasing, thus invalidating the
argument leading to it. Notice, therefore, that the derivative of β2(ci|ci) equals to
22Restricting attention to the game described in Lemma 3.3, notice that the possibility of ci < c1 does not
contradict the firms’ beliefs and, therefore, does not violate the consistency requirement in the definition of
Nash equilibrium. We can simply assume that prior to the draw of the privately known marginal costs ci,
each firm attaches zero probability to the event ci < c1, for all i.
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ddci
[ β2(ci|ci) ] = −piNS(ci, ci) (N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci)
+
∫ c¯
ci
piNS2 (c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
+
∫ c¯
ci
piNS(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ,
or, after integrating the last term by parts, to
d
dci
[ β2(ci|ci) ] =
∫ c¯
ci
piNS2 (c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
+
∫ c¯
ci
piNS1 (c, ci)
[1− F (c)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) . (3.2)
Since the derivatives piNS1 (ci | c1) and piNS2 (ci | c1) are respectively decreasing and increasing
in the valuation ci, we have
d
dci
[ β2(ci|ci) ] ≥ piNS2 (c¯, ci) + piNS1 (ci, ci) × [E[c1−i,j | c1−i,j ≥ ci]− ci ]
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ,
where c1−i,j denotes the lowest value among N-2 realizations of the marginal cost ci. Hence,
since piNS1 < 0 < pi
NS
2 , if the hazard ratio f(ci)/[1− F (ci)] is too small, then the derivative
d
dci
[ β2(ci|ci) ] can be positive.
We avoid this possibility by imposing the following condition:
Assumption 3.4.
The distribution of the firms’ marginal costs satisfies the inequality
∫ c¯
ci
[1− F (c)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ≥ supc≥ci
{
piNS2 (c, ci)
−piNS1 (c, ci)
}
1− F (ci)
(N − 2) f(ci) ,
for all ci ∈ [c, c¯].
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In the case of uniformly distributed marginal costs, Assumption 3.4 is satisfied for the
Cournot oligopoly that we have described. Indeed, for ci ∼ U [c, c¯], it requires that
c¯− ci
N − 1 ≥
c¯− ci
2(N − 2) ,
which is true for all N ≥ 3. On the other hand, for a Bertrand oligopoly with parameter
γ ∈ [0, 1), the assumption reduces to requiring that
N − 2
N − 1 ≥
γ
2− γ2 ,
which is satisfied only if the number of firms, N , is sufficiently large, relative to γ.
Assumption 3.4 requires that the inverse hazard rate does not decrease too rapidly. More
precisely, as it is shown by the proof of the next Lemma, the inequality
1− F (c)
f(c)
>
piNS2 (c, ci)
−piNS1 (c, ci)
1− F (ci)
f(ci)
remains valid for a sufficiently large interval of values c ≥ ci, so that the negative term in
the equation (3.2) defining d
dci
[β2(ci|ci)] dominates the positive one.
Lemma 3.5.
Under Assumption 3.4, the function β2(ci|ci) is decreasing in ci ∈ [c, c¯].
In the first auction, suppose that all firms follow a strictly monotone bidding strategy
b1 = β1(c) and consider firm i with marginal cost ci. Then, by mimicking a type c˜i ∈ [c, c¯]
in this auction, firm i will win the first license if and only if c˜i ≤ c1−i. In this case, the actual
value of this license will be equal to firm i’s market profit, piNS(ci, c
1
−i), which depends on
the marginal cost c1−i of the winner of the second license.
Therefore, by bidding b˜i = β(c˜i) for c˜i ≤ ci, firm i expects a total payoff
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Π(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c¯
c˜i
[ piNS(ci, c
1)− β1(c˜i) ] (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c˜i
c
[ piNS(ci, c
1)− β2(ci | c1) ] (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c1) dc1,
while by bidding b˜i = β(c˜i) for c˜i ≥ ci, firm i expects a total payoff
Π(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c¯
c˜i
[ piNS(ci, c
1)− β1(c˜i) ] (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ ci
c
[ piNS(ci, c
1)− β2(ci | c1) ] (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c˜i
ci
[ piNS(c1, c1)− β2(c1 | c1) ] (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1.
In the second case, the extra term results from the possibility of selling the first license to
a firm with marginal cost c1 ∈ [ci, c˜i]. In this case, firm i bids b2 = β2(c1 | c1) in the second
auction, knowing that it has the lowest marginal cost among the remaining firms.
In both cases, the necessary first-order condition at the endpoint c˜i = ci results in
d
dc˜i
{ [1− F (ci)]N−1 β1(ci)} = − β2(ci | ci) (N − 1) [1− F (ci)]N−2 f(ci). (3.3)
By solving this differential equation, along with the boundary condition
β1(c¯) = piNS(c¯, c¯)
that expresses the bidding behavior of the weakest possible type, we get the strategy
β1(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
β2(c1 | c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1,
which is part of the equilibrium in our sequential auction.
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Proposition 3.6.
In a sequential first-price auction of two oligopoly licenses, in which the winners’ bids are
announced at the end of each round and their marginal costs are truthfully revealed at the
end of the entire auction, the following strategy profile constitutes a symmetric separating
equilibrium:
– In the first auction, each firm i bids
β1(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
piNS(c2, c1)
(N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1. (3.4)
– In the second auction, if firm i has a marginal cost ci ≥ c1 = (β1)−1(b1), where b1 is the
price at which the first license was sold, then it bids
β2(ci |c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
piNS(c2, c1)
(N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
2, (3.5)
while with a marginal cost ci < c
1, it bids b2 = β2(c1 |c1).
The equation (3.4) defining the bidding strategy β1(ci) is a non-arbitrage condition for
the winner of the first auction, which is, as it has turned out, the firm with the lowest
marginal cost ci. If this firm does not participate in the first auction, then it can win the
second auction with a bid equal to β2(c1|c1), where c1 ≥ ci is the revealed lowest competing
marginal cost. Therefore, to be indifferent, this firm must bid in the first auction an amount
equal to its expected bid in the second round.
In the sequential first-price auction, the firms can infer from the first-round price, prior
to submitting their second-round bids, the marginal cost of the strongest firm. Therefore,
in the sequential auction, unlike the case of the simultaneous auction, it is possible for both
winning firms to avoid paying for their licenses prices that exceed their ex-post values.
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Corollary 3.7.
In the sequential first-price auction, both licenses are sold at prices below their ex-post values.
Proof:
The proof for the license sold in the first auction, to the firm with the lowest marginal cost,
follows from a direct argument, identical to the one for the simultaneous auction.
In the second auction, the remaining bidders know the marginal cost c1 of the first firm
and, therefore, their value for the license, so that they never bid an amount above it.
The revelation of the marginal cost of the strongest firm after the end of the first auction
makes the second license less profitable for the remaining firms. As a result, these firms’
bidding for the second license becomes less aggressive.
Corollary 3.8.
In the sequential first-price auction, the prices at which the two licenses are sold form a
super-martingale:
Ec1−i [β
2(c1−i|ci) | ci] ≤ β1(ci).
Proof:
Suppose that the first license is sold at a price b1 = β1(ci), corresponding to a marginal cost
ci. Then, conditional on this information, the expected price for the second license will be
Ec1−i [β
2(c1−i|ci) | b1 = β1(ci)] = Ec1−i [β2(c1−i|ci) | c1−i ≥ ci]
and, since β2(c1|c1) > β2(c1|ci), for all c1 ∈ [ci, c¯],
Ec1−i [β
2(c1−i|ci) | b1 = β1(ci)] < Ec1−i [β2(c1−i|c1−i) | c1−i ≥ ci] = β1(ci),
as required for the result.
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The super-martingale property implies that the (ex-ante) expected price of the second
license is lower than the expected price of the first license:
Eci, c1−i [ β
2(c1−i|ci) ] = Eci [Ec1−i [β2(c1−i|ci) | b1 = β1(ci)] ]
< Eci [ β1(ci) ].
Hence, the information revealed in the process of the sequential auction makes the ex-
pected prices decrease.
3.4.3 Comparison of Auction Schemes
The two auction schemes that we have examined, the simultaneous pay-your-bid auction and
the sequential first-price auction, have turned out to be allocation equivalent. The licenses
are allocated to the two strongest firms, that is, to the firms with the lowest marginal costs.
However, the manner in which the firms bid in each scheme is different.
In the simultaneous auction, the firms submit their bids without knowing the actual
value of the licenses that they try to acquire. This value is determined endogenously, by the
marginal costs of the firms that will compete in the market, and is revealed only at the end
of the auction. In addition, the firms cannot know whether, in case they win one of the two
licenses, they will face a stronger or a weaker market competitor. Therefore, while bidding,
they need to take both possibilities into account.
On the other hand, in the sequential auction, the firms bidding for the second license
know its actual value, since the marginal cost of the first oligopolist has been revealed by
the winning bid in the first auction. Furthermore, in the auction for the first license, the
firms know that if they win, then they will face a weaker market competitor. Therefore,
they can bid more aggressively, since they are protected from the more negative of the two
possibilities.
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The following result shows that these informational differences do not affect the revenue
generated by the auctioneer in the two schemes.
Proposition 3.9.
The simultaneous pay-your-bid auction and the sequential first-price auction of two Cournot
oligopoly licenses result in the same expected revenue for the auctioneer.
Proof:
It is easy to show, by changing the order of integration in the definition of β(ci), that
P[c2−i ≥ ci] β(ci) = [1− F (ci)]N−1 β1(ci)
+ (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci)
∫ ci
c
β2(ci|c1) f(c
1)
F (ci)
dc1. (3.6)
This means that the expected payments of a firm with marginal cost ci in the simulta-
neous auction, RDNS(ci), and in the sequential auction, R
S
NS(ci), are equal.
Therefore, since this is true for any ci ∈ [c, c¯], it follows that
N
∫ c¯
c
RDNS(ci)f(ci) dci = N
∫ c¯
c
RSNS(ci)f(ci) dci,
so that the two auction schemes raise the same expected revenue.
Hence, the auctioneer is indifferent, with respect to the revenue that he expects to raise,
between the two auction schemes. Similarly, the bidders are indifferent, with respect to the
payments that they expect to make, between the simultaneous and the sequential auction.
The two auction formats, however, allocate each of the two licenses at different prices.
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Proposition 3.10.
The stronger of the two oligopolists pays a higher price for his license in the sequential first-
price auction than in the simultaneous pay-your-bid auction; the weaker oligopolist pays a
lower price for his license in the sequential auction than in the simultaneous auction:
β1(ci) > β(ci) > Ec1−i [ β
2(ci | c1−i) | c1−i < ci].
Therefore, in the first auction of the sequential format, the firms bid more aggressively than
in the simultaneous auction, knowing that if they win, they will necessarily face a weaker
market competitor. On the other hand, the firms participating in the second auction bid
less aggressively, on average, since they know that they will have to face a stronger market
competitor.
Corollary 3.11.
The stronger of the two oligopolists makes a higher total profit in the simultaneous pay-your-
bid auction. The weaker oligopolist makes a higher total profit in the sequential first-price
auction.
Proof:
Since both auction formats result to the same market supply and profits, any change in the
firms’ total profits will be the consequence of a change in the prices that the firms pay for
their licenses. Therefore, the result follows directly from Proposition 3.10.
Hence, an auctioneer aiming at a more equal distribution of the wealth generated in the
oligopolistic market will prefer the sequential first-price auction to the simultaneous pay-
your-bid auction.
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3.5 POSITIVE SIGNALING: COURNOT COMPETITION
When signaling is possible, we need to revise the firms’ valuations for the oligopoly licenses
so as to incorporate to them the informational rents that the firms can extract. In the case
of Cournot competition, in which the signaling incentives are positive, the firms’ valuations
shall be adjusted upwards.
To demonstrate the need for this adjustment, consider an auction of a single license to
compete against a monopolist with known marginal cost c1. When signaling is not possible,
a firm i with marginal cost ci ∈ [c, c¯] would be willing to bid for the license an amount up to
piNS(ci, c
1) = pi(ci | ci, c1).
If signaling becomes possible, then, by mimicking a marginally stronger type c˜i < ci, firm i
can increase its market profit, in case it wins the license, by approximately
−pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) dc˜i > 0.
Therefore, the maximal amount that the firm would be willing to bid exceeds piNS(ci, c
1).
Since the effects of mimicking a different type depend on the auction format and on the
equilibrium strategies that the bidders use, the manner in which the firms adjust their valu-
ations will also depend on these elements. Therefore, the firms’ valuations will be different
in each auction environment that we consider.
Overall, under positive signaling, a firm’s deviation to signaling a stronger type will have
two effects. First, assuming that the bidding strategies are monotone, it will increase the
probability of acquiring a license. Second, it will increase the profitability of the license that
the firm may win. Hence, to offset both these effects, the firms must bid more aggressively
than they would do if signaling were not possible.
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3.5.1 Simultaneous Auction
Suppose that all firms follow a strictly decreasing bidding strategy b = β(c) and consider
firm i with marginal cost ci. If firm i mimics a type c˜i ∈ [c, c¯] during the auction, by bidding
b˜i = β(c˜i), then its expected total payoff will be
Π(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c˜i
c
pi(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
c˜i
pi(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
− P[c2−i ≥ c˜i] β(c˜i).
The first-order condition with respect to c˜i results in the equation
d
dc˜i
{P[c2−i ≥ ci] β(ci)} =
∫ ci
c
pi2(ci | ci, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (ci)]N−2 f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
ci
pi2(ci | ci, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c1)]N−2 f(c1) dc1 (3.7)
−
∫ ci
c
pi(ci | ci, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (ci)]N−3 f(ci)f(c1) dc1,
which requires that any increase in the firm’s expected market profit from a deviation to
c˜i 6= ci, as this may be augmented by the expected gains from false signaling23, must be
offset by an increase in the firm’s expected payment in the auction.
The differential equation derived from the first-order condition, along with the boundary
condition expressing the behavior of the weakest type, ci = c¯,
β(c¯) =
∫ c¯
c
pi(c¯ | c¯, c) f(c) dc,
23In particular, when ci < c1−i < c
2
−i, the change in the firm’s expected market profit is entirely the
consequence of false signaling.
53
provides the equilibrium strategy for this setting.
Proposition 3.12.
In the simultaneous pay-your-bid auction of two Cournot oligopoly licenses, in which the win-
ners’ bids are revealed at the end of the auction, there is a symmetric separating equilibrium
given by the strategy
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c
2)]N−3 f(c2) f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c
2)]N−2 f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2 (3.8)
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c2
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c
1)]N−2 f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2.
In this equilibrium, the firm with the lowest marginal cost gains its license at a price below its
ex-post value. The firm with the second-lowest marginal cost, however, may gain its license
at a price above its ex-post value.
Proof:
Notice that the strategy β(ci) can be expressed as
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
u(c2)
(N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c2)]N−3 F (c2) f(c2)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc2,
where
u(c) =
∫ c
c
pi(c | c, c1) × f(c
1)
F (c)
dc1
+
∫ c
c
[−pi2(c | c, c1) 1− F (c)
(N − 2)f(c) ] ×
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1
+
∫ c¯
c
[−pi2(c | c, c1) 1− F (c)
(N − 2)f(c) ] ×
[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (c)]N−2F (c) dc
1,
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for c ∈ [c, c¯], is the valuation of a firm with marginal cost c, assuming that its market
opponent is stronger and taking into account the informational rents from false signaling.
Therefore, the proof of this result parallels the one of Proposition 3.1, with u(c) in place
of vNS(c). Its details, in particular, the argument establishing that u(c) is decreasing, can
be found in the Appendix.
The first term in the bidding strategy,
βNS(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c
2)]N−3 f(c1)f(c2)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2,
corresponds to the amount that a firm with marginal cost ci would bid, if signaling were not
possible.
The second and third terms,24
βS(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
2)]N−2f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c2
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2,
correspond to the amount by which the firms should augment their bids so as to offset possi-
ble gains from false signaling by the other firms. Even though there can be no false signaling
in equilibrium, without this amount, it would be possible for a firm to deviate into mimick-
ing a stronger type and, therefore, to increase both the probability of winning a license and,
through false signaling, the value of that license.
24The two double integrals do not allow, of course, for the possibility of c1−i > c
2
−i. Rather, in each case,
the outer integral determines a value c2 ∈ [ci, c¯] such that c2 ≤ c2−i, while c1−i ≤ c2−i. This creates two
possibilities, namely, either c1−i ≤ c2 ≤ c2−i, corresponding to the first signaling term, or c2 ≤ c1−i ≤ c2−i,
corresponding to the second signaling term.
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3.5.2 Sequential Auction
In the sequential auction, the winning bid in the first round reveals the marginal cost c1 of
the strongest oligopolist. Therefore, similarly to the case in which signaling is not possible,
in the second round, the firms know precisely the value of the license for which they bid.
In addition, they know that the other firms’ marginal costs are bounded below by c1; thus,
they update their beliefs, so that, for all c ∈ [c1, c¯],
ci ∼ F˜ (c) = F (c)− F (c
1)
1− F (c1) .
Since the privately known first-period bids do not affect the firms’ incentives in the second
auction, our second-period bidding environment belongs to the class of auctions studied by
Das Varma [23], Goeree [37] and Katzman and Rhodes-Kropf [60]. In the following Lemma,
we apply their analysis to our setting:
Lemma 3.13.
Suppose that N − 1 firms, whose marginal costs are i.i.d. according to the distribution func-
tion F (.) on [c, c¯], compete in a first-price auction for a license to participate in a Cournot
oligopoly against a firm with known marginal cost c1. In addition, suppose that the firms
believe that the unknown marginal costs are bounded below by the value c1 ∈ [c, c¯]. Then,
assuming that the winner’s bid is revealed at the end of the auction, the following strategy
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium:
For a marginal cost ci ≥ c1, firm i bids
β2(ci |c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
[
pi(c|c, c1)− pi2(c|c, c1) 1− F (c)
(N − 2)f(c)
]
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc,
while for a marginal cost ci < c
1, firm i bids b2 = β2(c1 |c1).
In addition, for any c1 ∈ [c, c¯], the strategy β2(ci|c1) is strictly decreasing in ci ∈ (c1, c¯ ], so
that, along the equilibrium path, an auction price b2 < β2(c1|c1) fully reveals the marginal
cost of the winning firm.
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Every firm i submits a bid that is equal to the value that its strongest competitor is
expected to have for the license, assuming that this competitor has marginal cost c ≥ ci,
β2NS(ci | c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
pi(c | c, c1) (N − 2)[1− F (c)]
N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc,
augmented by the amount needed to offset possible gains from false signaling by its com-
petitors, namely,
β2S(ci | c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
−pi2(c | c, c1) [1− F (c)]
N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc.
Without this amount, it would be possible for a firm i to deviate into mimicking c˜i < ci and
to increase both the probability of winning a license and, through false signaling, the value
of that license. For the second gain to be offset, each firm needs to bid above β2NS(ci |c1), by
an amount at least as large as β2S(ci |c1).
To ensure that the strategy β2(ci|ci) is decreasing with respect to the marginal cost ci,
we will need to modify Assumption 3.4 in the following manner:
Assumption 3.14.
The distribution of the firms’ marginal costs satisfies the inequality
∫ c¯
ci
[1− F (c)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ≥ supc≥ci
{
v2(c, ci)
−v˜1(c, ci)
}
1− F (ci)
(N − 2) f(ci) ,
for all ci ∈ [c, c¯], where
v˜1(c, c
1) =
d
dc
[pi(c | c, c1)] − d
dc
[pi2(c | c, c1)] 1− F (c)
(N − 2) f(c) .
For the Cournot duopoly that we have described, we have
sup
c≥ci
{
v2(c, ci)
−v˜1(c, ci)
}
= sup
c≥ci
{
pi1(c | c, ci)
−pi2(c | c, ci)
}
,
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so that Assumption 3.14 reduces to Assumption 3.4. In particular, for marginal costs
ci ∼ U [c, c¯], the assumption is always satisfied.
Lemma 3.15.
Under Assumption 3.14, the function β2(ci|ci) is decreasing in ci ∈ [c, c¯].
In the first auction, arguing in the same manner as in the non-signaling case, suppose
that all firms follow a strictly monotone bidding strategy β1(c) and consider firm i with
marginal cost ci. By bidding b˜i = β(c˜i) for c˜i ≤ ci, firm i expects a total payoff
Π(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c¯
c˜i
[ pi(ci | c˜i, c1)− β1(c˜i) ] (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c˜i
c
[ pi(ci | ci, c1)− β2(ci | c1) ] (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c1) dc1,
while by bidding b˜i = β(c˜i) for c˜i ≥ ci, firm i expects a total payoff
Π(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c¯
c˜i
[ pi(ci | c˜i, c1)− β1(c˜i) ] (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ ci
c
[ pi(ci | ci, c1)− β2(ci | c1) ] (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c˜i
ci
[ pi(ci | c1, c1)− β2(c1 | c1) ] (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1.
In both cases, the necessary first-order condition at the endpoint c˜i = ci results in the
differential equation
d
dc˜i
{ [1− F (ci)]N−1 β1(ci)} =
∫ c¯
ci
pi2(ci | ci, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c1)]N−2 f(c1) dc1
− β2(ci | ci) (N − 1) [1− F (ci)]N−2 f(ci).
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By solving this differential equation, along with the boundary condition
β1(c¯) = pi(c¯ | c¯, c¯),
we get the strategy
β1(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
β2(c1 | c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1
−
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c2
pi2(c
2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1 dc2,
for the equilibrium of the sequential auction.
Proposition 3.16.
In a sequential first-price auction of two Cournot oligopoly licenses, in which the winners’ bids
are revealed at the end of each auction, the following strategy profile constitutes a symmetric
separating equilibrium:
– In the first auction, each firm i bids
β1(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
2)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1 (3.9)
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c1
ci
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1.
– In the second auction, if firm i has a marginal cost ci ≥ c1 = (β1)−1(b1), where b1 is
the price at which the first license was sold, then it bids
59
β2(ci | c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
2
+
∫ c¯
ci
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) [1− F (c
2)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
2, (3.10)
while with a marginal cost ci < c
1, it bids b2 = β2(c1 |c1).
Proof:
Notice that the strategy β1(ci) can be expressed as
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
v(c1)
(N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2 f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1,
where
v(c) =
∫ c¯
c
pi(c | c, c1) × (N − 2) [1− F (c
1)]N−3f(c1)
[1− F (c)]N−2 dc
1
+
∫ c¯
c
[−pi2(c | c, c1) 1− F (c)
(N − 2)f(c) ] ×
(N − 2) [1− F (c1)]N−3f(c1)
[1− F (c)]N−2 dc
1
+
∫ c¯
c
[−pi2(c | c, c1) 1− F (c)
(N − 2)f(c) ] ×
(N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (c)]N−1 dc
1,
for c ∈ [c, c¯], is the valuation of a firm with marginal cost c, assuming that its market
opponent is weaker.
Therefore, the proof of this result parallels the one of Proposition 3.6, with v(c) in place
of u(c). Its details can be found in the Appendix.
Similarly to the case of non-signaling, the equation (3.9) defining the bidding strategy
β1(ci) is a non-arbitrage condition for the firm with the lowest marginal cost, ci. For this
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firm to be indifferent between winning the first or the second auction, its bid in the first
round must exceed its expected bid in the second round by precisely its expected gain from
signaling a stronger type.
The first term of the bidding strategy for the first auction,
β1NS(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c1)f(c2)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1,
corresponds, again, to the amount that firm i would bid if signaling were not possible. The
remaining two terms,
β1S(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
2)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c1
ci
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1,
correspond to the amounts that the firms must add to their bids in order to offset possible
gains from false signaling by their competitors.
Because of the information revealed in the first round of the sequential auction, the
weaker of the two oligopolists is able to avoid the possibility of winning his license at a price
above its ex-post value. Thus, along the equilibrium path, both oligopolists make a positive
profit.
In addition, the revelation of the marginal cost of the strongest firm makes the second
license less profitable and, therefore, the firms’ bidding for it less aggressive. As a result, the
prices of the two licenses form a super-martingale,
Ec1−i [β
2(c1−i| ci) | ci] ≤ β1(ci),
so that the expected price of the second license is lower than that of the first license.
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3.5.3 Comparison of Auction Schemes
Our analysis of the simultaneous and the sequential auctions under positive signaling paral-
lels the analysis of the same auctions without signaling. Non-surprisingly, so do the results
regarding the comparison of the equilibria that we derived.
Proposition 3.17.
The simultaneous pay-your-bid auction and the sequential first-price auction of two Cournot
oligopoly licenses result in the same expected revenue for the auctioneer.
Therefore, the informational differences between the two auction schemes do not affect
the expected revenue of the auctioneer or the expected payment of the bidders.
Proposition 3.18.
The stronger of the two oligopolists pays a higher price for his license in the sequential first-
price auction than in the simultaneous pay-your-bid auction; the weaker oligopolist pays a
lower price for his license in the sequential auction than in the simultaneous auction:
β1(ci) > β(ci) > Ec1−i [ β
2(ci | c1−i) | c1−i < ci].
Therefore, the stronger of the two oligopolists makes a higher total profit in the simultaneous
pay-your-bid auction while the weaker oligopolist makes a higher total profit in the sequential
first-price auction.
Hence, an auctioneer aiming at a more equal distribution of the wealth generated in the
Cournot duopoly will still prefer the sequential auction to the simultaneous one, even when
signaling is possible.
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3.6 NEGATIVE SIGNALING: BERTRAND COMPETITION
In the case of Bertrand competition, the firms have an incentive to signal a weaker type.
Therefore, opposite to the case of Cournot competition, the firms’ valuations shall be ad-
justed downwards. Because of this adjustment, if the firms’ signaling incentive is too strong,
it is possible that a positive measure of bidder types will have valuations below zero. To
avoid this problem, we need to assume the presence of a large number of firms competing in
the auction.
Under this assumption, we can construct an equilibrium in strictly monotone bidding
strategies for the simultaneous auction. On the other hand, in the sequential auction, since
it is not possible to balance the bidders’ signaling profits from deviating into waiting for the
second round, such an equilibrium turns out not to exist.
3.6.1 Simultaneous Auction
By repeating the argument that we used for the Cournot oligopoly, that is, by assuming the
use of a strictly decreasing bidding strategy b = β(c) and considering the necessary first-
order condition for the expected payoff function Π(c˜i|ci) of some firm i at c˜i = ci, we can
derive the equilibrium for this setting.
Proposition 3.19.
In the simultaneous pay-your-bid auction of two Bertrand oligopoly licenses, with the winners’
bids revealed at the end of the auction, if there are sufficiently many bidders, then there is a
symmetric separating equilibrium given by the strategy
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c
2)]N−3 f(c2) f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c2
c
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c
2)]N−2 f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2 (3.11)
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c2
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c
1)]N−2 f(c1)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc1 dc2.
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In this equilibrium, the firm with the lowest marginal cost gains its license at a price below its
ex-post value. The firm with the second-lowest marginal cost, however, may gain its license
at a price above its ex-post value.
Notice that by understating its strength, a firm gains in terms of its expected market
profit and of a lower payment in the auction, assuming that it wins an oligopoly license. On
the other hand, it suffers the cost of a lower probability of winning the auction. This cost
increases as the number of the bidders in the auction, N , becomes larger. Therefore, if N is
sufficiently large, the cost is so severe that it can always counter-balance possible gains from
false signaling.
3.6.2 Sequential Auction
In the sequential auction, the firms’ incentive to signal a weaker type turns out to be too
strong. Contrary to the case of the simultaneous auction, it is not possible to construct a
symmetric separating equilibrium.
Proposition 3.20.
In a sequential first-price auction of two Bertrand oligopoly licenses, in which the winners’
bids are revealed at the end of each auction, there is no symmetric equilibrium in monotone
strategies.
In the presence of a sufficiently large number of bidders, as shown in Das Varma [23],
the strategy β2(ci|c1), given in Lemma 3.13, forms the unique symmetric equilibrium for the
continuation game that follows the allocation of the first license to a firm with marginal cost
c1 ∈ [c, c¯]. In addition, by adapting Assumption 3.14 to the Bertrand oligopoly setting, one
can show that β2(c|c) is decreasing in c. Finally, by replicating the argument leading to
Proposition 3.16, one can derive the bidding strategy β1(ci), identical to the one used in the
Cournot oligopoly, as the unique solution to the necessary first-order condition.
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This strategy, however, cannot be part of an equilibrium. Although, the non-signaling
component of β2(ci|c1) is sufficiently more aggressive than the non-signaling component of
β1(ci), so that to just eliminate the incentive to wait for the second round (if signaling were
not possible), the signaling component of β2(ci|c1) cannot counter-balance the corresponding
component of β1(ci). As a result, each firm has a profitable deviation from β
1 into waiting,
b1i = 0, for the second round.
In particular, trying to diminish the potential gains from signaling by increasing the
number of firms, as in the case of the simultaneous auction, cannot produce any result. The
deviation into waiting for the second round does not cost any firm in terms of the probability
of acquiring a license, so, changing the number of firms is ineffective.
3.7 CONCLUSIONS
We have examined two multi-unit auction schemes with allocative and, possibly, informa-
tional externalities, in particular, two auctions of oligopoly licenses.
When there is no signaling, we have provided a rationale for the use of a sequential
procedure. The information generated during this procedure leads to more informative
bidding. Even though this does not affect the seller’s expected revenue, or the bidders’
expected payments, the two winners are protected from the possibility of regret, that is,
from buying a license at a price that exceeds its ex-post value. In addition, the strongest
oligopolist has to pay a higher price for his license than he would pay in a simultaneous
auction, whereas the weaker oligopolist pays a lower price. Therefore, the sequential auction
results in a more even distribution of the wealth generated in the oligopoly.
When signaling is possible, these results remain valid only in the case of positive signaling
incentives, as in the Cournot oligopoly. On the other hand, with negative signaling incentives,
as in the Bertrand oligopoly, there is no symmetric monotone equilibrium for the sequential
auction. Hence, in this environment, an efficient allocation is achieved only by means of a
simultaneous auction.
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The two auction formats will cease to be revenue equivalent, if we consider affiliated
marginal costs. In this case, according to the intuition of the linkage principle, the sequential
format will dominate, in terms of revenue, the simultaneous auction. The two auctions will
also generate different expected seller revenues, if the firms face participation costs. In
particular, if the winning bid in the first round of the sequential auction is sufficiently low,
then some bidder types that would otherwise not participate may decide to bid in the second
round. In this case, however, the auction scheme that is preferable for the seller may depend
on the distribution of the firms’ marginal costs.
A seller may also increase his expected revenue by adopting different information rev-
elation rules and, therefore, allowing for different signaling possibilities. According to the
intuition derived from the study of the auction of a single license, schemes that reveal more
information about the winners will be revenue dominant in the case of positive signaling
incentives, while schemes that disable signaling will be dominant in the case of negative
signaling incentives.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate experimentally the bidding behavior in a
sequential auction with negative informational externalities. An experimental study may
reveal patterns of behavior that can be of interest to sellers that would like to consider the
use of a sequential procedure.
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4.0 SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS WITH PARTICIPATION COSTS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In many auctions, the bidders can participate only at a cost, associated with either the
preparation or the submission of their bids. For example, they may need to travel to the
auction site or to hire an agent to bid on their behalf. It is also possible that they may
enter the auction only at a fee, paid to the auctioneer (who can differ from the seller).
Furthermore, in order to participate in the auction, the bidders may have to forego other
profitable opportunities. Finally, the bidders may need to finance their bids by posting
security bonds, aiming to protect the seller from spurious bidding. These costs, which are
independent from those of learning one’s valuation for the auctioned object, may affect a
potential bidder’s decision to participate in an auction as well as his bidding behavior in it.
When such bidding costs are present, the seller typically suffers from low levels of
participation as well as from more restrained bidding by the buyers who enter the auction.
To combat these effects, the seller may attempt to finance the bidders’ entry by reimbursing
part of their expenses. In addition, the seller may post a reserve price, in order to force the
participating buyers to bid more intensively.
In the case of multi-unit sales, an additional option is often available to the seller, that
of auctioning the goods sequentially, one unit at a time, rather than simultaneously. A
sequential procedure has the advantage of generating information during the bidding process,
in a manner that affects the buyers’ subsequent participation and bidding behavior. In
particular, unfavorable outcomes in the early rounds, characterized by relatively low sale
prices, are likely to encourage stronger participation in the later rounds, thus amplifying the
bidding competition and enhancing the seller’s revenue.
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The present chapter examines this possibility, by analyzing a sequential first-price auction
for selling two identical units to buyers with single-unit demands. We assume that the buyers
who participate in the first-round of the auction can also bid in the second round at no
additional cost; and that the seller reveals the first-round price prior to the beginning of the
second round. In this setting, we construct a symmetric equilibrium and, for particular cases
of valuation distributions, we compare its expected seller revenue to that of the symmetric
monotone equilibrium in a simultaneous “pay-your-bid” auction.
In both auction formats, the buyers adopt cut-off strategies, such that they enter the
auction if and only if their valuations exceed a certain threshold. Because of the possibility
of second-round entry, threshold for the first-round of the sequential auction is higher than
that of the simultaneous auction. However, if the first unit is sold at a low price or not at all,
the second-round threshold may decrease, possibly below that for the simultaneous auction.
The participating buyers bid in a strictly monotone manner, with the lowest type, there-
fore, bidding zero. In the sequential auction, as it turns out, the price paths do not behave
in a uniform manner. Rather, there is a certain threshold price such that, for a first-round
prices above it, the second-round price is expected to decrease while for first-round prices
below it, because of stronger participation, the second-round price is expected to increase.
To compare the expected seller revenue from the sequential and simultaneous auctions,
we need to use simulations, since analyticity is lost even in simple cases. For valuations that
follow a uniform or a power distribution, we observe that the sequential auction generates
a higher revenue when the number of potential bidders is large relative to the participation
cost and to the degree of concavity. Given a fixed number of buyers (that is not too low), the
sequential auction dominates when the participation cost is below a certain value. This value
becomes larger, rather rapidly, for larger numbers of buyers or for more convex distributions.
Most of the literature on auctions with costly participation1 has focussed on the case of
single-unit sales. Green and Laffont [38] and Samuelson [86] calculate symmetric equilibria
1There are two other directions in the literature on auctions with costly participation. The first direction
has studied auctions in which the bidders must incur a fixed or variable cost in order to learn their valuations,
possibly in the form of pre-bid investment in R&D. For example, see Matthews [71], French and McCormic
[29], McAfee and McMillan [72], Engelbrecht-Wiggans [24], Tan [92], Levin and Smith [66], Chakraborty and
Kosmopoulou [17], Ye [96] and Lu [67]. The other direction has looked at sales in which it is costly for the
seller to elicit price offers; for example, see McAfee and McMillan [73], Burguet [13] and Cre´mer et al. [21].
For a general survey of the subject of costly information acquisition, see Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [10].
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in cut-off strategies for the second- and the first-price auctions respectively. In these equilib-
ria, the seller’s expected revenue may decrease as the number of potential bidders increases.
Stegeman [90] shows that the second-price auction can always implement the ex ante ef-
ficient outcome (that is, it has an equilibrium that maximizes the expected total surplus)
whereas the first-price auction has an efficient equilibrium if and only if the efficient equi-
librium of the second-price auction is symmetric. In addition, he constructs an equilibrium
in asymmetric cut-off strategies for the first-price auction. Furthermore, Tan and Yilankaya
[93] show that the second-price auction always has a symmetric equilibrium and identify
conditions on the distribution of the buyers’ valuations for this equilibrium to be unique
(and therefore, efficient). In addition, they identify conditions under which the second-price
auction has asymmetric cut-off equilibria, describe these equilibria and show that they are
suboptimal for the seller. In an alternative set up, a second-price auction in which the buy-
ers’ valuations are commonly known but the entry costs are private information, Kaplan and
Sela [58] construct an equilibrium in cut-off strategies in which a bidder’s expected payoff
may, somewhat surprisingly, decrease in his valuation. Finally, for a general class of games,
including standard auctions, Landsberger [65] shows that even small participation costs can
have a dramatic effect upon entry, especially when the number of players is large.
Regarding the issue of revenue maximization, Gal et al. [31] show that it is beneficial
for the seller to commit to a partial reimbursement policy. Celik and Yilankaya [16] con-
struct the revenue-maximizing auction mechanism. In this mechanism, first, the object is
given to the participant with the highest valuation and, second, participation is determined
in a non-stochastic manner by appropriately designed thresholds. Under certain conditions
on the distribution of the buyers’ valuations, these thresholds can be asymmetric. In this
case, the optimal mechanism, which is ex post inefficient, can be implemented either by a
second-price auction with individualized reserve prices and entry fees (or subsidies) or by an
asymmetric equilibrium of an anonymous second-price auction. Finally, Lu [68] explores rev-
enue maximization in an environment in which both the buyers’ valuations and participation
costs are private information. He first shows that in any implementable mechanism, a bidder
participates if and only if his bidding cost is below a certain threshold, which is determined
by his valuation. In addition, the probability of win in such a mechanism is independent of
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the bidder’s privately known bidding cost. Finally, he characterizes the classes of symmetric
ex post efficient and ex post revenue maximizing mechanisms and proposes a second-price
auction with uniform reserve price and entry subsidy for their implementation.
In the case of multi-unit sales, Menezes [76] and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Menezes [26]
examine sequential second-price auctions of stochastically equivalent objects with delay or
continuation costs. In these auctions, the bidders can participate freely in the first round but
must incur a cost in order to remain in subsequent rounds. Similarly, Menezes and Monteiro
[77] analyze a two-round sequential auction with participation costs, such that a bidder can
enter the second round only if he has also bid in the first round, always at a cost. These
studies try to understand why bidders may drop out from an auction as well as to provide
a cost-based explanation for the “declining price anomaly”.2
We depart from the earlier work on sequential auctions with participation costs by looking
at the problem of the seller and trying to provide an explanation for his choice to conduct
the sale sequentially rather than simultaneously. We construct an equilibrium in which the
information revealed by the first-round price may encourage stronger participation in the
second-round. Overall, we find that the sequential and the simultaneous auctions result in
different outcomes. In particular, for valuations that follow a uniform or a power distribution,
the seller may expect a higher revenue from a sequential auction, especially when the number
of potential bidders is large, the participation cost small or the distribution convex.
We introduce our model in the next section. In sections 4.3 and 4.4, we describe the
symmetric equilibrium for the simultaneous and the sequential auctions respectively. We
compare the corresponding expected seller revenues, for the case of uniform valuations, in
section 4.5. We conclude in section 4.6. All proofs, along with the source code for the revenue
comparison, are in section C of the appendix.
2In many real-world sequential auctions, for example, auctions for wine, art, real estate or dairy cattle, it
has been observed that the prices tend to drift downward over time, contrary to the theoretical prediction
of a constant or an increasing price-path, respectively for the cases of independent or affiliated bidders’
valuations. For more on the declining price anomaly, see Ashenfelter [2], McAfee and Vincent [74], Milgrom
and Weber [79] and Krishna [62].
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4.2 MODEL
There is one seller with two identical units for sale. His reservation value is normalized
to zero. There are N > 2 potential buyers, each with single-unit demand. Each buyer i
has a private valuation vi ∈ [v, v¯], for 0 ≤ v < v¯, drawn randomly at the beginning of the
game. The valuations are distributed independently, according to a common distribution
function F : [v, v¯]→ [0, 1]. We assume that the distribution F is differentiable and that the
corresponding density f : [v, v¯]→ R+ has full support.
The seller can allocate the two units either simultaneously, by means of a sealed-bid
pay-your-bid auction, or sequentially, by means of two sealed-bid first-price auctions. In the
sequential auction, we assume that the seller reveals the first-round winning bid b1 ∈ R+ (or
that the first unit has remained unsold) prior to the beginning of the second round.
In either selling scheme, each buyer can participate only at a cost c > 0, which is identical
across all buyers. Obviously, in the simultaneous auction, this cost must be incurred prior
to the submission of the bids. On the other hand, in the sequential auction, the buyers can
decide whether to participate prior either to the first or to the second round. We assume
that the buyers who participate in the first round can also participate in the second round
at no additional cost. Finally, in both the simultaneous and the sequential auction, buyers
cannot observe the number of the participating bidders.
We restrict attention to symmetric equilibria. Therefore, in the simultaneous auction,
each buyer i follows a participation and bidding strategy3
β : [v, v¯] −→ R+ ∪ {a},
where a denotes the action of abstaining from the auction. Similarly, in the first round of
the sequential auction, buyer i follows a strategy
β1 : [v, v¯] −→ R+ ∪ {a}.
3Without loss of generality, the buyers’ participation and bidding decisions are made simultaneously.
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In the second round of the sequential auction, following a first round private history
h1i = (b
1, b1i ) ∈ H1 =
[
R+ × (R+ ∪ {a})] ∪ {(a, a)} ,
consisting of the publicly known first-round highest bid b1 and the privately known4 first-
round decision b1i , each remaining buyer i follows a strategy
β2 : [v, v¯]×H1 −→ R+ ∪ {a}.
It will turn out that the bidders’ second-round behavior does not depend on the particular
bid that they may have submitted in the first round. It only depends on whether they
participated or not as well as on the first-round outcome. In particular, every bidder who
participates in the first round will also bid in the second round.
In case bidder i participates in the auction and wins a unit, his game payoff will be equal
to his valuation vi minus the price that he paid, minus the cost c. In case he participates
in the auction but fails to win any of the two units, his game payoff will be −c. Finally, if
buyer i does not participate to the auction, his payoff will be 0.
The solution concept is that of Bayesian equilibrium for the simultaneous auction and of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the sequential auction. The players must therefore behave
optimally at each decision point, given their knowledge of the other players’ strategies and
their beliefs. On the equilibrium path, the players’ beliefs are formed by applying Bayes’
rule while, off the equilibrium path, they are arbitrary.5
4.3 SIMULTANEOUS AUCTION
A buyer will be willing to participate to the simultaneous auction only if his expected gain
from participating exceeds the cost c. When the buyers’ participation and bidding strategy
β(vi) is monotone, the participation decision is characterized by a cut-off valuation v
∗ ∈ [v, v¯],
4Trivially, when b1 = a, the bidders can infer their opponents’ private first-round decisions.
5In fact, in the equilibrium that we construct for the sequential auction, the players’ beliefs will also be
Bayesian off the equilibrium path, for all first-round winning bids b1 ≤ β1(v¯).
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defined by
P[v2−i ≤ v∗] v∗ = c,
where v2−1 denotes the second order statistic among N − 1 valuations. According to β(·), a
buyer with valuation vi will participate in the auction if and only if vi ≥ v∗. In particular, a
buyer with valuation v∗ is indifferent between participating and non-participating. When he
enters the auction, he bids β(v∗) = 0, so that he wins a unit if and only if there is at most
one other participating bidder. Finally, it is easy to check that the participation threshold
v∗ = v∗(c) is unique and increasing in the cost c.
Proposition 4.1.
The following strategy constitutes a symmetric equilibrium for the simultaneous pay-your-bid
auction of two identical units to buyers with single-unit demands and participation cost c:
A buyer with valuation vi ≥ v∗, where v∗ ∈ [v, v¯] is defined by
{F (v∗)N−1 + (N − 1)F (v∗)N−2[1− F (v∗)]} v∗ = c, (4.1)
participates in the auction and bids
β(vi) =
∫ vi
v∗
v
(N − 1)(N − 2)F (v)N−3[1− F (v)] f(v)
F (vi)N−1 + (N − 1)F (vi)N−2[1− F (vi)] dv ; (4.2)
while for vi < v
∗, a buyer abstains from the auction.
Clearly, under participation cost c, each buyer’s participation decision is identical to his
decision to submit a bid in an auction without entry cost but with reserve price r = v∗.
Therefore, since his bid is
β(vi) = E[min{v2−i, v∗} | v2−i ≤ vi] −
c
P[v2−i ≤ vi]
,
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this auction is equivalent with respect to allocation and seller revenue to an auction with
reserve price r = v∗ and entry subsidy c.
4.4 SEQUENTIAL AUCTION
In the sequential auction, we will construct a symmetric equilibrium in strategies (β1, β2)
such that a buyer participates in the auction if and only if his valuation exceeds a threshold
value v∗1 or v
∗
2, with the value v
∗
2 determined endogenously, as a function of the first-round
outcome. Since a buyer who participates in the first round can also bid in the second round
at no additional cost, it follows that v∗1 ≥ v∗2. Finally, in both rounds, the participating
buyers bid in a strictly monotone manner, with the lowest participating type bidding zero.
In such a strategy profile, the information provided by the revelation of the first-round
winning bid b1 ∈ R+ (or b1 = a, when the first unit remains unsold) takes the form of an
upper bound for the remaining buyers’ valuations, namely6,
v1 =

(β1)−1(b1), for b1 6= a;
v∗1, for b
1 = a.
(4.3)
Thus, prior to the beginning of the second round, the buyers update their beliefs so that,
for v ∈ [v, v1],
vi ∼ F (v | v1) = F (v)
F (v1)
.
In addition, by learning whether the first unit was sold, the buyers can infer the number,
N − 1 or N , of the players who remain interested in acquiring the second unit.
Given the above information update, some of the buyers who abstained from the first
round may decide to enter the second round of the auction. They will do so if their expected
gain with respect to their updated beliefs exceeds the cost c.
6Off the equilibrium path, for b1 > β1(v¯), we can assume that v1 = v¯.
74
Notation:
We will denote7 each buyer i’s second-period action (bid or decision not to participate), fol-
lowing a first-period action b1i ∈ R+ ∪ {a} and a price b1 = β1(v1) ∈ R+, by
β2(vi | β1(v1), b1i ) ≡ β2(vi | v1).
Similarly, following no sale in the first period, so that b1 = a, buyer i’s second-period action
will be β2(vi | a, a) ≡ β2(vi | a).
If the first object remains unsold, so that v1 = v∗1 and N buyers remain in the auction,
the bidders who will enter the second round have valuations vi ∈ [v∗2, v∗1), where v∗2 = v∗2(a)
is defined by the condition
F (v∗2 | v∗1)N−1 v∗2 = c. (4.4)
These buyers will bid, as in Samuelson [86],
β2(vi | a) =
∫ vi
v∗2(a)
v
(N − 1)F (v)N−2 f(v)
F (vi)N−1
dv . (4.5)
On the other hand, buyers with valuations vi < v
∗
2 will abstain from the auction. Finally, off
the equilibrium path, buyers with valuations vi ≥ v∗1 will participate to the second auction
and bid b2i = β
2(v∗1 | a).
If the first object is sold at a price b1 = β1(v1), for some valuation v1 ∈ [v∗1, v¯], then every
buyer who participated in the first round will also bid in the second round. In addition, on
the equilibrium path, a non-participating buyer i will enter the second round if and only if
his valuation is vi ≥ v∗2, where v∗2 = v∗2(v1) ∈ [v, v1) is defined8 by the condition
F (v∗2 | v1)N−2 v∗2 = c. (4.6)
7This simplification is customary in sequential auctions; for example, see Krishna [62], section 15. It is
based on the strict monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy β1, which allows us to identify any first-round
price b1 ∈ R+ with a winning valuation v1 ∈ [v∗1 , v¯], as well as on the independence of the equilibrium
strategy β2 of the first-round bid b1i .
8 In a manner that is consistent with our notation for the strategy β2, following a first-round sale, we
describe the threshold v∗2(·) as a function of the winning valuation v1 rather than of the price b1.
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In particular, there is a value vˆ1 = vˆ1(v
∗
1) ∈ (v∗1, v¯), defined by the condition v∗2(vˆ1) = v∗1,
that is, by
F (v∗1 | vˆ1)N−2 v∗1 = c, (4.7)
such that for all v1 ≥ vˆ1 no additional bidder will enter the second round of the auction;
and, for v1 ∈ [v∗1, vˆ1), buyers with valuations vi ∈ [v∗2(v1), v∗1) will enter the second round.
v v∗2(v
∗
1) v
∗
2(a) v
∗
1 vˆ1 v¯
Never
Participate
Participate at t = 2,
depending on the outcome
of the first-round auction
Participate
at t = 1, 2
Figure 4.1: Participation Thresholds.
Clearly, following a first-round sale, the buyers’ participation threshold is monotonically
increasing in the price b1. In comparison to the case of non-sale, however, because of the
difference in the number of the bidders remaining in the auction, we have v∗2(v
∗
1) < v
∗
2(a), so
that monotonicity does not hold overall.
Each participating buyer will bid
β2(vi | v1) =
∫ vi
v∗2s(v1)
v
(N − 2)F (v)N−3 f(v)
F (vi)N−2
dv , (4.8)
where v∗2s(v
1), defined by
v∗2s(v
1) = min{v∗1, v∗2(v1)} =

v∗2(v
1), if v1 ∈ [v∗1, vˆ1];
v∗1, if v
1 ∈ [vˆ1, v¯],
denotes the lowest valuation possibly participating in the second round.
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To describe the buyers’ behavior off the equilibrium path, first, we define the upper
bound v¯1 ∈ [vˆ1, v¯] by
v¯ − β2(v¯1 | v¯1) = c, if a solution v¯1 ∈ [v, v¯] exists;
v¯1 = v¯, otherwise.
This is the valuation corresponding to the largest first-round winning bid, b¯1 = β1(v¯1), for
which a bidder with valuation vi = v¯ will have a second-round expected payoff that exceeds
the participation cost c.9
In addition, for all v1 ∈ [v∗1, v¯1], we define the participation threshold v˜∗2 = v˜∗2(v1) by
F (v˜∗2 | v1)N−2 [ v˜∗2 − β2(min{v˜∗2, v1} | v1 ) ] = c. (4.9)
In particular, for v1 ∈ [v∗1, vˆ1], we have v˜∗2(v1) = v∗2(v1) and β2(min{v˜∗2, v1} | v1 ) = 0.
A buyer i with valuation vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯] who did not participate in the first round will enter
the second round, if and only if both v1 < v¯1 and v˜
∗
2(v
1) ≤ vi.10 In this case, he will bid
b2i = β
2(vi | v1), for vi ≤ v1, and b2i = β2(v1 | v1), for vi ≥ v1. In addition, a buyer i with
valuation vi ∈ [v1, v¯] who participated in the first round with a bid b1i < b1 will submit a
bid b2i = β
2(v1 | v1) in the second round. Finally, a buyer i with valuation vi ∈ [v, v∗1] who
participated in the first round with a bid b1i < b
1 will submit a bid b2i = β
2(vi | v1), for
vi ≥ v∗2(v1), and b2i = 0, for vi ≤ v∗2(v1).
In the first round of the auction, a bidder i with valuation vi ∈ [v, v¯] will submit a bid,
if his overall expected gain, prior to any information update, exceeds the participation cost
c. Therefore, bidder i will participate in the first round if vi ≥ v∗1, where v∗1 is defined by
(N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2[1− F (vˆ1)] v∗1 + F (v∗1)N−1 β2(v∗1 | a) = [1− F (vˆ1)N−1] c, (4.10)
9The expected second-period payoff of a buyer with valuation vi = v¯ exceeds the participation cost c
regardless of the first-round winning bid if and only if c ≤ v¯ − β2(v¯ | v¯). Therefore, for sufficiently small
participation cost c, in particular, for
c ≤ v¯ − E[v(N−2)1 ],
where v(N−2)1 denotes the highest among N − 2 independent realizations of vi, the v¯-type will always be
willing to enter the 2nd round.
10In particular, for all v1 ∈ [v∗1 , vˆ1], buyer i will enter the second round.
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expressing the v∗1-type’s indifference between entering the auction in the first round and
waiting for the beginning of the second round in order to decide whether to participate.
Finally, each buyer participating in the first round bids according to the strategy
β1(vi) =
∫ vi
v∗1
β2(v | v) (N − 1)F (v)
N−2 f(v)
F (vi)N−1
dv,
that is, he bids an amount equal to the price that he would expect to pay in the second
round, conditional on the possibility of a first-round win, v1−i ≤ vi.
Substituting equation (4.8) for β2(v | v) results in
β1(vi) =
∫ vi
v∗1
∫ v
v∗2s(v)
w
(N − 1)(N − 2)F (w)N−3 f(w)f(v)
F (vi)N−1
dw dv , (4.11)
Therefore, bidder i bids an amount equal to the expected valuation of the highest losing
buyer, among those who may potentially participate in the auction, conditional on the real-
ization of a first-round win, v1−i ≤ vi.
Proposition 4.2.
The bidding strategies β1 and β2, along with the participation thresholds v∗1, v
∗
2 and v˜
∗
2, define
a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the sequential first-price auction.
The equilibrium price paths of the sequential auction do not demonstrate uniform be-
havior. Instead, there is a value v˜1 ∈ (v∗1, vˆ1), defined by
∫ v∗1
v∗2(v˜1)
∫ v
v∗2(v˜1)
wF (w)N−3 f(w)f(v) dwdv =
∫ v˜1
v∗1
∫ v∗2(v˜1)
v∗2(v)
wF (w)N−3 f(w)f(v) dwdv,
such that the expected price in the second period is
E[b2 | b1 = β1(v1)] <
>
b1, for v1
>
<
v˜1.
Therefore, a relatively low (high) price in the first round of the auction is likely to be followed
by a higher (respectively, lower) price in the second round.
78
4.5 REVENUE COMPARISON
To compare the expected seller revenue in the two auction formats, we need to assume a
particular form of the distribution of the bidders’ valuations. First, we analyze the problem
of uniformly distributed valuations, deriving insights about the cases in which the sequential
auction may generate a higher seller revenue. Subsequently, we briefly examine whether
these insights are valid for certain convex or concave distributions.
Let vi ∼ U [0, 1] and suppose that the buyers follow bidding strategies (β1, β2), with their
participation in the auction determined by the thresholds v∗1, v
∗
2 and v˜
∗
2, as described in the
previous section.
Since the strategy β1 is strictly monotone in [v∗1, v¯], the first-round outcome reveals an
upper bound v1 ∈ [v∗1, v¯] for the remaining buyers’ valuations. Therefore, in the second
round, the buyers update their beliefs so that, for v ∈ [v, v1],
vi ∼ F (v | v1) = v
v1
.
In addition, the buyers learn whether there are N − 1 or N players still in the auction.
If the first object remains unsold, the second-round threshold will be
v∗2(a) = [(v
∗
1)
N−1 c ]
1
N
and the buyers entering the second round will bid
β2(vi | a) = N − 1
N
[
vi −
(
v∗1
vi
)N−1
c
]
.
If the first object is sold at a price b1 = β1(v1), for some valuation v1 ∈ [v∗1, v¯], then every
bidder that participated in the first round will bid again the second round. Furthermore,
when v1 ∈ [v∗1, vˆ1], where
vˆ1 =
[
(v∗1)
N−1 c−1
] 1
N−2 ,
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additional bidders may enter the auction. These bidders will have valuations vi ≥ v∗2(v1),
where
v∗2(v
1) = [(v1)N−2 c ]
1
N−1 .
In this case, each participating buyer i will bid
β2(vi | v1) = N − 2
N − 1
[
vi −
(
v1
vi
)N−2
c
]
.
On the other hand, when v1 ∈ [vˆ1, v¯], no new bidders will enter the second round. The
bidders remaining from the first round will bid
β2(vi | v1) = N − 2
N − 1
[
vi − (v
∗
1)
N−1
(vi)N−2
]
.
In the first round, a buyer will enter the auction if and only if his valuation is vi ≥ v∗1,
where v∗1 ∈ [v, v¯] is the solution to the equation
(N − 1)(v∗1)N−1(1− vˆ1) +
N − 1
N
(v∗1)
N−1 (v∗1 − c) = [1− (vˆ1)N−1] c.
For vi ∈ [v∗1, vˆ], bidder i will bid
β1(vi) =
1
(vi)N−1
[
N − 2
N
[(vi)
N − (v∗1)N ] −
N − 2
N − 1 [(vi)
N−1 − (v∗1)N−1] c
]
,
while, for vi ∈ [vˆ, v¯], he will bid
β1(vi) =
1
(vi)N−1
[
N − 2
N
[(vi)
N − (v∗1)N ]
− (N − 2) (v∗1)N−1(vi − vˆ1) −
N − 2
N − 1 [(vˆi)
N−1 − (v∗1)N−1] c
]
.
The equilibrium price path of the sequential auction is increasing for all v1 ∈ [v∗1, v˜1],
where v˜1 ∈ [v∗1, vˆ1] is the solution to the equation
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1N
[ (v∗1)
N − v∗2(v˜1)N ] + v∗2(v˜1)N = v˜1 v∗2(v˜1)N−1 −
1
N − 1 [ (v˜1)
N−1 − (v∗1)N−1 ] c,
while they are decreasing for v1 ∈ [v˜1, v¯].
In the simultaneous auction, a buyer will participate if and only if his valuation is vi ≥ v∗,
where v∗1 ∈ [v, v¯] is the solution to the equation
(v∗)N + (N − 1)(v∗)N−1 (1− v∗) = c.
In this auction, each participating bidder i will bid
β(vi) =
N − 2
N
N(vi)
N−1 − (N − 1) (vi)N − N(v∗)N−1 + (N − 1)(v∗)N
(vi)N−1 + (N − 1)(vi)N−2 (1− vi) .
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Figure 4.2: Expected Seller’s Revenue for N = 10.
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Comparing numerically the expected seller revenues from the two auction schemes, it
appears that the sequential auction generates a higher seller revenue for larger numbers of
bidders and for smaller participation costs. For example, when N = 4, the sequential auction
generates a higher seller revenue only for c ≤ 0.1295.Similarly, when N = 5, the sequential
auction dominates for c ≤ 0.4441. Finally, when N = 10, the case depicted in Figure 4.2, the
sequential auction dominates for all c ≤ 0.89. In Figure 4.3, we graph the difference in the
expected seller’s revenue from the sequential and the simultaneous auctions, as a function
of c ∈ [0, 1], for various values of N .11
The insights regarding the revenue comparison of the two auction schemes do not change
when the buyers’ valuations are distributed according to the power distribution, F (v) = vα,
for v ∈ [0, 1] and α > 0. Again, for a fixed parameter α > 0 and a fixed number of
bidders, N , the sequential auction generates a higher seller revenue if and only if the cost
c is below a certain threshold value; and this threshold value increases, as the number of
bidders increases. In addition, as the ‘degree of convexity”, α, increases, the results from
the revenue comparison become more pronounced, that is, the revenue gains from using a
sequential auction increase while the region of dominance expands. Therefore, convexity
appears to favor the use of a sequential procedure while concavity the use of a simultaneous
one. In Figure 4.4, we demonstrate the effects of convexity for the case of N = 8 bidders.
11 When N = 3, the simultaneous auction appears to dominate for all values of c. In general, for the
sequential auction to dominate for some values of c, the number of buyers must not be too low relative to
the concavity of the distribution.
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Figure 4.3: Difference in the Expected Seller’s Revenue.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
α = 2
Rsqc - Rsim
α = 0.5
α = 1
c
Figure 4.4: Revenue Effects of Convexity for N = 8.
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4.6 CONCLUSIONS
For a sequential auction in which bidding is costly, we have constructed an equilibrium in
cut-off strategies, such that the second-period participation threshold is determined endoge-
nously, as a function of the information that the first-round price reveals. In this equilibrium,
the price paths can be both decreasing, for a relatively high first-period price, and increasing,
for a first-period price that is so low so as to encourage sufficiently stronger second-round
participation. Compared to its simultaneous counterpart, the sequential auction generates
a higher expected seller revenue, in cases in which the number of potential bidders is large,
the participation cost small or the distribution of valuations convex.
This study can be extended in several directions. First, a more detailed comparison
between the outcomes of the sequential and the simultaneous auctions, for example, a com-
parison of the prices paid by the stronger and the weaker of the two winners in each of the
two auction schemes, will shed more light upon the reasons favoring the use of a particular
auction format. In addition, one may introduce a positive marginal cost for bidding in the
second round, for the bidders who participated in the first round. In this case, when the
first-round price is high, some of the participating bidders may exit the auction in the second
round. Finally, one can allow the seller to adopt different information revelation policies,
such as announcing only whether the first object was sold, and to examine whether revealing
the first-round price is optimal.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
This dissertation has aimed at explaining the reasons for which a seller may decide to conduct
a multi-unit auction sequentially rather than simultaneously. In particular, it has tried to
analyze the manners in which the information generated in a sequential auction can affect
the bidders’ behavior to his benefit.
Overall, two informational effects have been identified:
a. A direct effect, generated by the bidders’ actions in the first round, which leads to better
informed bidding in the second round of the sequential auction (chapters 3 and 4). In the
sale of the oligopoly licenses, it allows the winner of the second round to avoid overpaying
for his license. In the presence of participation costs, it gives the opportunity to some of
the buyers who would abstain from the simultaneous auction to enter the second round
of the sequential auction.
b. An indirect effect, generated by the type of equilibrium that is possible in a sequential
auction, which leads to better informed bidding in both rounds (chapter 3). In the sale of
the oligopoly licenses, since the sequential auction allocates the two assets in an ordered
manner, the winner of the first license expects a stronger presence in the market while
the winner of the second license knows that he will have a weaker presence. As a result,
the degree of competition in each of the rounds of the sequential auction is different from
that in the simultaneous auction.
The second effect turns out to affect only the distribution of the auction prices, in a
manner which favors the weaker of the two winners. On the other hand, the first effect
may affect the seller’s total revenue from the auction, as in the case of participation costs,
possibly in a positive manner.
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Finally, in order to profit from organizing a sequential auction, the seller must commit
not to use, during the later rounds, the information that the bidders reveal in the earlier
rounds (chapter 2). If such intertemporal commitment is not possible, the seller will be
better off using a simultaneous procedure.
Several extensions have been proposed to the problems analyzed in this dissertation. A
promising direction for future research appears to be the introduction of alternative informa-
tion disclosure policies by the auctioneer. Such policies will alter the effect of the first-round
outcome upon the second-round behavior and, in the problem of the auction of oligopoly
licenses, upon the market competition. It would be interesting to identify the environments
in which revealing the first-round winning bid is optimal as well as the ones in which the
seller can enhance his revenue by adopting different policies.
Finally, another direction for future work is that of generalizing the sale mechanisms
which the seller can use in each round of a sequential allocation. Although single-round
direct-revelation mechanisms are optimal in general, it will be interesting to determine the
kinds of mechanisms that are revenue optimizing when the seller’s options are restricted to
sequential procedures.
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APPENDIX
A PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
Suppose that r1 < r¯1. The argument that led to the derivation of the bidding function
β1(vi | r1) has shown that no bidder with valuation vi ∈ [v(r1), v¯] can profit by deviating
unilaterally to bidding β1(v˜i, r1), for v˜i ≥ v(r1) such that v˜i 6= vi.
It remains to show that no bidder with valuation vi ≥ v(r1) can profit by abstaining from
the first auction; and that no bidder with valuation vi < v(r1) can profit by participating
in the first auction. This result follows from the indifference of the v(r1)-type between
abstaining and participating in the first period.
Consider a bidder with valuation vi ≥ v(r1). Since Π[vi, vi] > Π[v(r1), vi], it suffices to
show that the bidder’s payoff from abstaining does not exceed his payoff from mimicking the
type v(r1). Obviously, these two payoffs differ only if all other bidders’ valuations are below
v(r1). In this case, in the second period, it is optimal for a bidder with valuation vi > v(r1)
to bid
β2,N [ v(r1) | v(r1), r2(v(r1)) ] = r1 = β1[v(r1) | r1].
Thus, the bidder’s payoff from abstaining at reserve price r1 < r¯1 is equal to his payoff from
acquiring the object at price β1[v(r1), r1]. Hence, it is optimal for the bidder to participate
in the first auction with a bid β1[vi | r1].
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Conversely, consider a bidder with valuation vi < v(r1). Since Π[v˜i, vi] < Π[v(r1), vi]
for all v˜i > v(r1), it suffices to compare the bidder’s payoff from abstaining with that from
mimicking the type v(r1). Since the type v(r1) is indifferent between participating in the
first auction and abstaining from it, we can consider, equivalently, the bidder’s second-period
payoffs from bidding according to his valuation vi and mimicking the type v(r1). Hence, by
Lemma 2.1, the bidder cannot profit from participating in the first auction.
For reserve prices r1 > r¯1, no bidder is supposed to participate in the first auction.
Therefore any bidder can claim the first-period object at price r1. Since
r1 > r¯1 = β
2,N(v¯ | v¯, r2(v¯)),
claiming the first-period object would be inferior to abstaining from the first auction and
mimicking, in the second auction, the type v¯. Therefore, by Lemma 2.1, participation in the
first auction cannot be profitable.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
By setting a first-period reserve price r1 ∈ [v, r¯1], corresponding to a participation threshold
v = v(r1) ∈ [v, v¯], the auctioneer expects a revenue
R(v) =
∫ v¯
v
β1(v1 | v) Nf(v1)G(v1) dv1
+
∫ v
r2(v)
β2,N [v1 | v, r2(v)] Nf(v1)G(v1) dv1
+
∫ v¯
v
∫ v1
r2(v1)
β2,N−1[v2 | v1, r2(v1)] Nf(v1)g(v2) dv2 dv1.
The first two integrals correspond to the payment of the buyer with the highest valuation,
when he wins either the first or the second of the two auctions, while the third integral
corresponds to the payment of the bidder with the second-highest valuation, when he can
acquire the second-period object.
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By differentiating with respect to the threshold valuation v and substituting the expres-
sions for d
dv
β1(v1|v) and ddvβ2,N [v1| v, r2(v)], we get
dR
dv
(v) = N [1− F (v)]
[
g(v) r1(v) + G(v)
dr1
dv
(v)
]
− N [1− F (v)] g(v) β2,N−1[v | v, r2(v)]
− N G[r2(v)] f [r2(v)] r2(v) dr2
dv
(v)
+ N [F (v)− F (r2(v))] G[r2(v)] dr2
dv
(v)
− N f(v)
∫ v
r2(v)
β2,N−1[v2 | v, r2(v)] g(v2) dv2.
Since ψ(r2(v) | v) = 0 and, therefore, F (v)−F [r2(v)] = f [r2(v)] r2(v), as in equation (2.3), we
can simplify this sum by eliminating its third and fourth terms. In addition, by substituting
the expressions for r1(v),
dr1
dv
(v) and g(u) βN−1[u; v, r2(v)], we get
dR
dv
(v) = N [1− F (v) ]
[
g(v) v + G(r2(v))
dr2
dv
(v)
]
− N (N − 1) f(v) [1− F (r2(v)) ]F (r2(v))N−2 r2(v)
− N (N − 1) f(v) [1− F (v) ]
∫ v
r2(v)
u (N − 2)F (u)N−3 du
− N (N − 1) f(v)
∫ v
r2(v)
f(v2)
∫ v2
r2(v)
u (N − 2)F (u)N−3 du dv2.
Finally, by integrating the last integral by parts, canceling the opposite-sign terms and
substituting the expression ψ(v) = v − 1−F (v)
f(v)
, the derivative becomes
dR
dv
(v) = N [1− F (v) ] G(r2(v)) dr2
dv
(v) − N f(v)
∫ v
r2(v)
ψ(u) g(u) du.
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First, suppose that r0 > v. If v ∈ [v, r0], then, since the function ψ(v) is increasing,
we have ψ(u) < 0 for all u ∈ [v, v). Therefore, the derivative dR
dv
(v) > 0, for all v ∈ [v, r0],
implying that v∗ > r0. By the Intermediate Value Theorem, since dRdv (r0) > 0 and
dR
dv
(v¯) < 0,
we conclude that there exists a value v∗ ∈ (r0, v¯) for which the auctioneer’s revenue function
R(v) attains its maximum.
Now, suppose that r0 = v. Then, for all v ∈ [v, v¯], we have r2(v) = v, implying that
dR
dv
(v) < 0. Hence, in this case, v∗ = v, as asserted.
Proof of Proposition 2.5:
We consider only the case of a sequential sealed-bid first-price auction. The argument for
the sequential English and sealed-bid second-price auctions is very similar.
Suppose that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium [(β1i , β
2
i )
N
i=1, (r1, r2)] such that
the first-period bidding strategies are symmetric and increasing in the valuation vi. To
derive a contradiction, it suffices to consider the restriction of the equilibrium to the contin-
uation game following a first-period reserve price r1, such that a positive measure of bidders’
types, [v(r1), v¯], participates in the first auction. In particular, in any equilibrium of the
continuation game following r1 = v, all bidder types must participate to the first auction.
First, we rule out the existence of an equilibrium involving first-period bidding strategies
β1(· | r1) that are strictly increasing in [v(r1), v¯]. Under such a bidding strategy profile, we
have perfect revelation of the participating bidders’s valuations. Therefore, these bidders
expect to make zero profit in the second auction. Hence, on the strategy-realization path,
the participating bidders treat the problem as that of a single-period, single-unit auction.
According to the symmetric equilibrium of the first-price auction, we must have
β1(vi | r1) =

E[ max{v(N−1)1 , r1} | v(N−1)1 < vi ], if vi ≥ v(r1);
a, if vi < v(r1).
By splitting cases, according to the realized type-profile, we claim that each bidder i
has a profitable deviation to β˜1(vi | r1) ≡ a. Notice that, along the equilibrium path, the
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second-period reserve price r2 will be
r2(b
1
1, ..., b
1
N , r1)

= [β1(· | r1)]−1(b(N)2 ), if b(N)2 6= a;
≤ r1, if b(N)2 = a.
If bidder i, with valuation vi ∈ [v(r1), v¯], turns out to have the highest valuation, then
he will still win an object, in the second auction, at an expected price
p2 = E[ max{v(N−1)2 , r1} | v(N−1)1 < vi ] + ε.
For sufficiently small ε > 0, the price p2 is smaller than β
1(vi | r1), the price bidder i will
pay, if he wins the object in the first auction.
If bidder i turns out to have the second-highest valuation, then he will again win an
object in the second auction, at an expected price
p2 = E[ max{v(N−1)2 , r1} | v(N−1)2 < vi < v(N−1)1 ] + ε.
Again, for sufficiently small ε > 0, the price p2 is strictly smaller than vi, the price bidder i
would pay in the second auction, if he revealed his valuation
Finally, if bidder i turns out to have the third-highest, or lower, valuation, then he will
win no object, as he would do after bidding β1(vi | r1).
We conclude the proof by ruling out the existence of intervals of non-increase in [v(r1), v¯].
Suppose that β1(vi | r1) = b, for all vi  [vL, vH ] ⊂ [v(r1), v¯]. If b > vL, then any bidder i with
type vi  V1 = [vL,min{b, vH}] is better off bidding b˜1(vi | r1) = vi, a bid that avoids winning
the object at a price above vi. If b < vL, then there is an ε > 0 sufficiently small such that
the deviation to the strategy β1(vi | r1) = b + ε, for all vi  [vL, vH ] is profitable. Finally, if
b = vL, then we can simply apply the argument for b < vL to the interval [
1
2
(vL + vH), vH ].
Hence, there cannot exist an interval of non-increase of β1(· | r1).
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Proof of Proposition 2.6:
We consider only the case of a sequential sealed-bid second-price auction, the argument
for the other cases being essentially the same. It suffices to rule out the existence of an
equilibrium in the subgame following a first-period reserve price r1 = v.
Suppose that in the second auction, each participating bidder bids his valuation. The
reserve price r2 depends on the outcome of the first period and on whether the auctioneer
turns out to be credible. It is r2 = r1 = 0 with probability 1 − ρ; and r2 = β1(·|0)−1(p1),
the second-highest valuation revealed in the first period, with probability ρ.
If each bidder follows a first-period bidding strategy β1(v | 0), the expected payoff of a
bidder i with valuation vi who mimics a type v˜i > vi will be
Π[v˜i; vi] = F (v˜i)
N−1 vi −
∫ v˜i
0
β1(v | 0)(N − 1)F (v)N−2f(v) dv
+ (N − 1) [1− F (v˜i)] (1− ρ)F (vi)N−2 vi
− (N − 1) [1− F (v˜i)] (1− ρ)
∫ vi
0
v(N − 2)F (v)N−3f(v) dv.
The necessary first-order condition ∂Π
∂v˜i
[vi; vi] ≤ 0 yields the inequality
F (vi)
N−2 β1(vi | 0) ≥ (1− ρ)
∫ vi
0
v(N − 2)F (v)N−3f(v) dv + ρF (vi)N−2 vi.
Therefore, to avoid first-period deviations to mimicking a type v˜i > vi, the bidders must bid
more aggressively than in the case of perfect commitment.
If bidder i mimics a type v˜i < vi, his expected payoff will be
Π[v˜i; vi] = F (v˜i)
N−1 vi −
∫ v˜i
0
β1(v | 0)(N − 1)F (v)N−2f(v) dv
+ (N − 1) [1− F (v˜i)]F (vi)N−2 vi
− (N − 1) [1− F (v˜i)] (1− ρ)
∫ vi
0
v(N − 2)F (v)N−3f(v) dv
− (N − 1) [1− F (v˜i)] ρ
∫ vi
0
max{v, v˜i} (N − 2)F (v)N−3f(v) dv.
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The necessary first-order condition ∂Π
∂v˜i
[vi; vi] ≥ 0 yields the inequality
F (vi)
N−2 β1(vi, 0) ≤ (1− ρ)
∫ vi
0
v(N − 2)F (v)N−3f(v) dv + ρF (vi)N−2 vi
− ρ F (vi)N−2 1− F (vi)
f(vi)
.
Therefore, to avoid first-period deviations to mimicking a type v˜i > vi, the bidders must not
bid too aggressively.
Clearly, for any ρ > 0, the two necessary conditions cannot hold simultaneously. Hence,
as asserted, there cannot exist any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in increasing
first-period bidding strategies.
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B PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
It is straightforward to verify that the function β(ci) is a solution to the differential equation
that resulted from the necessary first-order condition. In addition, by using L’Hospital’s
rule, it is easy to check that
lim
ci→c¯
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
c
piNS(c¯ | c¯, c) f(c) dc,
as required by the boundary condition.
Since the equation that produced the strategy β(ci) was only a necessary condition, we
still need to establish that it is optimal for any bidder i with marginal cost ci to bid bi = β(ci),
if all other bidders follow this bidding strategy.
Suppose that firm i bids b˜i = β(c˜i), for c˜i ∈ [c, c¯] while having a marginal cost ci. Then,
by changing its bid marginally, that is, by mimicking a marginally different type, it can
change its expected payoff by
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = − d
dc˜i
{P[c2−i ≥ c˜i] β(c˜i) }
−
∫ c˜i
c
piNS(ci, c
1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c˜i)]N−3 f(c˜i)f(c1) dc1.
Substituting the expression (3.1) defining β(ci) results in
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c˜i
c
piNS(c˜i, c
1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c˜i)]N−3f(c˜i)f(c1) dc1
−
∫ c˜i
c
piNS(ci, c
1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c˜i)]N−3f(c˜i)f(c1) dc1.
Since the function piNS(ci, c
1) is decreasing in the marginal cost ci, the change in the firm’s
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expected payoff is
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci)

> 0, for c˜i < ci;
= 0, for c˜i = ci;
< 0, for c˜i > ci,
showing that the firm’s expected profit Π(c˜i | ci) attains its maximum at c˜i = ci.
To show that the strategy β(ci) is decreasing, we can calculate its derivative to be
dβ
dci
(ci) =
− d
dci
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
×
[
−v(ci) +
∫ c¯
ci
v(c2)
− d
dc2
P[c2−i ≥ c2]
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc2
]
,
where
vNS(c) =
∫ c
c
piNS(c, c1)
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1,
for c ∈ [ci, c¯], is the expected market profit of the strongest non-winning firm. Therefore, if
the function v(c) is decreasing, we can conclude that
dβ
dci
(ci) <
− d
dci
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
× [−v(ci) + v(ci) ] = 0,
as required for the strategy β(ci) to be decreasing.
By differentiating the function vNS(c), we get
dvNS
dc
(c) = piNS(c, c)
f(c)
F (c)
+
∫ c
c
piNS1 (c, c
1)
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1
−
∫ c
c
piNS(c, c1)
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1
f(c)
F (c)
,
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and, after integrating the last term by parts,
dvNS
dc
(c) =
∫ c
c
piNS1 (c, c
1)
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1 +
∫ c
c
piNS2 (c, c
1)
F (c1)
F (c)
dc1
f(c)
F (c)
.
Since the firms’ marginal costs are distributed in a logconcave manner, the expression
f(c)/F (c) is decreasing. Therefore,
dvNS
dc
(c) ≤
∫ c
c
[ piNS1 (c, c
1) + piNS2 (c, c
1) ]
f(c1)
F (c)
dc1,
and, since piNS1 + pi
NS
2 < 0, we conclude that
dvNS
dc
(c) < 0,
completing the argument.
Proof of Corollary 3.2:
Suppose that firm i has the lowest marginal cost among all firms, namely, ci ∈ [c, c¯]. Then, in
equilibrium, it will win one of the two licenses, at a price β(ci), for a market profit pi
NS(ci, c
1),
where c1 ≥ ci is the lowest competing marginal cost. Its overall payoff, therefore, will be
piNS(ci, c
1)− β(ci). Since the function piNS(ci, c1) is increasing in c1,
piNS(ci, c
1)− β(ci) ≥ piNS(ci, ci)− β(ci),
so, it suffices to show that
P[c2−i ≥ ci] {piNS(ci, ci)− β(ci)} ≥ 0.
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Notice that this last inequality is true for the boundary value ci = c¯. Furthermore,
d
dci
{P[c2−i ≥ ci] [piNS(ci, ci)− β(ci)] } =
− (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (ci)]N−3F (ci)f(ci) piNS(ci, ci)
+ { [1− F (ci)]N−1 + (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) } d
dci
[piNS(ci, ci)]
+
∫ ci
c
piNS(ci, c
1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (ci)]N−3 f(ci)f(c1) dc1.
By integrating the last term by parts, this derivative becomes
d
dci
{P[c2−i ≥ ci] [piNS(ci, ci)− β(ci)] } =
{ [1− F (ci)]N−1 + (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) } d
dci
[piNS(ci, ci)]
−
∫ ci
c
piNS2 (ci, c
1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (ci)]N−3 F (ci) f(c1) dc1.
Since both terms are negative, it follows that
d
dci
{P[c2−i ≥ ci] [piNS(ci, ci)− β(ci)] } ≤ 0,
proving firm i’s realized payoff to be always positive.
To show that the firm with the second-lowest marginal cost may win a license at a price
above its ex-post value, consider a firm with marginal cost ci = c¯. In equilibrium, such a
firm will bid
β(c¯) =
∫ c¯
c
piNS(c¯, c) f(c) dc,
the expected value of the license, given that N − 2 firms have marginal cost equal to c¯. If
the firm wins the license, then, in the market, it may face an opponent with marginal cost
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c. In this case, it will make a market profit piNS(c¯, c) ≤ piNS(c¯, c), for all c ∈ [c, c¯]. Therefore,
piNS(c¯, c) <
∫ c¯
c
piNS(c¯, c) f(c) dc,
for a negative overall profit.
Proof of Lemma 3.5:
The derivative of the function β2(ci|ci) with respect to the variable ci is equal to
d
dci
[ β2(ci|ci) ] =
∫ c¯
ci
−piNS1 (c, ci) w(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc,
where
w(c, ci) =
piNS2 (c, ci)
−piNS1 (c, ci)
− f(ci)/[1− F (ci)]
f(c)/[1− F (c)] .
The expression w(c, ci) is negative for c = ci, positive for c = c¯, continuous and increasing
with respect to c ∈ [ci, c¯]. Hence, there exists a value c∗ = c∗(ci) ∈ (ci, c¯) such that
w(c, ci)

< 0, for c ∈ [ci, c∗);
= 0, for c = c∗;
> 0, for c ∈ (c∗, c¯ ].
It follows that
d
dci
[ β2(ci|ci) ] < −piNS1 (c∗, ci)
∫ c¯
ci
w(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
and, since Assumption 3.4 implies that
∫ c¯
ci
w(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ≤ 0,
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we conclude that β2(ci|ci) is decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 3.6:
Suppose that all firms follow the bidding strategy (β1, β2) and consider firm i with marginal
cost ci ∈ [c, c¯]. The optimality of bidding β2(ci | c1) in the second auction, following the sale
of the first license at a price b1 = β1(c1), has been established in Lemma 3.3.1 Therefore, we
only need to examine the optimality of bidding β1(ci) in the first auction.
Obviously, firm i cannot gain from submitting a bid above β1(c) or below β1(c¯). So,
suppose that it mimics a type c˜i ∈ [c, c¯], that is, it bids β1(c˜i). If c˜i ≤ ci, then, by changing
its bid marginally, firm i will change its expected payoff by
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = piNS(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
− piNS(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
− β2(ci|c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
− d
dc˜i
{ [1− F (c˜i)]N−1 β1(c˜i) }.
Substituting the first-order condition (3.3) in the last term gives
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = piNS(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
− piNS(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
− β2(ci|c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
+ β2(c˜i|c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i).
1If the first license is sold at a price b1 > β1(c), an event outside the equilibrium path, we can assume that
the remaining firms attribute a marginal cost c1 = c to the winner of the license. Similarly, for b1 < β1(c¯),
we can assume that c1 = c¯.
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The difference between the last two terms equals to
β2(c˜i|c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−β2(ci|c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i) =∫ ci
c˜i
piNS(c2, c˜i) (N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2) dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
and, since piNS(ci, c
1) < piNS(c2, c1), for all c2 ∈ [c˜i, ci], to
β2(c˜i, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−β2(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i) >
− piNS(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
+ piNS(ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i).
Hence, we can conclude that
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) ≥ 0,
with equality only when c˜i = ci.
Similarly, if firm i mimics a marginal cost c˜i ≥ ci, then, by changing its bid marginally,
it will change its expected payoff by
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = − β2(c˜i, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
− d
dc˜i
{ [1− F (c˜i)]N−1 β1(c˜i) }.
After substituting the second term, we get
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) ≤ 0,
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with equality only when c˜i = ci.
We have therefore shown that the derivative of the firm’s expected profit is
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci)

> 0, for c˜i < ci;
= 0, for c˜i = ci;
< 0, for c˜i > ci,
as required for the firm’s expected profit Π(c˜i | ci) to attain its maximum at c˜i = ci.
To show that the bidding strategy β1(ci) is strictly decreasing, notice that
dβ1
dci
(ci) =
(N − 1)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ×
[
β2(ci | ci) +
∫ c¯
ci
β2(c2 | c2)(N − 1)[1− F (c
2)]N−2f(c2)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2
]
.
Since Assumption 3.4 implies that β2(ci | ci) is decreasing in ci, we can conclude that
dβ
dci
(ci) <
(N − 1)f(ci)
1− F (ci) × [−β
2(ci | ci) + β2(ci | ci) ] = 0,
as required for the bidding strategy β1 to be strictly decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 3.10:
First, notice that by rearranging the terms of the equation (3.6), in the proof of Proposition
3.9, we get
[1− F (ci)]N−1 [ β1(ci)− β(ci) ] =
(N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) ×
[
β(ci)−
∫ ci
c
β2(ci|c1) f(c
1)
F (ci)
dc1
]
.
Therefore, for the entire result, it suffices to show that β1(ci) > β(ci).
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Using the equations (3.1) and (3.4), defining respectively the strategies β(ci) and β
1(ci),
we can show, by means of a direct calculation, that β1(ci) > β(ci) if and only if
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
piNS(c2, c1)
(N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1 >
∫ ci
c
∫ c¯
ci
piNS(c2, c1)
(N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
(N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
2 dc1.
That is, we shall show that
Ec1−i,c2−i [ pi
NS(c2, c1) | c2−i ≥ c1−i ≥ ci ] > Ec1−i,c2−i [ piNS(c2, c1) | c2−i ≥ ci ≥ c1−i ].
Since the market profit function piNS(c2, c1) is increasing in c1, we have
Ec1−i,c2−i [ pi
NS(c2−i, c
1
−i) | c2−i ≥ c1−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec2−i [Ec1−i [pi
NS(c2−i, c
1
−i) | c1−i ∈ [ci, c2−i] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
> Ec2−i [Ec1−i [pi
NS(c2−i, ci) | c1−i ∈ [ci, c2−i] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec2−i [ pi
NS(c2−i, ci) | c2−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec2−i [Ec1−i [pi
NS(c2−i, ci) | c1−i ∈ [c, ci] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
> Ec2−i [Ec1−i [pi
NS(c2−i, c
1
−i) | c1−i ∈ [c, ci] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec1−i,c2−i [ pi
NS(c2−i, c
1
−i) | c2−i ≥ ci ≥ c1−i ],
as required for the result.
102
Proof of Proposition 3.12:
It is straightforward to verify that the function β(ci) is a solution to the differential equation
(3.7) that resulted from the necessary first-order condition. In addition, by using L’Hospital’s
rule, it is easy to check that
lim
ci→c¯
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
c
pi(c¯ | c¯, c) f(c) dc,
as required by the boundary condition.
Since the equation (3.7) was only a necessary condition, we still need to establish that it
is optimal for any bidder i with marginal cost ci to bid bi = β(ci), if all other bidders follow
this bidding strategy.
Suppose that firm i bids b˜i = β(c˜i), for c˜i ∈ [c, c¯] while having a marginal cost ci.2 Then,
by changing its bid marginally, that is, by mimicking a marginally different type, it can
change its expected payoff by
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = − d
dc˜i
{P[c2−i ≥ c˜i] β(c˜i) }
−
∫ c˜i
c
pi(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c˜i)]N−3 f(c˜i)f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c˜i
c
pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c˜i)]N−2 f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
c˜i
pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1) [1− F (c1)]N−2 f(c1) dc1.
Substituting the definition (3.8) of the strategy β(ci) and gathering the corresponding terms
together result in
2If a license is sold at a price b > β(c), an event outside the equilibrium path, we can assume that the
remaining firms attribute a marginal cost c = c to the winner of that license. Similarly, for b < β(c¯), we can
assume that c = c¯. In either case, no firm can profit from mimicking a type c˜i 6∈ [c, c¯].
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∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c˜i
c
[pi(c˜i | c˜i, c1)− pi(ci | c˜i, c1)] (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c˜i)]N−3f(c˜i)f(c1) dc1
−
∫ c˜i
c
[pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1)− pi2(ci | c˜i, c1)] (N − 1) [1− F (c˜i)]N−2 f(c1) dc1
−
∫ c¯
c˜i
[pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1)− pi2(ci | c˜i, c1)] (N − 1) [1− F (c1)]N−2 f(c1) dc1.
Since the functions pi(ci | c˜i, c1) and −pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) are decreasing in ci, the change in the
firm’s expected profit is
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci)

> 0, for c˜i < ci;
= 0, for c˜i = ci;
< 0, for c˜i > ci,
showing that the firm’s expected profit Π(c˜i | ci) attains its maximum at c˜i = ci.
To show that the strategy β(ci) is decreasing, we can calculate its derivative to be
dβ
dci
(ci) =
− d
dci
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
×
[
−v(ci) +
∫ c¯
ci
v(c2)
− d
dc2
P[c2−i ≥ c2]
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc2
]
,
where
v(ci) =
∫ ci
c
pi(ci | ci, c1) × f(c
1)
F (c1)
dc1
+
∫ ci
c
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
]
× f(c
1)
F (c1)
dc1
+
∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
1.
Therefore, if the function v(ci) is decreasing, we can conclude that
dβ
dci
(ci) <
− d
dci
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
× [−v(ci) + v(ci) ] = 0.
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For the monotonicity of the function v(ci), it suffices to show that each of the three terms
in its definition is decreasing. We demonstrate the result for the third term only, since the
argument for the first two integrals is similar.
By rewriting this term as
∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) [1− F (ci)]
2
(N − 2)F (ci)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1,
we can calculate its derivative to be
d
dci
{∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
1
}
=
pi2(ci | ci, ci) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
+
∫ c¯
ci
d
dci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) [1− F (ci)]
2
(N − 2)F (ci)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1
+
∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)F (ci)
]
× (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1.
By integrating the last term by parts, we get
d
dci
{∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
1
}
=
∫ c¯
ci
d
dci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) [1− F (ci)]
2
(N − 2)F (ci)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1
+
∫ c¯
ci
d
dc1
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)F (ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−1
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1,
and, since the assumption of the decreasing inverse hazard ratio 1−F (ci)
f(ci)
implies that the term
[1− F (ci)]2
(N − 1)(N − 2)F (ci)f(ci) =
[1− F (ci)]
(N − 1)F (ci)
[1− F (ci)]
(N − 2)f(ci)
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is also decreasing, we can drop a negative term from the first integral, so as to get
d
dci
{∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
1
}
≤
∫ c¯
ci
d
dci
[−pi2(ci | ci, c1) ] [1− F (ci)]
2
(N − 2)F (ci)f(ci) ×
[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1
+
∫ c¯
ci
d
dc1
[−pi2(ci | ci, c1) ] 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)F (ci) ×
[1− F (c1)]N−1
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1.
Using again the assumption of the decreasing inverse hazard rate,
d
dci
{∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
1
}
≤
∫ c¯
ci
d
dci
[−pi2(ci | ci, c1) ] 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)F (ci) ×
[1− F (c1)]N−1
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1
+
∫ c¯
ci
d
dc1
[−pi2(ci | ci, c1) ] 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)F (ci) ×
[1− F (c1)]N−1
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1.
Finally, since
d
dci
[−pi2(ci | ci, c1) ] + d
dc1
[−pi2(ci | ci, c1) ] =
− [ pi21(ci | ci, c1) + pi22(ci | ci, c1) + pi23(ci | ci, c1) ] < 0,
for all marginal costs ci ∈ [c, c¯] and all c1 ∈ [ci, c¯], we conclude that the derivative is negative.
The argument establishing that the stronger of the two oligopolists always makes a pos-
itive profit, unlike the weaker oligopolist who may regret his participation to the market, is
identical to that in the proof of Corollary 3.2, with pi(ci | ci, c1) in place of piNS(ci, c1). It is
therefore omitted.
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Proof of Lemma 3.10:
For arbitrary c1 ∈ [c, c¯], suppose that all firms follow the bidding strategy β2( . | c1) and
consider firm i with marginal cost ci ∈ [c1, c¯]. Obviously, firm i cannot profit by bidding
above β2(c1 | c1) or below β2(c¯ | c1).3 So, suppose that firm i mimics a type c˜i ∈ [c1, c¯], that
is, it bids β2(c˜i | c1). Then its expected payoff will be
Π(c˜i | ci) = [1− F˜ (c˜i)]N−2 [ pi(ci | c˜i, c1)− β2(c˜i|c1) ].
By changing its bid marginally, firm i will change its expected payoff by
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = − pi(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 2)[1− F˜ (c˜i)]N−3f˜(c˜i)
+ pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) [1− F˜ (c˜i)]N−2
− ∂
∂c˜i
{ [1− F˜ (c˜i)]N−2 β2(c˜i | c1) }.
By calculating the derivative in the last term, we get
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = [ pi(c˜i | c˜i, c1)− pi(ci | c˜i, c1) ] (N − 2)[1− F˜ (c˜i)]N−3f˜(c˜i)
+ [ pi2(ci | c˜i, c1)− pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1) ] [1− F˜ (c˜i)]N−2.
Since both the profit function pi(ci | c˜i, c1) and the derivative −pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) are decreasing in
ci, it follows that
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci)

> 0, for c˜i < ci;
= 0, for c˜i = ci;
< 0, for c˜i > ci,
as required for the optimality of bidding β2(ci | c1).
3If the license is sold at a price b2 > β2(c1|c1), an event outside the equilibrium path, we can assume that
the remaining firms, in particular, the competing oligopolist, will attribute a marginal cost c2 = c1 to the
winner of the license. Similarly, for b2 < β2(c¯|c1), we can assume that c2 = c¯.
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In addition, when firm i has marginal cost ci ∈ [c, c1], the previous analysis shows that
Π1(c˜i | ci) < 0, for all c˜i ∈ [c1, c¯]. Hence, firm i is best-off bidding β2(c1 | c1).
Finally, for the monotonicity of the strategy β2(ci | c1), notice that, since the inverse
hazard rate [1− F (c)]/f(c) is decreasing, the expression
v(c | c, c1) = pi(c | c, c1) − pi2(c | c, c1) 1− F (c)
(N − 2)f(c)
is decreasing in c. Therefore, the derivative
∂β2
∂ci
(ci |c1) = − v(ci | ci, c1) (N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci)
+
∫ c¯
ci
v(c | c, c1) (N − 2)[1− F (c)]
N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ×
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci)
is negative, showing that the strategy β2(c1 | c1) is strictly decreasing in ci ∈ (c1, c¯ ].
Proof of Lemma 3.15:
The derivative of β2(ci | ci) equals to
d
dci
[ β2(ci | ci) ] = −v(ci, ci) (N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ,
+
∫ c¯
ci
v2(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
+
∫ c¯
ci
v(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ×
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ,
or, after integrating the last term by parts, to
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ddci
[ β2(ci | ci) ] =
∫ c¯
ci
v2(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
+
∫ c¯
ci
v1(c, ci)
[1− F (c)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ×
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) .
For all ci ∈ [c, c¯], since the inverse hazard ratio [1− F (c)]/f(c) is decreasing, we have
d
dci
[ β2(ci | ci) ] <
∫ c¯
ci
v2(c | ci) (N − 2)[1− F (c)]
N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
+
∫ c¯
ci
v˜1(c | ci) [1− F (c)]
N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
(N − 2)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ,
where
v˜1(ci | c1) = dpi
dci
(ci | ci, c1)− dpi2
dci
(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 2)f(ci) .
Since the expression
w(c, ci) =
v2(c | ci)
−v˜1(c | ci) −
f(ci)/[1− F (ci)]
f(c)/[1− F (c)]
=
1
2
− f(ci)/[1− F (ci)]
f(c)/[1− F (c)]
is negative for c = ci, positive for c = c¯, continuous and increasing with respect to c ∈ [ci, c¯],
there exists a value c∗ = c∗(ci) ∈ (ci, c¯) such that
w(c, ci)

< 0, for c ∈ [ci, c∗);
= 0, for c = c∗;
> 0, for c ∈ (c∗, c¯ ].
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Therefore, since the function −v˜1(c, c1) is decreasing in c ∈ [ci, c¯] and positive, we have
d
dci
[ β2(ci | ci) ] <
∫ c∗
ci
−v˜1(c | ci) w(c, ci) (N − 2)[1− F (c)]
N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
+
∫ c¯
c∗
−v˜1(c | ci) w(c, ci) (N − 2)[1− F (c)]
N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
< −v˜1(c∗ | ci)
∫ c¯
ci
w(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
Finally, Assumption 3.14 implies that
∫ c¯
ci
w(c, ci)
(N − 2)[1− F (c)]N−3f(c)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ≤ 0,
which suffices for β2(ci|ci) to be decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 3.16:
Suppose that all firms follow the bidding strategy (β1, β2) and consider firm i with
marginal cost ci ∈ [c, c¯]. The optimality of bidding β2(ci | c1) in the second auction, following
the sale of the first license at a price b1 corresponding to a marginal cost c1 = (β1)−1(b1),
has been established in Lemma 3.13.4 Therefore, we only need to examine the optimality of
bidding β1(ci) in the first auction.
Obviously, firm i cannot gain from submitting a bid above β1(c) or below β1(c¯). So,
suppose that it mimics a type c˜i ∈ [c, c¯], that is, it bids β1(c˜i). If c˜i ≤ ci, then, by changing
its bid marginally, firm i will change its expected payoff by
4In case the first license is sold at a price b1 > β1(c), an event outside the equilibrium path, we can
assume that the remaining firms attribute a marginal cost c1 = c to the winner of the license. Similarly, for
b1 < β1(c¯), we can assume that c1 = c¯.
110
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = pi(ci | ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
− pi(ci | c˜i, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1,
− β2(ci | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
− d
dc˜i
{ [1− F (c˜i)]N−1 β1(c˜i) }.
After substituting the appropriate expression for the last term, the change in the expected
payoff of firm i becomes
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = pi(ci | ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
− pi(ci | c˜i, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
− β2(ci | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
+ β2(c˜i | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i).
The difference between the last two terms equals to
β2(c˜i | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−β2(ci | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i) =∫ ci
c˜i
pi(c2 | c2, c˜i) (N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2) dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
+
∫ ci
c˜i
−pi2(c2 | c2, c˜i) [1− F (c2)]N−2 dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i).
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Since pi(ci | c˜i, c1) is decreasing in ci, we have
β2(c˜i | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−β2(ci | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i) >∫ ci
c˜i
pi(ci | c2, c˜i) (N − 2)[1− F (c2)]N−3f(c2) dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
+
∫ ci
c˜i
−pi2(c2 | c2, c˜i) [1− F (c2)]N−2 dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
and, by integrating the first term by parts,
β2(c˜i | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
−β2(ci | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i) >
pi(ci | c˜i, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
− pi(ci | ci, c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2f(c˜i)
−
∫ ci
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c2, c˜i) [1− F (c2)]N−2 dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
+
∫ ci
c˜i
−pi2(c2 | c2, c˜i) [1− F (c2)]N−2 dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i).
Hence, we get
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) ≥ −
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
−
∫ ci
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c2, c˜i) [1− F (c2)]N−2 dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
+
∫ ci
c˜i
−pi2(c2 | c2, c˜i) [1− F (c2)]N−2 dc2 (N − 1)f(c˜i)
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and, since the derivative −pi2(ci | c˜i, , c1) is decreasing in ci, we can conclude that
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) ≥ 0,
with equality only when c˜i = ci.
Similarly, if firm i mimics a marginal cost c˜i ≥ ci, then, by changing its bid marginally,
it will change its expected payoff by
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = −
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1,
− β2(c˜i | c˜i) (N − 1)[1− F (c˜i)]N−2f(c˜i)
− d
dc˜i
{ [1− F (c˜i)]N−1 β1(c˜i) }.
By substituting the appropriate expression for the last term, we get
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = −
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
+
∫ c¯
c˜i
−pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1,
which implies that
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) ≤ 0,
with equality only when c˜i = ci.
We have therefore shown that the derivative of the firm’s expected profit is
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci)

> 0, for c˜i < ci;
= 0, for c˜i = ci;
< 0, for c˜i > ci,
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as required for the firm’s expected profit Π(c˜i | ci) to attain its maximum at c˜i = ci.
Finally, to show that the bidding strategy β1(ci) is strictly decreasing, notice that we
can write its derivative as
dβ1
dci
(ci) =
(N − 1)f(ci)
1− F (ci) ×
[
−v1(ci) +
∫ c¯
ci
v1(c2)
(N − 1)[1− F (c2)]N−2f(c2)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2
]
,
where
v1(ci) = β
2(ci | ci)
+
∫ c¯
ci
[
−pi2(ci | ci, c1) 1− F (ci)
(N − 1)f(ci)
]
× (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
1.
Because of Assumption 3.14, the term β2(ci | ci) is decreasing in ci. In addition, by an
argument similar to the one used for the corresponding term in d
dci
β(ci), we can show that
the second term is also decreasing in ci. Therefore, the function v
1 is decreasing.
It follows that
dβ
dci
(ci) <
(N − 1)f(ci)
1− F (ci) × [−v(ci) + v(ci) ] = 0,
as required for the bidding strategy β1 to be strictly decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 3.18:
First, notice that by rearranging the terms of the equation (3.6), relating the bidding strate-
gies β(ci), β
1(ci) and β
2(ci | c1) in the proof of Proposition 3.9, we get
[1− F (ci)]N−1 [ β1(ci)− β(ci) ] =
(N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci)
[
β(ci)−
∫ ci
c
β2(ci | c1) f(c
1)
F (ci)
dc1
]
.
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Therefore, for the entire result, it suffices to show that β1(ci) > β(ci).
Using the equations (3.8) and (3.9) defining the strategies β(ci) and β
1(ci), we can show,
by means of a direct calculation, that β1(ci) > β(ci) if and only if
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
v(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1 +
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c1
ci
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1 >
∫ ci
c
∫ c¯
ci
v(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
(N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
2 dc1,
where
v(c2 | c2, c1) = pi(c2 | c2, c1) − pi2(c2 | c2, c1) 1− F (c
2)
(n− 2)f(c2) .
Since the second double integral is positive, it suffices to show that
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
v(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1 >
∫ ci
c
∫ c¯
ci
v(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
(N − 1)[1− F (ci)]N−2F (ci) dc
2 dc1,
that is, to show that
Ec1−i,c2−i [ v(c
2
−i | c2−i, c1−i) | c2−i ≥ c1−i ≥ ci ] > Ec1−i,c2−i [ v(c2−i | c2−i, c1−i) | c2−i ≥ ci ≥ c1−i ].
Since the function v(c2 | c2, c1) is increasing in c1, we have
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Ec1−i,c2−i [ v(c
2
−i | c2−i, c1−i) | c2−i ≥ c1−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec2−i [Ec1−i [v(c
2
−i | c2−i, c1−i) | c1−i ∈ [ci, c2−i] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
> Ec2−i [Ec1−i [v(c
2
−i | c2−i, ci) | c1−i ∈ [ci, c2−i] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec2−i [ v(c
2
−i | c2−i, ci) | c2−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec2−i [Ec1−i [v(c
2
−i | c2−i, ci) | c1−i ∈ [c, ci] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
> Ec2−i [Ec1−i [v(c
2
−i | c2−i, c1−i) | c1−i ∈ [c, ci] ] | c2−i ≥ ci ]
= Ec1−i,c2−i [ v(c
2
−i | c2−i, c1−i) | c2−i ≥ ci ≥ c1−i ],
as required for the result.
Proof of Proposition 3.19:
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 3.12, notice that the strategy β(ci) can be expressed as
β(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
u(c2 | c2) (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c
2)]N−3 F (c2) f(c2)
P[c2−i ≥ ci]
dc2,
where
u(c˜ | c) =
∫ c˜
c
pi(c | c˜, c1) × f(c
1)
F (c˜)
dc1
−
∫ c˜
c
[
pi2(c | c˜, c1) 1− F (c˜)
(N − 2)f(c˜)
]
× f(c
1)
F (c˜)
dc1
−
∫ c¯
c
[
pi2(c | c˜, c1) 1− F (c˜)
(N − 2)f(c˜)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (c˜)]N−2F (c˜) dc
1,
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for c˜, c ∈ [c, c¯]. In particular, u(c) = u(c | c) is the valuation of a firm with marginal cost c,
assuming that its market opponent is stronger.
Therefore, we have
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) = (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c˜i)]N−3 F (c˜i) f(c˜i) [u(c˜i | c˜i)− u(c˜i | ci) ]
and
∂2Π
∂c˜i∂ci
(c˜i | ci) = − (N − 1)(N − 2) [1− F (c˜i)]N−3 F (c˜i) f(c˜i) u2(c˜i|ci).
Hence, if we can show that
u2(c˜i | ci) > 0,
then, since ∂Π
∂c˜i
(ci | ci) = 0, we can conclude that
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci)

> 0, for c˜i < ci;
= 0, for c˜i = ci;
< 0, for c˜i > ci,
as it suffices for firm i’s expected profit function Π(c˜i|ci) to attain its maximum at c˜i = ci.
Notice that
u2(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c˜i
c
pi1(ci | c˜i, c1) × f(c
1)
F (c˜i)
dc1
−
∫ c˜i
c
[
pi21(ci | c˜i, c1) 1− F (c˜i)
(N − 2)f(c˜i)
]
× f(c
1)
F (c˜i)
dc1
−
∫ c¯
ci
[
pi21(ci | c˜i, c1) 1− F (c˜i)
(N − 2)f(c˜i)
]
× [1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (c˜i)]N−2F (c˜i) dc
1.
Therefore, if N is sufficiently large, then the positive term dominates the negative ones,
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so that u2(c˜i | ci) > 0. Moreover, it is possible to find N∗ such that for N > N∗ we have
u2(c˜i | ci) > 0, for all c˜i, ci ∈ [c, c¯], uniformly.
The rest of the proof is identical to that of Proposition 3.12, so, it is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.20:
Suppose, contrary to our assertion, that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in monotone
bidding strategies (β1, β2). Since β1 is strictly decreasing, the announcement of the first-
round winning bid reveals the marginal cost c1 of the strongest oligopolist. Therefore, in the
second round, the firms update their beliefs, so that, for all c ∈ [c1, c¯],
ci ∼ F˜ (c) = F (c)− F (c
1)
1− F (c1) .
If the number of firms participating in the second auction, N − 1, is sufficiently large, so
as to satisfy the inequality
pi2(c, c)
pi12(c, c)
>
[1− F (c)]
(N − 2) f(c) ,
for all c ∈ [c, c¯], then, as shown in Das Varma [23], the strategy
β2(ci |c1) =
∫ c¯
ci
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
2
+
∫ c¯
ci
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) [1− F (c
2)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc
2,
for ci ≥ c1, forms the unique equilibrium in the auction of the second license. In particular,
for a marginal cost ci < c
1, firm i bids b2 = β2(c1 |c1).
By assuming, as we did in the case of the Cournot oligopoly, that, for all ci ∈ [c, c¯],
∫ c¯
ci
[1− F (c)]N−2
[1− F (ci)]N−2 dc ≥ supc≥ci
{
v2(c, ci)
−v˜1(c, ci)
}
1− F (ci)
(N − 2) f(ci) ,
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where
v˜1(c, c
1) =
d
dc
[pi(c | c, c1)] − d
dc
[pi2(c | c, c1)] 1− F (c)
(N − 2) f(c) ,
we can ensure that the strategy β2(ci|ci) is decreasing in the marginal cost ci.
In the first auction, the optimization of the profit function Π(c˜i|ci) of a firm i with
marginal cost ci results in the strategy
β1(ci) =
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
pi(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)(N − 2)[1− F (c
2)]N−3f(c2)f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c¯
c1
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
2)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1
+
∫ c¯
ci
∫ c1
ci
−pi2(c2 | c2, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c
1)]N−2f(c1)
[1− F (ci)]N−1 dc
2 dc1 ,
as the unique solution of the differential equation derived from the necessary first-order
condition Π1(ci | ci) = 0.
To check sufficiency, we can calculate, for c˜i ≥ ci,
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) =
∫ c¯
c˜i
pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1
−
∫ c¯
c˜i
pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1) (N − 1)[1− F (c1)]N−2f(c1) dc1.
Since pi2(ci | c˜i, c1) > pi2(c˜i | c˜i, c1), for c˜i ≥ ci, we conclude that
∂Π
∂c˜i
(c˜i | ci) > 0,
showing that the firm’s deviation from β1(ci) to β
1(c˜i), for c˜i > ci, is profitable. Hence, the
strategy β1(ci) fails to support an equilibrium.
Since the strategy β1 was the unique solution to the necessary condition, we conclude
that the sequential auction has no equilibrium in strictly monotone strategies.
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C PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
Suppose that all buyers follow the bidding strategy β(·), with their participation in the
auction determined by the threshold value v∗. Consider buyer i with valuation vi ∈ [v, v¯].
First, for vi ≥ v∗, suppose that buyer i submits a bid b˜i = β(v˜i), for some v˜i ∈ [v∗, v¯]
such that v˜i 6= vi. Then his expected payoff is
Π(v˜i | vi) = P[v2−i ≤ v˜i] [ vi − β(v˜i) ] − c,
or, after substituting equation (4.2) defining the strategy β(·), integrating by parts the re-
sulting expression, and applying equation (4.1) defining the threshold v∗,
Π(v˜i | vi) = P[v2−i ≤ v˜i] ( vi − v˜i ) +
∫ v˜i
v∗
P[v2−i ≤ v] dv.
Hence, buyer i’s expected profit from this deviation is
Π(v˜i | vi)− Π(vi | vi) = P[v2−i ≤ v˜i] ( vi − v˜i ) +
∫ v˜i
vi
P[v2−i ≤ v] dv.
For either v˜i > vi or v˜i < vi, we have
Π(v˜i | vi)− Π(vi | vi) ≤ P[v2−i ≤ v˜i] ( vi − v˜i ) + P[v2−i ≤ v˜i] ( v˜i − vi ) ≤ 0,
showing that the deviation to bidding b˜i = β(v˜i) is not profitable.
If buyer i abstains from the auction, his payoff will be
0 = Π(v∗ | v∗) ≤ Π(v∗ | vi) ≤ Π(vi | vi),
the first inequality following from the monotonicity of Π(v˜i | vi) in the buyer’s type vi, the
second inequality from the argument used above. Therefore, buyer i is better-off participating
in the auction and bidding bi = β(vi).
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Finally, for vi < v
∗, suppose that buyer i participates to the auction by submitting a bid
b˜i = β(v˜i), for some v˜i ∈ [v∗, v¯]. Then
Π(v˜i | vi) ≤ Π(v˜i | v∗) ≤ Π(v∗ | v∗) = 0,
so that buyer i is better-off abstaining from the auction.
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Suppose that all buyers follow the bidding strategy (β1, β2), with their participation in the
auction being determined by the threshold values v∗1, v
∗
2 and v˜
∗
2.
First, it is easy to check that the strategy β1 is strictly increasing in [v∗1, v¯]. Therefore,
the first-period price b1 ∈ [0, β1(v¯)]∪{a} reveals an upper bound v1 for the valuations of the
remaining buyers, as described in equation (4.3).
In the second period, an argument similar to the one in Samuelson [86] shows that
the strategy profile b2i = β
2(vi | v1), for all i, along with the participation rule defined by the
thresholds v∗1, v
∗
2 and v˜
∗
2, defines a symmetric equilibrium for the continuation game following
any first-period outcome described by the price b1 ∈ R+ ∪ {a}.
In particular, for any v1 ∈ [v∗1, v¯], the function y(v | v1) = F (v | v1)Mv, for v ∈ [v, v1],
whereM = N−2 orM = N−1, is strictly increasing, continuous, and takes values in [0, v1].
Since v1 ≥ v∗1 ≥ c, there exists a unique value v∗2 = v∗2(v1) ∈ [v, v1] such that y(v∗2 | v1) = c.
Therefore, on the equilibrium path, the buyers’ second-period participation decision, given
by the equations (4.4) and (4.6), is well defined.
Similarly, the function y˜(v | v1) = F (v | v1)N−2 [v − β2(min{v, v1} | v1)], for v ∈ [v, v¯] and
v1 ∈ [v∗1, v¯1], is strictly increasing, continuous, and takes values in [0, v¯ − β2(v1 | v1)]. Since
v1 ≤ v¯1, it follows that v¯ − β2(v1 | v1) ≥ c. Hence, there exists a unique value v˜∗2 ∈ [v, v¯]
such that y˜(v˜∗2 | v1) = c. Therefore, off the equilibrium path, the buyers’ second-period
participation decision, given by the equation (4.9), is well defined.
In the first period, the type v∗1 is indifferent between participating in the first round with
a minimal bid β1(v∗1) = 0 and waiting for the second round in order to decide, after observing
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the outcome b1, whether to participate in the auction. Equating the two expected payoffs
results in
(N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1)] v∗1
− [1− F (vˆ1)N−1] c
− (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2
∫ v¯
vˆ1
β2(v∗1 | v1) f(v1) dv1
+ F (v∗1)
N−1 β2(v∗1 | a) = 0,
which, since β2(v∗1 | v1) = 0, for all v1 ∈ [vˆ1, v¯], reduces to equation (4.10).
To show existence and uniqueness of the value v∗1, we proceed to defining the function
φ : [v, v¯] → R as the difference in the v-type’s payoff between entering in the first round
and waiting for the second round to decide whether to participate to the auction, under the
assumption that the first-round participation threshold is v.
First, for v ∈ [v, v¯], we define the upper bound vˆ1(v) ∈ [v, v¯] by

F [v | vˆ1(v)]N−2 v = c, if v ∈ [v, vˇ1];
vˆ1(v) = v¯, if v ∈ [vˇ1, v¯],
(C.1)
where vˇ1 is given by
F (vˇ1)
N−2vˇ1 = c.
For v ∈ [v, vˇ1], the value vˆ1(v) corresponds to the first-round winning bid b1 = β1(vˆ1(v))
that would make the v-type indifferent between entering the auction in the second round (to
compete against N−2 potential buyers) and abstaining from the entire procedure, under the
assumption that the first-round participation threshold is v. For v ∈ [vˇ1, v¯], the value vˆ1(v)
corresponds to the winning bids b1 = β1(vˆ1(v)) for which the v-type prefers abstaining from
the entire procedure to entering the auction in the second round, again under the assumption
that the first-round participation threshold is v.
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Given the upper bound vˆ1(v), we define the function φ : [v, v¯]→ R by
φ(v) = (N − 1)F (v)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1(v))] v − [1− F (vˆ1(v))N−1] c + F (v)N−1 β2(v | a),
or, after using equation (4.5), defining β2(v | a),
φ(v) = (N − 1)F (v)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1(v))] v
− [1− F (vˆ1(v))N−1] c
+
∫ v
v∗2(a)
v (N − 1)F (v)N−2f(v) dv,
with the threshold v∗2(a) being defined by equation (4.4) as a function of the value v. Clearly,
for all v ∈ [vˇ1, v¯], the function reduces to φ(v) = F (v)N−1 β2(v | a).
Since the function φ is continuous in [v, v¯] and takes values φ(v) < 0 and φ(vˇ1) > 0, by
the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a value v∗1 ∈ (v, vˇ1) such that φ(v∗1) = 0, as
required for equation (4.10) to have a solution.
In addition, for v ∈ [v, vˇ1], the derivative of φ(v) is
dφ
dv
(v) = (N − 1)(N − 2)F (v)N−3 [1− F (vˆ1(v))] f(v) v
+ (N − 1)F (v)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1(v))]
+ (N − 1)F (v)N−2 f(v) v
+ (N − 1) [F (v)N−2v − F (vˆ1(v))N−2c ] f(vˆ1(v)) dvˆ1
dv
(v) c
− (N − 1)F (v∗2(a))N−2 f(v∗2(a)) v∗2(a)
dv∗2(a)
dv
(v).
Equation (C.1) implies that
F (v)N−2 v = F (vˆ1(v))N−2 c,
so that we can eliminate the fourth term.
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In addition, differentiating both sides of the equation (4.4), which defines the threshold
v∗2(a) as a function of v, results in
(N − 1)F (v∗2(a))N−2 f(v∗2(a)) v∗2(a)
dv∗2(a)
dv
(v) = − F (v∗2(a))N−1
dv∗2(a)
dv
(v)
+ (N − 1)F (v)N−2 f(v) c.
Therefore,
dφ
dv
(v) = (N − 1)(N − 2)F (v)N−3 [1− F (vˆ1(v))] f(v) v
+ (N − 1)F (v)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1(v))]
+ (N − 1)F (v)N−2 f(v) (v − c)
+ F (v∗2(a))
N−1 dv
∗
2(a)
dv
(v).
It follows that dφ
dv
(v) > 0, so that the function φ(v) is strictly increasing in [v, vˇ1]. Therefore,
the value v∗1 ∈ [v, vˇ1] satisfying equation (4.10) is unique. In addition, for all v ∈ [vˇ1, v¯],
φ(v) > 0. Hence, the value v∗1 is the unique root of φ(v), for all v ∈ [v, v¯].
Having shown that the threshold v∗1 is well defined, we now examine the optimality of
the bidding strategy β1 for the bidders that participate in the first round.
If buyer i has a valuation vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯], then his expected payoff from bidding b˜1i = β1(v˜i)
in the first round, for any v˜i ≥ vi, and following the strategy β2 truthfully in the second
round will be
Π(v˜i | vi) = {F (v˜i)N−1 + (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 [1− F (v˜i)]} vi − c
− F (v˜i)N−1 β1(v˜i)
−
∫ v¯
v˜i
β2(vi | v1) (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 f(v1) dv1.
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Similarly, his expected payoff from bidding b˜1i = β
1(v˜i), for any v˜i ≤ vi, will be
Π(v˜i | vi) = {F (v˜i)N−1 + (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 [1− F (v˜i)]} vi − c
− F (v˜i)N−1 β1(v˜i)
−
∫ v¯
vi
β2(vi | v1) (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 f(v1) dv1
−
∫ vi
v˜i
β2(v1 | v1) (N − 1)F (v1)N−2 f(v1) dv1.
In either case, the necessary first-order condition, Π1(vi | vi) = 0, results in the differential
equation
d
dvi
{F (vi)N−1 β1(vi) } = (N − 1)F (v1)N−2 f(v1) β2(vi | vi), (C.2)
which, solved along with the boundary condition β1(v∗1) = 0, gives the bidding strategy β
1
that has been described in equation (4.11).
For sufficiency, first consider the case of v˜i ∈ [vi, v¯]. After differentiating with respect to
the mimicked type v˜i and substituting, first, the necessary first-order condition (C.2) for the
term d
dv˜i
{F (v˜i)N−1 β1(v˜i)} and, second, the definition (4.8) for β2(vi | v1), we get
Π1(v˜i | vi) = (N − 1) [F (v˜i)N−2 − F (vi)N−2] f(v˜i) vi
− (N − 1) f(v˜i)
∫ v˜i
vi
v (N − 2)F (v)N−3 f(v) dv
< (N − 1) [F (v˜i)N−2 − F (vi)N−2] f(v˜i) vi
− (N − 1) f(v˜i) vi
∫ v˜i
vi
(N − 2)F (v)N−3 f(v) dv
= 0,
so that a first-round deviation to bidding b˜1i = β
1(v˜i), for v˜i ≥ vi, is non-profitable.
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Now, consider the case of v˜i ∈ [v∗1, vi]. After differentiating with respect to the mimicked
type v˜i and substituting the necessary first-order condition (C.2), we get
Π1(v˜i | vi) = 0,
so that buyer i cannot profit from submitting a lower bid in the first round.
To complete the argument, we need to show that it is optimal for any buyer i with type
vi to participate in the first round, for vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯], and to abstain from the first round, for
vi ∈ [v, v∗1), that is,
Π(a | vi)

≤ Π(vi | vi), for vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯] ;
≥ Π(v˜i | vi), for vi ∈ [v, v∗1), v˜i ∈ [v∗1, v¯].
We have shown that Π(vi | vi) = Π(v∗1 | vi), for vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯]. In addition, by replicating
the argument that was used to rule out a first-round deviation to overbidding, it is easy to
show that Π(v˜i | vi) ≤ Π(v∗1 | vi), for vi ∈ [v, v∗1) and v˜i ∈ [v∗1, v¯]. Therefore, our task reduces
to showing that
Π(a | vi)

≤ Π(v∗1 | vi), for vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯] ;
≥ Π(v∗1 | vi), for vi ∈ [v, v∗1).
Since, by the definition of v∗1,
Π(v∗1 | v∗1)− Π(a | v∗1) = 0,
it suffices to show that, for all vi ∈ [v, v¯],
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} ≥ 0.
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First, consider the case of vi ∈ [v∗1, v¯]. Then
Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi) = (N − 1)F (vi)N−2[1− F (vˆ1(vi))] vi
− [1− F (vˆ1(vi))N−1] c
+ F (v∗1)
N−1 β2(v∗1 | a)
−
∫ v¯
vˆ1(vi)
β2(vi | v1) (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 f(v1) dv1.
Differentiating with respect to bidder i’s type vi results in, after canceling the opposite-sign
terms,
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} = (N − 1) f(vˆ1(vi))
dvˆ1
dvi
(vi) [F (vˆ1(vi))
N−2c − F (vi)N−2vi]
+ (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 [ 1 − F (vˆ1(vi)) ]
+ (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 f(vˆ1(vi)) β2(vi | vˆ1(vi)) dvˆ1
dvi
(vi)
By using the equation (C.1) defining the cut-off value vˆ1(vi), we can eliminate the first term,
so as to get
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} = (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 [ 1 − F (vˆ1(vi)) ]
+ (N − 1)F (vi)N−2 f(vˆ1(vi)) β2(vi | vˆ1(vi)) dvˆ1
dvi
(vi)
which is positive, showing that buyer i’s deviation to abstaining is non-profitable.
If buyer i has a valuation vi ∈ [v, v∗1), then, because of the different forms that the
payoff functions Π(v∗1| vi) and Π(a| vi) take, we need to consider three sub-cases, namely,
vi ∈ [v, v∗2(v∗1)), vi ∈ [v∗2(v∗1), v∗2(a)) and vi ∈ [v∗2(a), v∗1).
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When vi ∈ [v∗2(a), v∗1), bidder i’s benefit from submitting a bid β1(v∗1) = 0 is
Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi) = {F (v∗1)N−1 − F (vi)N−1 + (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1)] } vi
− [1− F (vˆ1(vi))N−1] c + F (vi)N−1 β2(vi | a)
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ1(vi)
(N − 1)F (v∗2(v1))N−2 f(v1) dv1 vi.
After differentiating with respect to bidder i’s type vi, using the identity v
∗
2(vˆ1(vi)) = vi,
eliminating the opposite-sign terms and applying the equation (C.1) defining vˆ1, we get
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} = F (v∗1)N−1 − F (vi)N−1
+ (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2 [1− F (vˆ1)]
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ1(vi)
(N − 1)F (v∗2(v1))N−2 f(v1) dv1.
Therefore,
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} ≥ 0,
showing that it is not profitable for a buyer with type vi ∈ [v∗2(a), v∗1) to deviate into partic-
ipating to the first round of the auction.
When vi ∈ [v∗2(v∗1), v∗2(a)), bidder i’s benefit from submitting a bid β1(v∗1) = 0 is
Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi) = {F (v∗1)N−1 + (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2 [1− F (v∗1)] } vi
− [1− F (vˆ1(vi))N−1 + F (v∗1)N−1] c
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ1(vi)
(N − 1)F (v∗2(v1))N−2 f(v1) dv1 vi.
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Arguing exactly as in the case of vi ∈ [v∗2(a), v∗1), we can calculate
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} = F (v∗1)N−1 + (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2 [1− F (v∗1)]
+
∫ vˆ1
vˆ1(vi)
(N − 1)F (v∗2(v1))N−2 f(v1) dv1,
which is positive, so that it is not profitable for buyer i, with type vi ∈ [v∗2(v∗1), v∗2(a)] to
participate to the auction.
Finally, when vi ∈ [v, v∗2(v∗1)), we have
Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi) = {F (v∗1)N−1 + (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2[1− F (vˆ1)] } vi − c
+
∫ vˆ1
v∗1
(N − 1)F (v∗2(v1))N−2 f(v1) dv1 vi,
so that
d
dvi
{Π(v∗1 | vi)− Π(a | vi)} = F (v∗1)N−1 + (N − 1)F (v∗1)N−2[1− F (vˆ1)]
+
∫ vˆ1
v∗1
(N − 1)F (v∗2(v1))N−2 f(v1) dv1,
which is positive, completing the argument.
Computer Code for Revenue Comparisons:
This is the source code used for the revenue comparison between the simultaneous and the
sequential auctions. It runs on Mathematica, a quite common scientific calculation software;
in particular, for this paper, it was ran on Mathematica, version 5.2.
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Clear@n, s, c, v, w, w1, tD;
Needs@"Miscellaneous`RealOnly "`D
n = 4;
s = 0.01;
ψ@v_, c_D := vn + Hn − 1L vn−1 H1 − vL − c;
u1@v_, c_D := i
k
jjj
vn−1cccccccccc
y
{
zzz
1cccccccn−2
;
φ@v_, c_D :=
Hn − 1L vn−1 H1 − Min@1, u1@v, cDDL + n − 1cccccccccccn  v
n−1 Hv − cL − H1 − Min@1, u1@v, cDn−1DL c;
ThrSim@c_D := NSolve@ψ@w, cD m 0, wD;
ThrSqc@c_D := NSolve@φ@w1, cD m 0, w1D;
w@c_D := w ê. ThrSim@cD@@n − 1DD;
w1@c_D := w1 ê. ThrSqc@cD@@1DD;
Rsim@w_D := 2 Hn − 2Lccccccccccccccccccccn + 1 − n Hn − 2L w
n−1 + 2 Hn − 1L Hn − 2L wn − n Hn − 1L Hn − 2Lccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccn + 1  w
n+1;
Rsqc@w1_, c_D := 2 Hn − 2Lccccccccccccccccccccn + 1 −
Hn − 1L2ccccccccccccccccccccn Hn + 1L  w1
n+1 − Hn − 2L w1n − n − 1cccccccccccn  w1
n c + n w1n−1 −
1cccccccccccn − 1  w1
n−1 c + Hn − 1L w1 c − n c − n Hn − 2Lccccccccccccccccccccn − 1  w1
Hn−1L2cccccccccccccccn−2  c− 1cccccccn−2 + n Hn − 1Lccccccccccccccccccccn + 1  w1
Hn+1L Hn−1Lcccccccccccccccccccccn  c n+1cccccccn −
Hn − 1L2 Hn − 2Lcccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccn Hn − 2L + Hn − 1L  w1
n Hn−2L+Hn−1Lcccccccccccccccccccccccccccn−1  c ncccccccn−1 + Hn − 1L
2 Hn − 2Lcccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccn Hn − 2L + Hn − 1L  w1
n Hn−2L+Hn−1Lcccccccccccccccccccccccccccn−2  c− 1cccccccn−2 ;
Rev@m_D := TableA8s ∗t, w@s∗tD, w1@s∗tD, Rsim@w@s∗tDD,
Rsqc@w1@s ∗tD, s∗ tD, Rsqc@w1@s∗tD, s∗ tD − Rsim@w@s∗tDD <, 9t, 1, 1ccccs − 1=E;
R@m_D := JoinA990, 0, 0, NA 2 Hm − 2Lccccccccccccccccccccm + 1 E, NA
2 Hm − 2Lccccccccccccccccccccm + 1 E, 0==, Rev@mD, 881, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0<<E;
Rev = R@nD
RsimGraph = ListPlot@Rev@@All, 81, 4<DD, AspectRatio → 1 ê1,
PlotStyle → 8RGBColor@1, 0, 0D<, PlotJoined → True, AxesLabel → 8"c", "Rsim"<D
RsqcGraph = ListPlot@Rev@@All, 81, 5<DD, AspectRatio → 1ê1,
PlotStyle → 8RGBColor@0, 0, 1D<, PlotJoined → True, AxesLabel → 8"c", "Rsqc"<D
Show@RsqcGraph, RsimGraph, AxesLabel → 8"c", "Revenue"<D
RdiffGraph = ListPlot@Rev@@All, 81, 6<DD, AspectRatio → 1ê1,
PlotStyle → 8RGBColor@0, 1, 0D<, PlotJoined → True, AxesLabel → 8"c", "Rsqc−Rsim"<D
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Prior to running this code, one should specify the number of buyers, n ≥ 3, and the step
size for the iteration, s ∈ { 1
k
: k ∈ N}. Subsequently, Mathematica will compute for all values
c = s*t, where t = 0, 1, 2, ..., k, the thresholds w and w1, respectively for the simultaneous
and the first round of the sequential auction, the expected seller revenues5 Rsim and Rsqc
and their difference Rdiff = Rsqc-Rsim. In fact, the output takes the form of a (k+1)× 5
matrix, consisting of row vectors (c, w, w1, Rsim, Rsqc, Rdiff ). Finally, the graphs of the
revenues Rsim and Rsqc and of their difference Rdiff will be plotted, as functions of the
cost c. Clearly, smaller values for the step of iteration s correspond to smoother graphs.
The graph of the difference in the expected seller revenue, Rsqc-Rsim, in the case of a
convex or a concave power distribution, shown in Figure 4.4, was produced in a similar man-
ner. However, one must adjust the way in which the root w or w1 is picked by the program.
In the case of the convex distribution F (v) = v2, this is done by replacing the commands
w[c_]:=w\.ThrSim[c][[2(n-1)]]
w1[c_]:=w1\.ThrSim[c][[1]]
In the case of the concave distribution F (v) = v1/2, one should also alter the way in which
the root w1[c_] is calculated. The new commands are
w[c_]:=w\.ThrSim[c][[2]]
ThrSqc[c_]:=FindRoot[\[Phi][w1,c]==0,{w1,0.5,0,1}];
w1[c_]:=w1\.ThrSim[c][[1]]
The rest of the source code is identical to the one used in the uniform case (apart for the
obvious adjustments for the threshold and the payoff functions) and is therefore omitted.
5Notice that this computation presupposes knowledge of the expected seller revenue as a function of the
number of buyers n, the cost c, and the appropriate threshold. In an alternative manner, one could compute
the two expected prices by integrating numerically the bidding functions, over the region of participation,
with respect to the distribution of the first- and second-order statistics.
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